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ARTICLES
STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS
Daniel B. Kelly*
The conventionalproblem with externalities is well known: Partiesoften
generate harm as an unintended byproduct of using theirproperty. This Article examines situations in which parties may generate harm purposely, in
order to extract payments in exchange for desisting. Such "strategic spillovers" have received relatively little attention, but the problem is a perennial
one. From the "livery stable scam" in Chicago to "pollution entrepreneurs" in
China, parties may engage in externality-generatingactivities they otherwise
would not have undertaken, or increase the level of harm given that they are
engaging in such activities, to profit through bargainingor subsidies. This
Article investigates the costs of strategicspillovers, the circumstances in which
threatening to engage in these spillovers may be credible, and potential solutions for eliminating, or at least mitigating, this form of opportunism
through externalities.
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INTRODUCTION

Just over fifty years ago, Ronald Coase, writing in the Journal of Law
& Economics, published The Problem of Social Cost.' Coase's article revolu3
tionized legal scholarship,2 profoundly influenced economic thinking,
1. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
Coase, Social Cost].
2. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 751, 767 tbl.1 (1996) (ranking The Problem of Social Cost as most-cited law review article
in Social Sciences Citation Index from 1956 through May 1995, with nearly double
citations of nearest competitor).
3. In 1991 Coase received the Nobel Prize in Economics "for his discovery and
clarification of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional
structure and functioning of the economy." The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991, Nobelprize.org, http://nobelprize.org/
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and was responsible, in no small part, for launching the field of law and
economics. 4 In his seminal article, Coase focused on social costs, that is,
the harmful effects that individuals and firms may impose on others
through the use and enjoyment of their property rights.5 Since then,
scholars have written countless articles, essays, and books addressing
these harmful effects, so-called "negative externalities," and proposing a
number of mechanisms for resolving externalities in a variety of
contexts.

6

nobel-prizes/economics/laureates/1991/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Oct. 19, 2011).
4. See Francesco Parisi, Coase Theorem and Transaction Cost Economics in the Law,
in The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics 7, 14 (Jfirgen G. Backhuas ed., 2d ed.
2005) ("Coase's article, discussing widely cherished themes in the legal and economic
traditions, constitutes, according to many commentators, the first example of an economic
analysis of law in North American literature."); Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History
of Law and Economics: 1739-2003, in The Origins of Law and Economics: Essays by the
Founding Fathers 3, 15 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) (noting Coase
launched law and economics research program with this article).
5. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 1-2 ("This paper is concerned with those
actions of business firms which have harmful effects on others.").
6. Economists define the term "externality" in various ways. Compare R.H. Coase, The
Firm, the Market, and the Law 24 (1988) [hereinafter Coase, The Firm] (defining
externality as "effect of one person's decision on someone who is not a party to that
decision"), with Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev.
(Papers & Proc.) 347, 348 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Property Rights] (defining
externality as effect that party does not have incentive to internalize). Pigou provided
much of the seminal work on externalities in the first half of the twentieth century. See,
e.g., A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 172-203 (4th ed. 1932) (describing situations
in which "private net product" of incremental change in resource input differs from "social
net product" and discussing means to mitigate this divergence); A.C. Pigou, Wealth and
Welfare 148-71 (1912) (discussing divergence between private net product and social net
product). According to Coase, though, the term itself "appears to have been coined by
[Paul] Samuelson in the 1950s." Coase, The Firm, supra, at 23. For a recent analysis and
synthesis of the economic approach to external effects, see Steven Shavell, Foundations of
Economic Analysis of Law 77-109 (2004) [hereinafter Shavell, Foundations]. For a
historical overview of the concept of externality, see Andreas A. Papandreou, Externality
and Institutions 13-68 (1994) ("There is one persistent problem reiterated throughout the
history of the notion of externality, and that is the sense that no good characterization of
externality exists."). Richard Posner has noted the term "externality" is "useful, but
potentially misleading" for two reasons: (1) "there is no presumption in economic theory"
that one party rather than another is causing or "should be made to bear" the social costs
of an activity; and (2) "if transaction costs are low the market may operate efficiently
despite the apparent presence of externalities." Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 90 (8th ed. 2011) [hereinafter Posner, Economic Analysis]; see also Coase, Social
Cost, supra note 1, at 2 (characterizing problem as being of "reciprocal nature"); Demsetz,
Property Rights, supra, at 348 ("What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an
externality is that the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of
the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile .... ."). This Article uses the terms
"external effect," "spillover," and "externality" interchangeably and assumes that an activity
that involves an external effect is an "externality" even if the nature of the effect depends
upon the initial definition of property rights and even if the parties can bargain to resolve
the effect.
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The classic problem with negative externalities is thus well known.
For example, in deciding whether to build a subdivision, a developer will
consider his or her own costs but may disregard certain social costs such
as increased congestion on nearby streets or additional runoff on adjacent parcels. Similarly, in deciding whether to operate a factory, a firm
will calculate its own costs but may ignore certain harms to others like
external health risks arising from elevated concentrations of particulate
matter. The primary reason these harms are socially problematic is
straightforward: A party may have an incentive to engage in an activity if
the activity's private benefits exceed its private costs even though, as a
result of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its social costs exceed its social benefits.
But activities that entail negative externalities can be problematic for
another reason as well: Namely, individuals and firms may purposely seek
to generate harm in their use of property to extract payments from victims in exchange for desisting. Indeed, an individual or firm may engage
or threaten to engage in an activity that harms others even though the
activity's private costs exceed the activity's private benefits. Or an individual or firm may continue imposing harm or increase the magnitude of
harm it is imposing even though it otherwise might have an incentive to
prevent the harm or reduce its magnitude. That is, despite the fact that,
in the absence of the externality, a party may not have any reason to undertake an activity or to continue generating harm, the party might do so
in an attempt to profit by imposing social costs on others. Thus, externalities, properly understood, are not only an unintended byproduct of otherwise self-serving activities; parties also can employ externalities oppor'' 7
tunistically as a type of extortion, the problem of "strategic spillovers.
7. As discussed below, see infra Part II.A.1, Coase himself acknowledges in The Problem
of Social Cost that parties might threaten to impose harm on others to improve their
bargaining positions. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 7-8 (describing how cattleraiser or farmer might act strategically to induce a larger payment in subsequent
bargaining). In the wake of Coase, a handful of economists also pointed out that firms may
have an incentive to generate externalities if they could exact bribes in exchange for
refraining or desisting. See, e.g., E.J. Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An
Interpretative Essay, 9J. Econ. Literature 1, 24 (1971) [hereinafter Mishan, Postwar] ("If
institutional innovations over time cause transactions costs to decline . . . , there would
be ... a temptation for enterprising firms, and others in a position to do so, to produce
unnecessary pollution in order to extract greater tribute from the public."); Jerome
Rothenberg, The Economics of Congestion and Pollution: An Integrated View, 60 Am.
Econ. Rev. 114, 115 (1970) ("[Ilf external diseconomies against others can be expected to
lead to bribes by victims to desist, then the production of negative externalities becomes a
valid by-product of primary production."); Donald C. Shoup, Comment, Theoretical
Efficiency in Pollution Control, 9 W. Econ. J. 310, 310-11 (1971) (noting "pollution
entrepreneur" will have incentive to threaten to pollute if "expected value of bribes
received for not polluting exceeds the cost of making the threats"). Two economists,
George Daly andJ. Fred Giertz, also criticized the "Coase-inspired" literature for failing to
perceive that "if bargaining is possible there is no a priori reason for ignoring the existence
and consequences of externally harmful activities which fail to yield direct private benefits
but can yield profitable side payments." George Daly & J. Fred Giertz, Externalities,
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Consider an example from the City of Chicago. In the nineteenth
century, a series of disputes arose regarding the location of livery stables.
These stables provided horse owners with a place to board their animals,
but they also generated a number of unpleasant side effects-noise, light,
congestion, and, of course, the smell of manure. 8 Under Illinois state law,
the determination of whether any particular stable constituted a nuisance
was made only after the stable was operational. 9 A proposal to build a
stable could therefore jeopardize the property values, as well as the quiet
enjoyment, of nearby residents. 10 Recognizing an opportunity, a number
of crafty Chicagoans "developed a regular practice of buying vacant lots
in residential subdivisions, threatening to build a stable, and then extorting a steep price from the neighbors to be bought out."'1 The prac12
tice was widespread and became known as the "livery stable scam."
This type of opportunism was limited neither to livery stables nor to
the Windy City. With San Francisco's rapid growth in the 1840s and
1850s, many land uses, including "[s]laughterhouses, chandleries, soap
and acid factories, charcoal burners, and other petty manufacturers
whose trades had offensive side effects," imposed significant social costs
on city residents. 13 Affluent residents sometimes offered to buy neighboring parcels to avoid these costs: "When J. Wieland proposed to put a
brewery at the comer of Folsom and Second, in an aristocratic area, the
'indignant' residents 'authorized fellow resident Milton S. Latham [a lawyer and politician] .. .to wait upon [Mr. Wieland] and make an offer of
Extortion, and Efficiency, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 997, 998 (1975) [hereinafter Daly & Giertz,
Externalities].
8. See Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of "Nature's Metropolis": The
Historical Context of Illinois' Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 527, 569
(1992) ("Livery stables produced certain externalities ....In addition to the accumulation
of horse manure, the stables typically brought noise and lights late in the evening and early
in the morning and created the nineteenth century equivalent of what we would call traffic
and parking problems." (citing Oehler v. Levy, 139 Ill. App. 294 (1907))). Livery
employees, known as "hostlers," also had a less than stellar reputation. See Clay McShane &
Joel A. Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth Century 119 (2007)
(describing how "hostlers had a reputation for gambling and drinking" and "[s] tables were
often the sites of illegal cockfights and of neighborhood fistfights").
9. See Bosselman, supra note 8, at 569 ("Typically, Illinois courts said that a stable was
not a nuisance per se so they would not enjoin its construction but would wait until the
stable was built and in operation before determining whether it turned out to be a
nuisance ...." (citing Sheldon v. Weeks, 51 111. App. 314, 315 (1893))).
10. See id. at 569-70 ("[Tihe threat to build a livery stable in a residential
neighborhood foreshadowed a substantial period of insecurity for the residents followed by
no assurance of a satisfactory remedy.").
11. Id. at 570.
12. Id. (citing Andrew L. King, Law and Land Use in Chicago 245-48 (1986)). The
harmful effects arising from stables created conflicts in other cities as well. See, e.g.,
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 174 (1915) (upholding municipal ordinance
prohibiting livery stables in Little Rock and discussing odors and disease emanating from
stables).
13. Roger W. Lotchin, San Francisco, 1846-1856: From Hamlet to City 11 (Illini
Books 1997) (1974).
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purchase for the property."' 14 And, as in Chicago, some of these transactions involved extortionate motives; according to one San Francisco newspaper, "a speculator had purchased a lot in a respectable section for the
full well
purpose of establishing a house of prostitution on it, knowing
15
that the residents would buy him out at an inflated price.'
These historical examples involving livery stables in Chicago and
breweries and bordellos in San Francisco merely illustrate a more widespread problem that continues to this day. For example, the United
Nations recently alleged that several Chinese factories are purposely generating excessive amounts of HFC-23, a potent greenhouse gas, to profit
from carbon credits. 16 Under the Kyoto Protocol, firms in industrialized
nations are permitted to pay factories in China and other developing nations to reduce their emission of greenhouse gases such as HFC-23. 17 The
problem is that the value of the credits the factories can obtain by creating and then incinerating HFC-23, $300,000 per ton, is considerably
higher than the cost of manufacturing and destroying HFC-23, $5,000 per
ton. Thus, there is a perverse incentive for "pollution entrepreneurs," including a number of factories in China, to manufacture goods in which
HFC-23 is a byproduct and then extract a payment by selling carbon credits. 1 8 In 2010, after reviewing "evidence that manufacturers of HFC-23 are
gaming the system for profit by intentionally producing HFC-23 ...at
higher rates and quantities than necessary," the United Nations halted
the issuance of credits for five Chinese projects and launched "a comprehensive investigation to ensure the projects do not result in fake emissions offsets." 19 Generating excessive pollution to "cash in" on carbon
14. Id. at 12.
15. Id.
16. See Press Release, Envtl. Investigation Agency, UN CDM Acts to Halt Flow of
Millions of Suspect HFC-23 Carbon Credits (Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter UN CDM], http:/
/www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/un-cdm-acts-to-halt-flow-of-millions-of-suspect-hfc-23carbon-credits-101162889.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Mark
Roberts, of the Environmental Investigation Agency, as stating "The evidence is
overwhelming that manufacturers [in China] are creating excess HFC-23 simply to destroy
it and earn carbon credits"); see also Climate Change/ETS: Member States Agree to Boost
Carbon Market Security, Eur. Energy, Feb. 9, 2011 ("Chinese manufacturers of refrigerant
gases earned billions of dollars by agreeing to destroy the HFC-23 emitted by their
production processes. According to some NGOs, certain firms are taking advantage of this
windfall and producing HFC-23 solely to obtain credits .. ").
17. See Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note, Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, 37 I.L.M. 22, 26-27 (1998)
(discussing Clean Development Mechanism aspect of Kyoto Protocol).
18. Shoup, supra note 7, at 310-11; see also John Heilprin, UN Carbon Trading
Scheme: $2.7 Billion Market Could Be 'Biggest

Environmental Scandal in History,'

Huffington Post, (Aug. 21, 2010, 12:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/
23/un-carbon-trading-scheme- n_690958.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing UN investigation into "perverse financial incentives" of Chinese chemical
plants).
19. UN CDM, supra note 16.
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credits exemplifies the problem of strategic spillovers in the twenty-first
20
century.
This Article attempts to provide the first comprehensive analysis of
"strategic spillovers" by exploring the structure of strategic spillovers, the
ubiquity of strategic spillovers, the harm of strategic spillovers, potential
solutions for strategic spillovers, and several variations of strategic
spillovers.
Part I distinguishes between conventional externalities and strategic
spillovers. For conventional externalities, an individual or firm is usually
concerned only with the costs and benefits that it will itself internalize.
Thus, under traditional assumptions, a negative externality is of zero value
to the party generating the externality. By contrast, this Article contends
that, in certain circumstances, a negative externality may have a positive
value to an individual or firm, for the individual or firm might be able to
extract a payment in exchange for ceasing its activity. Because of this positive value, a party may have an incentive to behave opportunistically and
consider the externality in deciding whether or not to engage in the activity or continue the activity. After discussing the differences between selfinterested and opportunistic behavior, the Article illustrates the distinction between conventional externalities and strategic spillovers with a numerical example involving pollution.
Part II suggests that strategic spillovers are ubiquitous by exploring
examples in several areas of the law. In property law, strategic spillovers
arise in situations involving nuisance, coming to the nuisance, spite
fences and skyscrapers, and conservation easements and open spaces. In
environmental law, this Article investigates "pollution entrepreneurs" and
their emergence in the multi-billion dollar market for carbon credits. In
intellectual property law, cybersquatters, the subject of federal legislation,
and patent trolls and patent thickets, which can impede innovation and
growth, are also types of strategic spillovers. In addition, this Article analyzes greenmail, as well as the strategic use of shareholder initiatives and
cumulative voting, in corporate law; "milker bills," legislative threats, and
other forms of rent extraction in legislation and regulation; and negative
expected value suits and objector blackmail in litigation and settlement.
Part III discusses the social costs of strategic spillovers. Parties often
bargain to resolve externalities, so threatening to engage in strategic spillovers may reduce social welfare as parties incur transaction costs to prevent external harm without engaging in any productive activity. Moreover, opportunistic parties may unnecessarily invest time and resources
engaging in externality-generating activities, or in the steps antecedent to
such activities, if doing so is necessary to establish the credibility of their
threats. In addition, even if it is infeasible to negotiate with potential vic20. See Steven Stoft, Carbonomics: How to Fix the Climate and Charge It to OPEC
212 (2008) (discussing rumors that certain Chinese chemical plants may have been
constructed "mainly to cash in on carbon credits").
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tims ex ante, strategic parties may make suboptimal decisions if they anticipate that victims might be willing to bargain ex post. And potential victims, knowing parties may engage in strategic spillovers, may have an
incentive to undertake various types of wasteful precautions.
Part IV investigates potential solutions for strategic spillovers. To prevent the social harm that strategic spillovers may entail, it is necessary to
1
identify opportunistic behavior and devise mechanisms for deterring it.2
However, it is usually difficult to determine whether a party engaging in
an activity is doing so despite the harm, or because of the harm, it is imposing on others. And, unfortunately, many of the traditional mechanisms
for resolving conventional externalities are ineffective for deterring strategic spillovers.
Notably, attempting to resolve strategic spillovers through bargaining leads to perverse outcomes, even if bargaining is frictionless. Bargaining enables opportunistic parties to extract payments from potential victims, so bargaining may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the problem.
Similarly, public subsidies-payments by the government to reduce expected social harm-may result in perverse outcomes as well. Such payments provide a financial incentive for parties to create harm, thereby
encouraging opportunistic behavior. Regulatory prohibitions are also
problematic. Prohibiting all possibly troublesome instances of an
externality-generating activity may eliminate not only strategic spillovers
but also certain socially desirable activities that entail nonopportunistic
externalities.
If bargaining and subsidies allow too many externality-generating activities and prohibitions enable too few externality-generating activities,
two alternatives are liability rules or corrective taxes. These alternatives
would force opportunistic parties to pay victims (in the case of liability
rules) or the government (in the case of corrective taxes) for the harm or
expected harm of their externality-generating activities. If forced to internalize this harm, opportunistic parties would not have any incentive to
extract payments, and self-interested parties would engage in externalitygenerating activities if and only if the activities are socially desirable. However, one problem with liability rules or corrective taxes is that these
mechanisms involve litigation or administrative costs and, to separate strategic spillovers from other externalities, courts or agencies would have to
impose liability or levy a tax on each party engaging in an externalitygenerating activity. As a result, relying on liability rules or corrective taxes
has the potential to increase litigation or administrative costs significantly. Another problem is that liability rules and corrective taxes create
informational problems for courts and agencies and, if a court or agency
does not set liability equal to damages or a tax equal to expected harm,
21. This Article uses the terms "strategic" and "opportunistic" interchangeably. Below,
the Article defines opportunism more precisely and distinguishes opportunism from mere
self-interest. See infra Part LB (noting conceptual ambiguities surrounding opportunism
and discussing link between self-interest and strategic spillovers).
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liability rules or corrective taxes might deter socially desirable activities or
encourage additional types of opportunism.
Because the traditional mechanisms for resolving conventional externalities are imperfect, this Article also explores several alternative approaches for targeting strategic spillovers. These approaches include increasing financial disclosures, adjusting the alienability of entitlements,
relying on equity to detect opportunism, and incorporating a doctrine of
abuse of right. 2 2 This Article also suggests the problem of strategic spillovers could be worse (and might be worse going forward), if not for
several nonlegal limitations-transaction costs, reputation effects, and social norms-all of which may reduce the opportunity for opportunism.
Thus, even if the legal system has largely ignored the possibility of strategic spillovers in the past, it may be necessary to differentiate between selfinterest and opportunism and reduce the potential for strategic spillovers
in the future.
Part V discusses how strategic spillovers may involve positive, as well as
negative, externalities. The classic problem with positive externalities, like
the classic problem with negative externalities, is well known: A party may
not have an incentive to engage in an activity if the activity's private costs
exceed its private benefits, even though the activity is desirable because
its social benefits exceed its social costs. But positive externalities may
create another problem as well: Certain parties may purposely withhold
benefits they otherwise would generate in using their property to extract
payments or subsidies in exchange for commencing their activities. And
parties who opportunistically withhold external benefits may be just as
prevalent as parties who opportunistically impose external costs. The existence of such strategic spillovers, whether positive or negative, suggests
that certain externalities previously deemed "irrelevant" actually may be
relevant.
The Article concludes with a summary of the main points.
I.

THE STRUCTURE OF STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS

A. Conventional Externalities Versus Strategic Spillovers
For conventional externalities, self-interested individuals and profitmaximizing firms use their property for various purposes, and, in doing
so, these individuals and firms may impose external effects on others.
That is, a party may undertake an activity that has not only private benefits and costs, which directly affect the party engaging in the activity, but
also social effects, which affect the welfare of other parties. 23 If these so22. Because strategic spillovers are often difficult to detect and involve harm that is
purposely imposed, this Article also notes the possibility of utilizing supracompensatory
remedies such as punitive damages or criminal sanctions to deter opportunism. See infra
note 246.
23. See supra note 6 (surveying definitions of "externality" and competing
conceptions of its usage).
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cial effects are beneficial, the activity entails positive externalities; if these
24
social effects are harmful, the activity entails negative externalities.
The primary focus of this Article is on negative externalities. 25 A textbook example is the "exhaust from automobiles [which] is a negative ex'2 6
ternality because it creates smog that other people have to breathe.
Drivers of automobiles will focus on the private benefits and costs of driving but may ignore the harm that driving imposes on others who wish to
27
breathe clean air. Another classic example is pollution from a factory.
In deciding whether to open a factory or increase production, a firm will
compare its private benefits and costs but may ignore the social costs of
pollution on local residents, other countries, or future generations.
A negative externality may be associated with an activity that is socially
undesirable-thesocial costs of the activity outweigh its social benefits-or
socially desirable-the social benefits of the activity outweigh its social
costs. 28 For example, a factory that emits pollution as a byproduct of manufacturing cars may be engaging in an activity that, from a social perspec24. On externalities, both positive and negative, see generally J.J. Laffont,
Externalities, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics 192, 192 (Steven N. Durlauf
& Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (describing traditional theory of externalities).
25. For a discussion of positive externalities and the opportunistic withholding of
social benefits, see infra Part V.
26. N. Gregory Mankiw, Essentials of Economics 204 (5th ed. 2008).
27. See WilliamJ. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, Economics, Environmental Policy, and
the Quality of Life 75-79 (1979); see also Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental
Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495, 1497 n.5 (1999) (describing "environmental pollution
as an uninternalized externality").
28. The criterion this Article employs for evaluating an activity, a public policy, or a
legal rule is based on social welfare. This Article, therefore, adopts many of the standard
assumptions of welfare economics, in which "social welfare is assumed to be a function of
individuals' well-being, that is, of their utilities." Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 2.
An activity that deviates from the socially optimal outcome involves a "deadweight loss," to
which this Article will refer occasionally as a "social loss," "social waste," or "misallocation
of resources." A reduction in deadweight losses may be possible if parties incur transaction
costs, construed either as the costs of bargaining or, more broadly, as the costs of
establishing and enforcing property rights, see Douglas W. Allen, Transaction Costs, in 1
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 893, 893-926 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De
Geest eds., 2000) (discussing two meanings of transaction costs), but incurring transaction
costs reduces social welfare as well. The social objective is thus to minimize the sum of
transaction costs and deadweight losses. Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale
L.J. 1315, 1326 (1993) ("Different land regimes . . .involve different combinations of
transaction costs and deadweight losses. A change in land rules is efficient when it reduces
the sum of these two sorts of costs."). As discussed below, strategic spillovers can increase
transaction costs or deadweight losses or both and, as a result, may prevent parties from
achieving the socially optimal outcome. See infra Part III (describing mechanisms by which
strategic spillovers create suboptimal outcomes, including transaction costs, informational
signaling costs, and precaution costs). However, strategic spillovers are also troublesome
from a fairness or rights-based perspective. If it is problematic to grant a firm the "right" to
pollute when the firm is generating pollution as an incidental byproduct of producing
food, cars, or other "goods," then it seems even more objectionable to permit a firm to
pollute when it is purposely producing pollution to harm others in order to extract a
payment.
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five, is either undesirable or desirable. Operating the factory may be socially undesirable, even if the firm has a private incentive to operate the
factory, if the social costs of operating the factory, including the external
costs of the pollution, exceed the social benefits of manufacturing the
cars. By contrast, operating the factory may be socially desirable, despite the
external costs of the pollution, if the social benefits of manufacturing the
cars exceed the social costs of operating the factory, including the exter29
nal costs of the pollution.
The conventional view of externalities, whether associated with socially undesirable or desirable activities, is that externalities arise as the
unintended byproduct of otherwise self-serving activities. 30 Under this view,
in deciding whether to undertake an externality-generating activity, the
party creating the externality may have no reason, at least in the absence
of legal liability or some other mechanism that forces the party to "internalize" the externality, to consider the harm it is imposing on others.A'
Because a party is only concerned with the costs and benefits it will itself
internalize, a negative externality, it has been assumed, does not have any
value to the party generating the externality and, therefore, does not
32
have any effect on the party's decisionmaking process.
29. Cf. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Authority, 14 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 23,
29 (1996) ("[T]he economics of pollution control demonstrate that it would be
undesirable to prevent all externalities because many externalities are the result of socially
desirable economic activity." (citingJames M. Buchanan & Craig Stubblebine, Externality,
29 Economica 371 (1962))).
30. See, e.g., E.J. Mishan & Euston Quah, Cost-Benefit Analysis 99 (5th ed. 2007)
(defining external effect as "a direct effect on another's profit or welfare arising as an
incidentalby-product of some other person's or firm's legitimate activity" (emphasis added));
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 716 n.2 (1996) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Property
Rules] ("By harmful externalities, we mean adverse outcomes that occur as a yproduct of
an injurer's activity

. . . ." (emphasis added));

Robert N.

Stavins, Environmental

Economics, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, supra note 24, at 882
(defining externality as "an unintended consequence of market decisions which affect
individuals other than the decision maker" (emphasis added)).
31. The usual assumption is that, in the absence of liability, regulation, taxation, or
some other mechanism that causes a party to internalize a negative externality, external
costs will not affect a party's incentive to engage in the action. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 645 (7th ed. 2009) (noting party "has no incentive
to account for the external costs that it imposes" on others). Similarly, the usual
assumption is that, in the absence of a subsidy or other mechanism that allows a party to
internalize a positive externality, external benefits will not affect a party's incentive to
engage in the action. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107
Colum. L. Rev. 257, 259 & n.2 (2007) ("'[T]he only motive that an individual has to
provide units of such a good is his or her own private motive of present or future
consumption. Enjoyment of those units by others is an incidental by-product.'" (quoting
Richard Comes & Todd Sandier, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club
Goods 55 (1996))).
32. See Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 6, at 90 (explaining concept of
negative externality and concluding that, "unless forced by law to do so or unless it is the
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By contrast, for strategic spillovers, a self-interested individual or
profit-maximizing firm may purposely seek to generate harm in the use of
property to extract payments or other benefits from victims in exchange
for desisting. In these circumstances, the negative externality may have a
positive value for the individual or firm engaging in the activity. Thus, in
deciding whether to undertake an externality-generating activity, whether
to continue an activity that is imposing external harm, or whether to increase, rather than prevent or reduce, external costs from an existing activity, an individual or firm may have an incentive to consider not only the
costs and benefits it will itself internalize but also the positive value of the
negative externality. Such a party may engage in a strategic spillover if the
expected benefits- of doing so, including any benefits derived from payments by victims or subsidies from the government, exceed the costs of
engaging or threatening to engage in the externality-generating
33
activity.
Although certain parties may have a private incentive to engage in
strategic spillovers, strategic spillovers are socially undesirable. The social
costs of such spillovers are discussed in more detail below, 3 4 but the basic
intuition is that strategic spillovers are problematic because they involve a
party engaging or threatening to engage in an activity that, but for the
possibility of extracting a payment from victims, the party would not have
undertaken. Put another way, strategic spillovers involve activities that not
only entail harmful external effects but also are contrary to the party's
35
self-interest in the absence of the external harm.
owner," a party "will not take into account [potential harm] in making its decisions"
because "the cost is external to its decisionmaking process"); Buchanan & Stubblebine,
supra note 29, at 372-77 (modeling concept of externality formally but implicitly
assuming that effect of A's activity on B will not alter A's utility function); see also Note,
Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 Yale L.J. 352, 352 n.5
(1982) ("An externality is a cost or benefit resulting from a decisionmaker's activity that
does not accrue to the decisionmaker and is thus 'external' to his decisionmaking process."
(citing Jack Hirshleifer, Price Theory and Applications 532 (2d ed. 1980))).
33. See Shoup, supra note 7, at 310-11 (pointing out that firm may threaten to
pollute if payments received for not polluting exceed costs of making threats).
34. See infra Part III (discussing harmful effects of strategic spillovers).
35. Obviously, a party that is engaging in a strategic spillover is acting out of selfinterest in seeking to extract a payment from others. Cf. Oliver E. Williamson,
Opportunistic Behaviour in Contracts, in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and
the Law 703, 703 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Williamson, Opportunistic
Behaviour] ("Opportunism is a type of self-interest seeking .. "). However, such an action
is contrary to the party's self-interest in the absence of the external harm because, if the
party did not have the opportunity to impose such harm and extract a payment, the party
would not have any incentive to undertake the action. Thus, even counting the
opportunistic party's private benefits (including any payments the opportunistic party is
able to extract) in the social calculus, strategic spillovers produce no net social benefits. Of
course, if we discount or exclude the opportunistic party's private benefits, then strategic
spillovers are, from a social perspective, even more problematic. Cf. George M. Cohen,
The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941, 973
(1992) ("Opportunistic behavior produces no social benefits; instead of adding to the net
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In addition, strategic spillovers are problematic whether the opportunistic party engages in the externality-generating activity or merely
threatens to do so. If the opportunistic party engages in the activity,3 6 the
loss in social welfare includes both the external harm imposed on others
and the private loss to the individual or firm (by definition, private costs
exceed private benefits), as well as any transaction costs in bargaining to
extract payments. If the opportunistic party does not engage in the activity (suppose the party agrees not to engage in the activity in exchange for
a payment), threatening to engage in the activity and then attempting to
extract a payment is itself socially undesirable. Here, the social loss includes the transaction costs of bargaining to extract payments, any investments the opportunistic party undertakes to establish the credibility of
the threat, and any precautions that potential victims undertake to avoid
strategic spillovers. 3 7 Thus, irrespective of whether or not the opportunistic party engages in the externality, strategic spillovers are socially
undesirable.
B. SelfInterest Versus Opportunism
Thus far, the Article has identified three situations involving external
effects: (1) conventional externalities associated with socially undesirable
activities; (2) conventional externalities associated with socially desirable
activities; and (3) strategic spillovers, which are socially undesirable regardless of whether the opportunistic party undertakes or threatens to
undertake the activity. The external harm that arises in the first two categories is the unintended byproduct of individuals and firms using their
property for what are otherwise self-serving activities. By contrast, the external harm that arises in the third category, strategic spillovers, is often
imposed purposely, with the objective of extracting a payment in exchange for desisting. But how are we to distinguish between behavior that
is "self-interested" and behavior that is "opportunistic"? And what additional problems do strategic spillovers create for the resolution of
externalities?
As jurists and economists have recognized, "opportunistic" behavior
is notoriously difficult to define.38 Oliver Williamson famously defined
wealth of society it merely redistributes wealth from one party to another. Because
opportunistic behavior, like criminal activity, violates social norms, any private gains to the
opportunistic party must be excluded from the social calculus." (footnotes omitted)).
36. There are a number of reasons a strategic party may undertake, rather than
merely threaten to undertake, an externality-generating activity: Initiating the activity may
be necessary to establish the credibility of the threat, see infra Part III.B; bargaining may
fail and the strategic party may initiate the activity to bolster the credibility of future
threats, see infra Part III.B; or bargaining may be infeasible ex ante but not ex post, and
the party may initiate the activity to extract a payment in exchange for desisting, see infra
Part III.C.
37. See infra Parts III.A-D (discussing harms attributable to strategic spillovers).
38. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of
Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 221, 228 (1991)
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opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile." 39 Within this definition,
Williamson includes "calculated efforts to mislead, deceive, obfuscate,
and otherwise confuse," including the incomplete disclosure of information. 40 More recently, Henry Smith has suggested that "opportunism is
behavior that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively captured- 41
defined, detected, and deterred-by explicit ex ante rulemaking."
Under this view, opportunistic behavior is "technically legal but is done
these
with a view to securing unintended benefits from the system, and 42
benefits are usually smaller than the costs they impose on others."
The idea underlying strategic spillovers is consistent with both of
these definitions. A party engaging in a strategic spillover seeks to maximize its own self-interest but does so in a way that involves "guile."'43 The
strategic party may attempt to exploit an informational advantage over
potential victims; indeed, those bearing the harm of a strategic spillover
most likely would be unwilling to pay to prevent the spillover if they had
perfect information about the strategic party's private costs and benefits.
By undertaking or threatening to undertake an activity that is contrary to
its self-interest, the strategic party is thus engaging in "calculated efforts

("The term 'opportunism' is not defined precisely in either the legal or economic
literature."). Some commentators have argued that the distinction between self-interested
and opportunistic behavior is meaningless. See, e.g., Peter Klein, Does Transaction Cost
Economics Need Opportunism?, Organizations and Markets (Oct. 6, 2006), http://
organizationsandmarkets.com/2006/10/06/does-transaction-cost-economics-needopportunism/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Today,... the distinction between
opportunism and self-interest probably confuses more than it clarifies."). However, a
number of legal scholars have emphasized recently why distinguishing opportunism from
self-interest is significant. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 1403, 1454 (2009) [hereinafter Fennell, Adjusting Alienability] (discussing why "we
may want to make the entitlement to engage in a behavior depend on one's reason for
wishing to engage in it"); Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 9-16
(Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Smith, Law Versus Equity],
available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith-LawVersusEquity7
.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting criticisms of concept of opportunism in
economics "have a great deal of force" but describing many situations in which "the
deliberate (bad faith) wrongdoer is treated more harshly than the innocent one" and
explaining functional significance of this distinction); see also Oliver E. Williamson,
Opportunism and its Critics, 14 Managerial & Decision Econ. 97, 97-100 (1993)
(defending significance of opportunism).
39. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 47 (1985)
[hereinafter Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism].
40. Id.; cf. Williamson, Opportunistic Behaviour, supra note 35, at 703
("Opportunism contemplates self-interest seeking with guile-to include the incomplete
or distorted disclosure of information, especially calculated efforts to mislead, distort,
disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse.").
41. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 9.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism, supra note 39, at 47.
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to mislead, deceive, obfuscate, and otherwise confuse." 44 In addition, strategic spillovers involve behavior that is "technically legal," even though
such behavior might not be permissible if legislatures, agencies, and
other institutions could cost-effectively target it through ex ante
45
rulemaking.
Identifying opportunism also complicates the resolution of externalities. The principal problem addressed in the existing literature is distinguishing between conventional externalities arising as the unintended byproduct of socially undesirable activities and conventional externalities
arising as the unintended byproduct of socially desirable activities. Thus,
prior scholars have focused, understandably, on various mechanismsincluding bargaining, regulation, liability, taxation, and subsidies-for
resolving such externalities. 46 Almost invariably, the goal of these mechanisms is to force parties to "internalize" their external costs, with the ultimate objective being to separate socially desirable from socially undesir47
able activities.
The problem this Article analyzes, by contrast, is the difficulty of distinguishing between conventional externalities that arise as the unintended
byproduct of socially desirable activities and strategic spillovers, which are
generated purposely to extract a payment and are socially undesirable.
Identifying strategic spillovers may be possible, especially in situations in
which potential victims can acquire information regarding a party's motivation. However, strategic spillovers are sometimes difficult to detect because an opportunistic party may be engaging in behavior that is identical
to, albeit with a different motivation than, a self-interested party who is
undertaking an activity that is in fact socially desirable. 48 Below, this
Article illustrates the difficulty of identifying opportunism, and the dis-

44. Williamson, Opportunistic Behaviour, supra note 35, at 703.
45. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 10.
46. See generally Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 83-109.
47. The idea of forcing parties to "internalize the externalities" of their activities is
discussed in several of the seminal articles on property and externalities. See, e.g.,
Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 6, at 348 ("A primary function of property rights is
that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities."); Robert C.
Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 684 (1973) [hereinafter Ellickson, Land Use Controls]
("Welfare economists have urged that harmful externalities be 'internalized' to eliminate
excessive amounts of nuisance activity. Internalization is said to be accomplished through
devices that force a nuisance-maker to bear the true costs of his activity."); see also
Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 Yale L.J. 1122, 1132 (2010) ("The standard solution to negative
externalities . . . is to change the incentives of individual choices by legally internalizing
some of the costs of the harms.").
48. Cf. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 670,
701-02 (1984) (describing "main problem" as "distinguishing blackmail from legitimate
bargaining" or "why the same threat when made by one person can be permissible, but
when made by another person in different circumstances can be blackmail").
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tinction between conventional externalities and strategic spillovers, with
49
an example involving pollution.
C. A Numerical Example IllustratingStrategic Spillovers
To illustrate the concept of strategic spillovers, consider a hypothetical example involving the 'j-Phone5," a new mobile phone and internet
device. An entrepreneur expects, if she opens a factory to build the jPhone5, to receive private benefits and incur private costs in manufacturing this new product. Moreover, there will necessarily be, even under the
best available technology, external harm to the factory's neighbors. Thus,
the social welfare function is the private benefit to the entrepreneur minus both the private cost to the entrepreneur and the external harm on
neighbors. 50 Table 1 illustrates three situations in which manufacturing
the j-Phone5 involves external harm on neighbors.

49. One concern with attempting to define, and to deter, strategic spillovers is that in
doing so the legal system may unnecessarily target certain activities that are primarily
undertaken to obtain a payment but that are generally considered to be legitimate. For
example, an investor in securities purchases a particular stock, hoping the price will rise in
order to obtain a payment, even though there may be negative effects on third parties.
Similarly, a speculator in real estate or oil futures may have no intention of residing on the
property or utilizing the oil, but nevertheless engages in speculation to obtain a payment.
The concern is noteworthy but unlikely to be critical. Strategic spillovers involve a legal
and economic problem that is distinct from these situations because of the difference
between pecuniary and nonpecuniay externalities. See generally Laffont, supra note 24, at
192. Pecuniary externalities entail external effects on third parties through prices (e.g.,
relative prices or asset prices) rather than actual resource effects. See id. (defining
pecuniary externalities as those "which work through the price system"). By contrast,
nonpecuniary (i.e., "real" or "technological") externalities involve harm that has a direct
resource effect on a third party (e.g., a factory's pollution on neighbors). See id. (defining
technological externalities as those which do "not work through the price system" and
listing pollution as an example). In traditional cost-benefit analysis, pecuniary externalities
are not taken into account. See Randall G. Holcombe & Russell S. Sobel, Public Policy
Toward Pecuniary Externalities, 29 Pub. Fin. Rev. 304, 304 (2001) ("Pecuniary externalities
have been analyzed relatively little by economists, perhaps because the costs or benefits
they create do not result in resource misallocations."). The focus of this Article, like
Coase's focus in The Problem of Social Cost, is on activities involving nonpecuniary, rather
than pecuniary, externalities. Cf. Clifford G. Holderness, The Assignment of Rights, Entry
Effects, and the Allocation of Resources, 18J. Legal Stud. 181, 184 n.9 (1989) ("Consistent
with the title of his article, 'The Problem of Social Cost,' Coase limits all of his examples
and, presumably, his analysis, to physical interferences between individuals."). Thus, this
Article does not consider situations involving externalities from market competition,
speculative investing, or other changes in asset prices.
50. Assume for the sake of simplicity that there are no positive externalities (i.e.,
external benefits) for the neighbors and that there is asymmetric information (i.e., that
none of the neighbors know the entrepreneur's private benefits and costs).
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TABLE 1:

(Social

THREE SITUATIONS INVOLVING ExTERNAL EFFECTS
Welfare = Private Benefit - Private Cost - External

Private Benefit
to Factory
Owner

Harm)

Situation # 1
Externality
Undesirable
Activity

Situation # 2
Externality
Desirable
Activity

Situation # 3
Strategic
Spillover
Undesirable
Activity

50

50

30

Private Cost to
Factory Owner
External Harm
to Neighbors

20
20

Social Welfare

-5

20
_20

20
_20

+5

-25

In Column 1, the entrepreneur has an incentive to operate the factory because her private benefit, 50, is greater than her private cost, 35,
even though operating the factory results in a decrease in social welfare,
50 - 35 - 20 = -5. This column represents the conventional problem with
externalities: A party might have a private incentive to engage in an activity even though, as a result of the harm arising as the incidental by51
product of its activity, 20, the activity itself is socially undesirable.
In Column 2, as in Column 1, the entrepreneur has an incentive to
operate the factory because her private benefit, 50, is greater than her
private cost, 25. However, unlike in Column 1, operating the factory is
socially desirable because doing so results in an increase in social welfare,
50 - 25 - 20 = +5. This column represents the situation in which, even
though there are negative external effects, 20, the activity is socially desir52
able because the social benefits exceed social costs.
For Columns 1 and 2, even if the legal system initially assigns the
entitlement to the "wrong" party (i.e., to the factory owner in Column 1
or to the neighbors in Column 2), the parties could transfer the entitlement and resolve the problem of social costs through bargaining, as
51. See, e.g., Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 80 (pointing out, in discussing
socially optimal resolution of external effects, that "it will be socially desirable for
individuals to engage less often in acts that cause detrimental effects than is in their
immediate self-interest").
52. See, e.g., Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 32, at 381 ("[T]he observation of
external effects, taken alone, cannot provide a basis for judgment concerning the
desirability of some modification in an existing state of affairs ....
The internal benefits
from carrying out the activity, net of costs, may be greater than the external damage that is
imposed on other parties.").
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Coase emphasized. 53 For either column, a range of possible values exists
such that both the entrepreneur and the neighbors would be better off by
bargaining to resolve the external effects. 54 Thus, assuming bargaining
costs are zero, bargaining is effective for resolving the externality and
achieving the optimal result, even if the initial assignment of entitlements
is erroneous.
Now consider Column 3, which illustrates the concept of a strategic
spillover. Legal scholars and economists typically have assumed that this
kind of situation does not present a problem; seemingly, the entrepreneur would have an incentive not to operate the factory as the entrepreneur's private costs, 35, exceed her private benefits, 30.5 5 Under the conventional wisdom, the entrepreneur's private incentive not to operate the
factory is consistent with the optimal social outcome because operating
the factory would be socially undesirable as the social costs, 55, exceed
the social benefits, 30. The conventional wisdom, however, ignores the
possibility that the entrepreneur may have an incentive to engage (or
threaten to engage) in production if the entrepreneur is able to impose
external harm, 20, and then extract a payment from the neighbors in
exchange for agreeing to cease (or not to undertake) production of thejPhone5.
For example, if the entrepreneur has an entitlement to manufacture
the j-Phone 5 (i.e., the neighbors cannot enjoin the factory), the neighbors may be willing to pay the entrepreneur 10 for not operating the
factory. The neighbors would be willing to make this offer because the
cost of the payment, 10, is less than the cost of bearing the harm, 20. The
entrepreneur would be willing to accept this offer because the offer, 10, is
greater than the benefits of operating the factory, -5. Thus, the entrepre53. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 4-6.
54. In Column 1, both parties would be better off if the neighbors paid the
entrepreneur not to operate the factory. Specifically, for any agreement between 15 and
20, the entrepreneur would be better off because any payment from the neighbors above
15 is greater than the profit the entrepreneur might obtain from operating the factory
(i.e., 50 - 35 = 15) and the neighbors would be better off because any payment below 20 is
less than the external harm the factory could impose (i.e., 20). In Column 2, both parties
would be better off if the entrepreneur were to pay the neighbors for the right to operate
the factory. Specifically, for any agreement between 20 and 25, the entrepreneur would be
better off because any payment to the neighbors less than 25 is less than the profit from
operating the factory (i.e., 50 - 25 = 25), and the neighbors would be better off because
any payment to the neighbors above 20 is greater than the external harm from operating
the factory (i.e., 20).
55. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 92 (1985) ("Unless investors in a firm can capture
private benefits exceeding the private costs, they will not incur these costs."); Keith N.
Hylton & Steven E. Laymon, The Internalization Paradox and Workers' Compensation, 21
Hofstra L. Rev. 109, 114 (1992) ("Private incentives are determined by comparing the
private benefits with the private costs of a given action."); Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1311, 1315 (1989) (assuming
people "consistently act to maximize the excess of their private benefits over their private
costs").
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neur may have an incentive to operate the factory (or threaten to do so),
even though the activity is socially undesirable, -25, and even though, in
the absence of the external harm and possibility of bargaining to resolve
the harm, the entrepreneur's private costs, 35, exceed the private benefits, 30. Moreover, unlike in Columns 1 and 2, bargaining is ineffective for
resolving this type of externality, a strategic spillover, and may result in a
56
suboptimal outcome, even if bargaining costs are zero.
This example highlights several points about strategic spillovers.
First, strategic spillovers involve activities that parties would not undertake but for the possibility of extracting a payment. Without a possible
payment, the entrepreneur in Column 3 would not manufacture the jPhone5. Second, strategic spillovers entail opportunistic behavior. Although manufacturing the j-Phone5 may be legal, the entrepreneur is
maximizing her self-interest through a form of guile. Third, the difficulty
strategic spillovers create is in distinguishing conventional externalities
involving socially desirable activities from strategic spillovers. The selfinterested entrepreneur in Column 2, whose activity is socially desirable,
and the opportunistic entrepreneur in Column 3, whose activity is socially
undesirable, are engaging in identical behavior but with different internal motivations. Fourth, bargaining is inadequate for resolving strategic
spillovers. While bargaining may provide a solution for the conventional
externalities in Columns 1 and 2, bargaining fails to deter the strategic
spillover in Column 3. Fifth, strategic spillovers typically arise in situations
involving asymmetric information. 5 7 The opportunistic entrepreneur in
Column 3 has the ability to extract a payment by threatening to impose

56. Technically, this example does not contradict the Coase Theorem because
"Coasean bargaining"-frictionless negotiation with zero transaction costs-assumes not
only the absence of bargaining costs but also perfect information (whereas, as noted above,
see supra note 50, this example assumes asymmetric information between the
entrepreneur and neighbors). See Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 84 n.8 (stating
Coase Theorem is "sometimes expressed by saying that a mutually beneficial outcome will
be achieved in the absence of transaction costs, where the latter are interpreted to be any
hindrances to bargaining-whether literally costs of bargaining, or instead other obstacles,
notably, asymmetries of information between bargaining parties"); see also Pierre Schlag,
The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1661, 1675 n.34 (1989) (noting
debate over "whether extortionate behavior (which would arguably vitiate the Coase
Theorem) can be subsumed under the concept of transaction costs (so as to rescue the
validity of the theorem)"). But see StewartJ. Schwab, Collective Bargaining and the Coase
Theorem, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 245, 278 (1987) ("Perfect information ... is an unnecessary
assumption that makes the Coase prediction uninteresting." (citing Jules L. Coleman,
Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law,
68 Calif. L. Rev. 221, 223 n.6 (1980))).
57. Cf. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 9 ("Models of self-interest
combined with asymmetric information can explain a lot of the behavior we would call
opportunistic."). For an accessible introduction to asymmetric information, see generally
Brian Hillier, The Economics of Asymmetric Information, at xii (1997), which explores
"situations where agents on one side of the market know something that agents on the
other side do not."
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harm on the neighbors only if the neighbors are unaware of the private
58
benefits and private costs of manufacturing the j-Phone5.
II.

THE UBIQUITY OF STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS

The previous Part discussed the basic structure of strategic spillovers, 59 including the nature of opportunistic behavior, 60 and illustrated
that structure with a numerical example involving pollution. 61 This Part
highlights the "real world" significance of strategic spillovers by examining strategic spillovers arising in property law, environmental law, intellectual property law, corporate law, legislation and regulation, and litigation and settlement. The fact that strategic spillovers are pervasive across
various substantive areas of the law suggests that parties are often willing
to impose harm opportunistically if it is in their interest to do so. It also
suggests the law may need to differentiate conventional externalities from
strategic spillovers more often than is currently the case.
A. Property Law
1. Nuisance. - It is appropriate to begin with nuisance, the area of
law that Coase was investigating in The Problem of Social Cost.62 In discussing his now-famous example of a cattle-raiser and farmer who bargain to
resolve social costs arising from cattle who wander onto the farmer's land,
Coase himself mentions the possibility that one party might act to induce
the other to pay a higher sum in subsequent bargaining:
It might be thought that it would pay the cattle-raiser [when
the cattle-raiser was not liable for damage] to increase his herd
above the size that he would wish to maintain once a bargain
had been made, in order to induce the farmer to make a larger
58. As this example illustrates, the problem of asymmetric information underlies
many strategic spillovers. An opportunistic party (here, the entrepreneur) typically knows
the private benefits and costs of engaging in an externality-generating activity. However,
the potential victims (here, the neighbors) usually do not know the opportunist's private
benefits and costs. Presumably, if they had perfect information and knew the activity was
not in the opportunist's self-interest, potential victims would be unwilling to pay because,
even if they refused to pay, the opportunist would not engage in the activity. And, knowing
that potential victims would refuse to pay, the opportunist would not have any incentive to
engage or threaten to engage in the activity (here, manufacturing the j-Phone5) in the first
place. Yet, because potential victims may have imperfect information, they may decide to
bargain with the opportunistic party to avoid the harm, and, knowing this, the opportunist
may have an incentive to engage or threaten to engage in a strategic spillover at the outset.
Moreover, as a result of asymmetric information, an opportunistic party may threaten to
engage in a strategic spillover not only if the external harm is greater than the differential
between the opportunistic party's private costs and benefits but even if the external harm is
less than this differential.
59. See supra Part I.A.
60. See supra Part I.B.
61. See supra Part I.C.
62. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 23 (discussing "court decisions arising out
of the common law relating to nuisance").
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total payment. And this may be true. It is similar in nature to the
action of the farmer (when the cattle-raiser was liable for damage) in cultivating land on which, as a result of an agreement
with the cattle-raiser, planting would subsequently be abandoned (including land which would not be cultivated at all in
the absence of cattle-raising).63
Coase recognizes the possibility that either the rancher, by buying more
cattle, or the farmer, by cultivating additional land, might attempt to increase social costs for the purpose of extracting a higher payment.
After flagging the issue, however, Coase chooses not to pursue it,
dismissing such strategic "manoeuvers" as mere "preliminaries to an
agreement." 64 These actions, Coase asserts, "do not affect the long-run
equilibrium position, which is the same whether or not the cattle-raiser is
held responsible for the crop damage brought about by his cattle." 65 In a
subsequent article on blackmail, Coase revisits the issue he acknowledged, but did not investigate, in The Problem of Social Cost.6 6 Yet, ultimately, Coase appears rather agnostic about what, if anything, the legal
67
system should do about this problem, in nuisance cases or otherwise.
As mentioned above, there are a number of historical examples involving nuisance in which one party has attempted to impose social costs
on another to extract a payment. In Chicago, the "livery stable scam" was
possible because courts determined whether any stable was a nuisance
only after the stable was built.68 In San Francisco, parties threatened to
open breweries, bordellos, and other nuisance-like establishments in affluent neighborhoods, and such threats were feasible in the absence of
land-use controls like zoning. 69 Once zoning laws separated residential
parcels from commercial and industrial parcels, strategic spillovers arising from conflicting land uses were less common.
Yet, despite the advent of zoning in the early twentieth century, similar conflicts have continued to arise in certain residential areas. For ex63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id. at 8.
65. Id.
66. Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 Va. L. Rev. 655
(1988) [hereinafter Coase, Blackmail]. According to Coase, he mentioned the possibility
of blackmail in The Problemof Social Cost because of a conversation he had with Harvard Law
Professor David Cavers when Coase and Cavers were fellows at the Center for Advanced
Study of the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford:
When I discussed my ideas with [Cavers] he pointed out, correctly, that if
someone had a right to commit a nuisance, he might threaten to create that
nuisance simply to extract money from those who would be harmed by it, in
return of course for agreeing not to do so. In effect, Cavers felt that what I was
advocating would lead to blackmail or something analogous to it.
Id. at 657.
67. See id. at 676 (concluding that whether the "British solution" for targeting
blackmail by "leav[ing] it up to the prosecutors, juries, and judges to be sensible" is the
"best that can be done is a question for lawyers to decide").
68. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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ample, there are several instances in which a convicted sexual offender
has attempted to extract a payment from neighbors in exchange for leaving a residential neighborhood or in which neighbors have offered to pay
a convicted sex offender to relocate. 70 The difficulty in such cases, as well
as with Coase's rancher and farmer, the livery stable owners in Chicago,
and the operators of breweries in San Francisco, is how to distinguish
merely self-interested behavior that may have incidental effects on others
71
from opportunistic behavior in which a spillover is strategic.
This distinction between a self-interested motivation in which external harm, even if likely to result, is not intended and an opportunistic
motivation in which the harm is in fact intended is relevant for a wide
variety of situations that arise in property and tort law. Notably, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
includes a dual definition of "intent" in which a "person acts with the
70. In 2005, the New York Times published that Randall Collins and his wife had
purchased a home in a new subdivision of Springdale, Arkansas. Sex Offender Sued for
Slow Home Sales, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2005, at A15 [hereinafter, N.Y. Times, Sex Offender
Sued]. Neighbors soon learned that Collins had prior criminal convictions for sexually
abusing his nieces, see Collins v. State, No. CACR97-407, 1998 WL 75661, at *1 (Ark. Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 1998), and several residents threatened to move if Collins did not, see N.Y.
Times, Sex Offender Sued, supra. Unable to sell any of the subdivision's remaining homes,
the developer sued Collins, his wife, and their realtor for failing to disclose Collins's
criminal history. Id. The complaint alleged, among other things, that Collins had called
the developer and offered to leave the neighborhood in exchange for $250,000; otherwise,
Collins vowed to "stay there and kill their subdivision." Id.
Similarly, in 2005, the Cincinnati Enquirer reported how residents in Goshen, Ohio
discovered that their new neighbor, David Lanford, was classified as a "sexual predator"
under Ohio state law. Reid Forgrave, Sex Offender's Neighbors Giving Him Money to
Move, Cincinnati Enquirer, Mar. 24, 2005, at Cl. This time, instead of threatening to
move, neighbors recruited a new buyer for Lanford's home and offered Lanford $20,000
in "moving expenses" if he agreed to leave the community. Id. One local prosecutor
opined that the neighbors' offer, which Lanford planned to accept, was "perfectly legal
and not considered extortion." Id.
71. Although Collins allegedly attempted to extract a payment of $250,000 from the
developer, N.Y. Times, Sex Offender Sued, supra note 70, and neighbors allegedly offered
Lanford $20,000 to move out, Forgrave, supra note 70, it is unclear whether either
situation involves a strategic spillover. If the reason Collins and Lanford moved to these
neighborhoods had nothing to do with attempting to extract a payment, their actions
would not constitute strategic spillovers. For, if their preference was to live in these
particular neighborhoods, moving in was not opportunistic, and negotiating with
neighbors was a way of resolving an "externality" after the fact (although query whether the
external "costs" residents may experience as a result of residing near a convicted sex
offender are a type of harm that society should recognize). Cf. Suzanna Hartzell-Baird,
When Sex Doesn't Sell: Mitigating the Damaging Effect of Megan's Law on Property
Values, 35 Real Est. LJ. 353, 390 (2006) (concluding "it is unlikely that a nuisance claim
would be granted against a sex offender moving into a residential neighborhood" because
"fear derived from someone's past capacity for criminal activity" is typically not legitimate
basis for injunctive relief). On the other hand, if their preference was to live somewhere
else, but Collins and Lanford purposely moved into these areas to impose harm on their
neighbors and then attempt to profit from side payments, their actions would be strategic
spillovers.
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intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose
of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the
consequence is substantially certain to result." 72 Strategic spillovers, including opportunistic nuisances like the livery stable scam, are intentional under the first definition: The purpose of the activity is to cause
harm (i.e., the party acts maliciously). Conventional externalities, including ordinary nuisances, are intentional but only under the second definition: Even if a harm is substantially certain to result, the purpose of the
activity is not to cause the harm itself (i.e., the party does not act maliciously). The Restatement suggests there are "obvious differences" between these two motivations and distinguishes the two "to accommodate
courts that in particular contexts might want to distinguish between intent in the sense of purpose and intent in the sense of knowledge. '73 The
distinction that the Restatement emphasizes between the two types of intent is consistent with this Article's call to differentiate strategic spillovers
and conventional externalities.
2. Coming to the Nuisance. - In many of the nuisance situations discussed above, the opportunistic party might have attempted to bargain
74
with potential victims before initiating the externality-generating activity.
However, in certain circumstances, it may not be feasible for a party to
bargain with potential victims until after initiating the externality-generating activity. Nevertheless, strategic spillovers can still arise, for an opportunistic party may consider the possibility of bargaining with victims ex
post in deciding ex ante whether to engage in the activity.
One example of this type of strategic spillover arises in the context of
the coming-to-the-nuisance problem. 75 Historically, a party that came to a
72. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 1
(2010). I thank Bob Ellickson for bringing this provision to my attention.
73. Id. § 1 cmt. a.
74. For example, Coase asserts it would be unnecessary for a farmer actually to plant
crops or a rancher to buy cattle before agreeing not to do so because "it is reasonable to
suppose that someone wishing to obtain money for agreeing not to engage in an activity
would normally not engage in it before negotiating, but would threaten to do so since this
would be less costly." Coase, Blackmail, supra note 66, at 657. Similarly, participants in the
livery stable scam bought vacant parcels, announced their intentions to the neighborhood,
and then attempted to extract payments before constructing or operating a livery stable.
See supra note 11 and accompanying text. And, presumably, a convicted sex offender
could purchase a home in a residential neighborhood and attempt to extract a payment
before he or she had physically relocated.
75. See Rohan Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An
Economic Analysis from an Incomplete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. Econ. & Org. 491,
510-11 (2003) (noting "coming to the nuisance cases" usually involve "an inability of the
parties to contract over the first mover's initial investment decision because the second
mover is not yet present"). For background on the coming-to-the-nuisance problem, see
generally Donald Wittman, Coming to the Nuisance, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics and the Law, supra note 35, at 292 [hereinafter Wittman, Coming to the
Nuisance]; Donald Wittman, First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of "Coming
to the Nuisance," 9 J. Legal Stud. 557 (1980).
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preexisting nuisance had no grounds for relief.76 Most American courts
now reject this categorical approach and instead consider the fact that a
party has come to a nuisance as one factor among many in deciding
77
whether to issue an injunction or award damages.
Suppose a firm must decide where to locate a new factory or other
facility involving harmful effects such as pollution, congestion, or noise.
The firm may choose (1) a location that is unlikely to conflict with future
suburban development (the "rural location"); or (2) a location in which
there is some probability of a conflict with future suburban development
(the "exurban location"). Even if the optimal outcome is the rural location, and even if the firm would prefer the rural location, the firm might
have an incentive to locate its facility in the exurban location. The reason
is that the firm knows that, if the suburban development does reach its
facility, it may be able to obtain a higher price from the developer or
homeowners because of the social harm the firm is imposing. Here, even
if the firm wanted to negotiate with potential victims before the fact, such
negotiations are infeasible as the developer or homeowners are not yet
known. Because such negotiations are infeasible, the firm may choose the
socially undesirable location now, with the expectation that the firm
might extract a payment later.
The fact that, in choosing a site for its facility, a firm may take into
account the possibility of a potential conflict, as well as the likelihood of
subsequent bargaining, seems to support the modern, multi-factor approach to the problem of coming to the nuisance. 78 A firm may have
arrived in the exurban location before the homeowners, but the firm may
have strategically taken into account the possibility of future development
in deciding where to locate its factory. Thus, the firm may have anticipated the possibility that parties might later come to its externality76. Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 835-36 (Ct. App. 1991) ("'The
early common law "coming to the nuisance" rule . . . was that if a noxious trade were
established in a place remote from habitations, those who afterward acquired property in
the vicinity were barred from obtaining either damages or an injunction ....

.'" (quoting

Cassius Kirk, Jr. Note, Torts: Nuisance: Defenses: "Coming to the Nuisance" as a Defense,
41 Calif. L. Rev. 148, 148 (1953))); see also Wittman, Coming to the Nuisance, supra note
75, at 292 ("For Blackstone, being first is everything: when the plaintiff comes to the
nuisance, then the nuisance has the right to continue; when the nuisance comes to the
plaintiff, then the plaintiff has the right.").
77. See, e.g., Pre-Club, Inc. v. Elliot Inv. Corp., No. 17347, 1996 WL 122086, at *1
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 1996) ("Although some jurisdictions may apply the coming to the
nuisance doctrine as a complete defense to a nuisance action, the prevailing American
view is that this 'defense' is just one of several factors to be considered in determining
whether a nuisance exists."); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D (1979) ("The fact that
the plaintiff has acquired or improved his land after a nuisance interfering with it has
come into existence is not in itself sufficient to bar his action, but it is a factor to be
considered in determining whether the nuisance is actionable.").
78. Cf. Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 Va. L.
Rev. 1299, 1344 & n.116 (1977) (exploring hypothetical in which "traditional [nuisance]
rule would encourage the polluter to produce smoke because the more smoke he
produces the more likely he will be able" to "extort excessive profits").
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generating activity and, despite this fact (indeed, because of this fact),
79
chosen to locate its facility in a site that is socially suboptimal.
However, under the modern approach to coming to the nuisance, it
is possible that potential victims may engage in a similar type of strategic
behavior. Consider Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co.,80 which Ian Ayres and
Kristin Madison believe "represents a strategic 'coming to the nuisance'
in order to extort a supercompensatory payment."8 1 The plaintiff in
Edwards purchased land being affected by the defendant's mill, not for
the purpose of using or occupying the land, but instead in an attempt to
sell the land to the defendant, using the threat of injunctive relief to extract a windfall benefit.8 2 Thus, just as a firm may engage in a strategic
spillover under the traditional approach by locating its facility opportunistically, a potential "victim" can engage in a strategic spillover under
the modem approach by opportunistically threatening to enjoin a preexisting nuisance.8 3 More generally, if a party has the legal right to enjoin
79. Cf. Pitchford & Snyder, supra note 75, at 511 ("Allocating property rights to the
first mover (i.e., following a coming to the nuisance rule) leads to overinvestment by the
first mover. . . . [T]he first mover strategically overinvests to improve its position in
subsequent bargaining with the second mover."). Donald Shoup, who considers the
possibility that an opportunistic party may attempt to bargain either before or after
initiating an externality-generating activity, emphasizes another important point: "The
threat to pollute, and bargaining for a bribe not to pollute, need not, of course, come only
from entrepreneurs who are in business only for such purposes." Shoup, supra note 7, at
311. Shoup cites the example of how "an oil company interested in the location for a new
refinery might 'consider' several populated sites for the purpose of being paid not to
locate there, especially if it were actually indifferent among these sites on considerations of
refinery profit alone." Id. The possibility of a suboptimal site is a concern in many
situations, in addition to the coming-to-the-nuisance problem. See, e.g., Michael
Greenstone, Richard Hornbeck & Enrico Moretti, Identifying Agglomeration Spillovers:
Evidence from Winners and Losers of Large Plant Openings, 118 J. Pol. Econ. 536, 550-60
(2010) (discussing locational decisions of large manufacturing plants); Herbert Mohring &
J. Hayden Boyd, Analysing "Externalities": "Direct Interaction" vs "Asset Utilization"
Frameworks, 38 Economica 347, 354-55 (1971) (discussing locational consequences of
conflicting water uses).
80. 38 Mich. 46, 46 (1878) (denying plaintiff's injunction request where plaintiff
speculatively bought land knowing sand was being deposited on it due to mill operation,
attempted to sell land to mill, and, having failed, sued for injunction).
81. Ian Ayres & Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient Performance of Injunctions
and Contracts, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 51 (1999) ("'[T]he peculiar facts of Edwards
dramatize how equitable remedies may be used to extort overcompensatory settlements.'"
(quoting Edward Yorio, Contract Enforcement: Specific Performance and Injunctions 85
(1989))).
82. See id. at 50 (describing how plaintiff purchased land "'not . . . for use or
occupation, but as a matter of speculation, and apparently under an expectation of being able
to force defendant to buy it at a large advance on the purchaseprice" (quoting Edwards, 38 Mich.
at 48) (emphasis added by Ayres & Madison)).
83. See Shoup, supra note 7, at 311 (pointing out that "similar bargaining by 'victim
entrepreneurs' would also seem inevitable if the polluter were made liable to the victim for
any external costs he imposes" because "potential 'victims' would have an incentive to
threaten to locate in polluted areas adjacent to pollution producers, in order to be bribed
not to locate in such areas"). Robert Ellickson usefully distinguishes between two types of
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an externality-generating activity, the party may attempt to extract a payment in exchange for not seeking an injunction, even if the party otherwise would not have invoked such a right and even though attempting to
84
extract a payment may be socially undesirable.
Consequently, the coming-to-the-nuisance problem illustrates not
only that "property rules" are not an adequate solution for resolving strategic spillovers, but also that strategic spillovers are possible irrespective
of how property rights are initially allocated or defined. To see why, consider the Calabresi-Melamed framework for awarding legal entitlements
85
and protecting those entitlements with property rules or liability rules.
Under a "Rule 3" approach, a defendant factory has an entitlement protected by a property rule. 86 But if the factory has a right to operate regardless of the social costs on its neighbors, then the factory may threaten
"coming to the nuisance" cases: (1) cases "where the plaintiff has improved his property
subsequent to initiation of the nuisance"; and (2) cases "where [the plaintiff] has simply
subsequently acquired [his property]." Ellickson, Land Use Controls, supra note 47, at 759
n.260. Based on this distinction, Ellickson reaches two conclusions. First, Ellickson
contends that "[tihe 'coming to the nuisance' defense has merit ...as a device to keep the
plaintiff from aggravating his damage by installing incompatible improvements in the face
of a preexisting nuisance." Id. This Article supports Ellickson's view that, in such situations,
a defendant should be able to rely on this defense, regardless of whether or not the
plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages is strategic. Second, Ellickson argues that "[d] enying
recovery to a plaintiff because he purchased an improvement that preexisted the nuisance
is clearly erroneous, unless his predecessor in title had recovered permanent damages." Id.
However, under these circumstances, this Article suggests that denying recovery may
sometimes be appropriate not only if the plaintiffs predecessor recovered permanent
damages, but also if, as in Edwards, the plaintiff strategically came to the nuisance to extract
a payment.
84. See Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About
Property Rights, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 1285, 1285 (2008) (suggesting that "'property rule'
protection often gives leverage to right holders disproportionate to the harm those right
holders would suffer from intrusion of their rights" and that "leverage, in turn, gives
potential resource users private incentives to expend time and money on search even when
search will generate minimal social benefit"); cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 Stan. L. Rev.
1075, 1077-78 (1980) [hereinafter Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance] (pointing out that one
"argument against injunctive remedies is that they allow the plaintiff to 'extort' the
defendant . . .whenever the potential cost that enforcement of the injunction would
impose on the defendant exceeds the loss borne by the plaintiff if the activity in question
occurs" but assuming that "extortion argument relates to the goal of distributional equity,
not economic efficiency").
85. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1090-93
(1972) (developing framework in which society must first choose which party receives
entitlement, i.e., plaintiff or defendant, and then how to protect entitlement, i.e., through
property rules, liability rules, or inalienability). Bracketing inalienability, which this Article
discusses below, see infra Part IV.B.2, the Calabresi-Melamed framework yields four basic
possibilities: (1) plaintiff has an entitlement protected by a property rule ("Rule 1");
(2) plaintiff has an entitlement protected by a liability rule ("Rule 2"); (3) defendant has
an entitlement protected by a property rule ("Rule 3"); or (4) defendant has an
entitlement protected by a liability rule ("Rule 4"). Id at 1115-18.
86. See supra note 85 (discussing "Rule 3").
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to operate to extract a payment from neighbors in exchange for desisting. Conversely, under a "Rule 1" approach, the plaintiff neighbors
have an entitlement protected by a property rule. 8 7 But, if the neighbors
have a right to shut down the factory regardless of the social costs on the
owner, then one or more of the neighbors may threaten to enjoin the
factory to extract a payment in exchange for not seeking an injunction.
And, in either situation, the opportunistic party may assert its entitlement
even though, in the absence of the possibility of imposing social costs, the
party might not have had any incentive to do so. In other words, opportunism remains a concern regardless of whether a factory has an entitlement to impose external harm or the factory's neighbors have an entitlement to be free of external harm. 88 The use of property rules is therefore
inadequate for deterring strategic spillovers because an opportunistic
party may assert, or threaten to assert, an entitlement subject to propertyrule protection in order to extract a payment in exchange for agreeing
not to assert the entitlement.8 9
3. Spite Fences and Skyscrapers. - Cases invovlving spite fences and
spite structures are a situation within nuisance law in which courts do
examine a party's motivation is cases involving spite fences and spite
structures. Landowners sometimes construct fences or other structures
they know will impose social costs on their neighbors. These structures
might interfere with access to light, prevent the circulation of air, or obstruct a particular view.90 Under the doctrine of "ancient lights," the common law courts of England would grant a prescriptive easement to an
individual who continuously enjoyed access to light, air, or a view.9 1 Although initially incorporating this doctrine into their own common law
traditions, American courts ultimately rejected it. 9 2 American courts did,
87. See supra note 85 (discussing "Rule 1").
88. I thank Terry Anderson for emphasizing the significance of this point to me in
conversations at the Searle-Kauffman Institute on Law, Innovation, and Growth. On
Coase's idea of reciprocal causation and why it may mean the term "externality" is
potentially misleading, see supra note 6.
89. Of course, it may be possible to reduce the likelihood of a strategic spillover by
granting an entitlement protected by a property rule to the party that is less likely to act
opportunistically, but property rules themselves do not eliminate the possibility of strategic
spillovers.
90. Perhaps the most famous example is Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five
Twenty-Five, Inc., 114 So. 2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), in which the
Fontainebleau's owner constructed a windowless "spite wall" facing the Eden Roc hotel
that cast a shadow over its pool. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property:
Principles and Policies 1005 (2007) (discussing case). For other colorful examples, see
Coty v. Ramsey Assocs., Inc., 546 A.2d 196, 201 n. 1 (Vt. 1988) ("spite farm"); Steve Bailey, A
Tiny, Beloved Home that Was Built for Spite, N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 2008, at F6 ("spite
house").
91. See Prah v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Wis. 1982) (describing doctrine of
"ancient lights").
92. See Lucas v. Planning Bd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 310, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("The English
doctrine of 'Ancient Lights' has been universally repudiated in this nation."); Prah, 321
N.W.2d at 188 ("American courts initially enforced the English common law doctrine of
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however, recognize a limited number of exceptions including the "spite
fence" doctrine. 93 This doctrine prohibits a landowner from constructing
a structure that interferes with a neighbor's access to light, air, or a view if
the landowner's motivation is spiteful or malicious. 94 Most state courts, in
examining the character, location, and use of a structure, require that
spite or malice be the sole, or at least the predominant, motivation for its
construction. 95
A party may construct or threaten to construct a structure that interferes with a neighbor's access to light, air, or a view not only out of malice
or spite but also to extract a payment or other benefit from the neighbor. 9 6 For example, in the classic English case Hardie & Lane, Ltd. v.
Chilton, the court poses the following hypothetical:
A. has land facing a new house of B.'s. A. proposes to build on
that land a house which will spoil the view from or light to B.'s
house and depreciate the value of his property. B. implores A.
not to build. A. says: 'I will not build if you pay me 1,000E, but I
shall build if you do not.' B. pays the money and A. does not
build. Could it be seriously argued9 7that B. could recover the
money back as obtained by threats?
ancient lights, but later every state which considered the doctrine repudiated it as
inconsistent with the needs of a developing country.").
93. See generally Robert C. Ellickson & Vicki L. Been, Land Use Controls: Cases and
Materials 520 (3d ed. 2005) (noting "spite fence doctrine" was one of "earliest [principles]
to evolve" in "American nuisance law"); Joseph William Singer, Property Law: Rules,
Policies, and Practices 377, 409-10 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing American courts' willingness
to recognize "spite fence" doctrine).
94. See Prah, 321 N.W.2d at 189 (concluding "a landowner's interest in sunlight has
been protected in this country by common law private nuisance law at least in the narrow
context of the modern American rule invalidating spite fences" (citing Sundowner, Inc. v.
King, 509 P.2d 785 (Idaho 1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 829 (1977))). Many
states have enacted "spite-fence statutes," which identify the circumstances in which a court
may grant relief if an individual maliciously constructs a structure to interfere with
another's access to light, air, or a view. See, e.g., R.I. Gen. Laws § 34-10-20 (2011).
95. Compare Austin v. Bald II, L.L.C., 658 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) ("'A spite
fence is one which is of no beneficial use to the owner and which is erected and
maintained solely for the purpose of annoying a neighbor.'" (quoting Welsh v. Todd, 133
S.E.2d 171, 173 (N.C. 1963))), with Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 272 (Ct. App.
2002) (adopting "the 'dominant purpose' test for determining whether the 'malice'
element of [California's spite fence statute] has been satisfied"). But cf. Stewart E. Sterk,
Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 62 (1987) (noting several cases
have held that "landowners may build whatever structures they please on their own land,
whatever their underlying motives, subject only to applicable zoning restrictions" (citing
Cohen v. Perrino, 50 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1947))).
96. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic
Analysis of the Law, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1849, 1861-64 (1993) (analyzing situation in which
owner may build fence higher than owner would have otherwise desired to extract
payment through bargaining); Sterk, supra note 95, at 84 (stating if owner "can construct a
fence at low cost that inflicts great hardship on his neighbor, he might be able to extract
money from his neighbor to remove the fence").
97. Hardie & Lane, Ltd. v. Chilton, [1928] 2 K.B. 306 (C.A.) at 316 (Eng.); cf. Wilson
v. Irwin, 138 S.W. 373, 373-74 (Ky. 1911) (concluding defendant, "by threatening to erect,
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Likewise, Mitchell Berman refers to Robert Nozick's discussion of the "deceptively tricky case" involving "B's threat to build a structure on his land
that will block the view of his neighbor A, unless A pays B $1,000."8 The
possibility of building a structure that imposes harm on one's neighbor
and then bargaining for a payment not to impose such harm is another
example of a strategic spillover. 99
A variation of this type of opportunistic behavior occurs in the skies
above many major cities, and the stakes are often quite high. 10 0 Owners
of skyscrapers and other buildings frequently oppose the construction of
new structures that may affect their property. In New York City, owners of
the Empire State Building objected to the planned construction of a new
tower that had the potential to detract from the scenic views and iconic
status of what was once the world's tallest building. 10' Likewise, in Hong
Kong, many residents feared that four new skyscrapers might obstruct the
view from several office towers and a luxury hotel. 10 2 Although some of
these conflicts involve behavior that is not opportunistic, the setting is
ripe for strategic spillovers. Existing owners can assert their entitlements,
or at least colorable claims to such entitlements, to obstruct new construction and extract a payment from developers.
and then erecting, an unsightly and unreasonable fence," had attempted "to deter"
plaintiffs from maintaining nuisance suit against his keeping dog kennels).
98. Mitchell N. Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking Motives
Seriously, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 866 n.230 (1998) (citing Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,
and Utopia 84-85 (1974)).
99. Cf. Larry Alexander, Is Morality Like the Tax Code?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1839, 1843
(1997) (reviewing Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains (1996)) (suggesting problem with building
spite fences and undertaking similar activities "consists of intentionally exploiting
another's vulnerability, making the actor better off than she would be had the victim not
existed, and-importantly-making the victim worse off than she would be had the actor
not existed"); Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1454 (discussing spite
fences as example in which "we may want to make the entitlement to engage in a behavior
depend on one's reason for wishing to engage in it" but pointing out that "it can be very
difficult to tell why a particular fence has been constructed" (citing Ward Farnsworth, The
Economics of Enmity, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 211, 235 (2002))).
100. See, e.g., Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings: A
Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 U. Pa.J. Const. L. 20, 41 (1998) ("In the congestion of
many urban habitats, space is maximized by building upward .... [I]t therefore [is] not
unusual for air rights to comprise the major part of a lot's value." (footnote omitted)).
101. See Charles V. Bagli, For the King of the Skyline, a Tall and Unwelcome New
Neighbor, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 2010, at Al (reporting "fierce weeklong public relations
and lobbying campaign by the owners of the Empire State Building to stop the rival tower,
contending that its bulky profile would scar the skyline and diminish the Empire State
Building's iconic status").
102. Monday Ng, Chief Clears Air on Tamar View Fears, Standard (Hong Kong) (Oct.
15, 2005), http://www.thestandard.com.hk/newsdetail.asp?pp-cat=II&artid=3513&sid=
5003520&con-type=l (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The chief executive has
taken to the airwaves to deny he has any intention of blocking sea and mountain views with
the sprawling government complex proposed for the former British military headquarters
site on the Tamar Basin . . ").
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For example, according to David Scharf and Kristin Roy, a common
strategy in New York City has been for owners to hinder or delay a development project by asserting adverse possession claims. 10 3 Scharf and Roy
explain that, "[a]s a result of the substantial value associated with the
fight to develop upwards into airspace, neighboring owners often attempt to claim a right to airspace by adverse possession ... to improperly
gain leverage to extract monetary payments from eager owners and developers wishing to build upwards."1 0 4 And the strategy is often successful, as
those parties "wanting to proceed expeditiously with projects in which
substantial time and money have been invested often are required to
make substantial cash settlements to those claiming adverse rights,
thereby holding hostage the ability to develop into the disputed airspace." 10 5 Thus, owners and developers make payments that are "nothing
short of extortion" to prevent "protracted legal disputes that halt develop10 6
ment indefinitely in the interim."
4. Conservation Easements and Open Spaces. - Strategic spillovers also
arise in situations involving servitudes and land-use planning. An increasing percentage of land in the United States is subject to conservation
easements, servitudes that restrict the future use and development of
land. 10 7 According to one estimate, "the amount of land in the United
103. See generally Y. David Scharf & Kristin T. Roy, Adverse Possession of Airspace,
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 24, 2008, at 10 (2008).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. In New York, the legislature recently amended the state's adverse possession
statute to require that an adverse possessor have "a reasonable basis for the belief that the
property belongs to the adverse possessor," i.e., the adverse possessor must have acted in
good faith. Act of July 7, 2008, ch. 269, sec. 1, § 501(3), 2008 N.Y. Laws 3299, 3300
(codified as amended at N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 501(3) (McKinney 2008)). The
amended statute effectively "makes entrepreneurial neighbors seeking cash payments in
order to permit upward development a thing of the past." Scharf & Roy, supra note 103.
However, although the statute attempts to address the possibility that opportunistic owners
may invoke adverse possession to obstruct a development for financial gain, see Rudolph
de Winter & Larry M. Loeb, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Consolidated Laws of
New York Annotated, bk. 49 1/2, Real Prop. Acts. Law § 501(3), at 81 (2008) (indicating
adverse possession should not be used offensively), no analogous provision prevents
developers from threatening to build structures that would impose harm on existing
owners and then agreeing not to build once a side payment is made. For a recent proposal
regarding the external harm from the construction of skyscrapers and other urban
buildings, see Edward L. Glaeser, Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes
Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier 161 (2011) ("If tall heights create
costs by blocking light or views, then form a reasonable estimate of those costs and charge
the builder appropriately.").
107. For historical and legal background on conservation easements, see generally
Merrill & Smith, supra note 90, at 1038-41; Shea B. Airey, Conservation Easements in
Private Practice, 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 745 (2010); Zachary Bray, Reconciling
Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilemma of Conservation Easements,
34 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 119 (2010); Ann Harris Smith, Note, Conservation Easement
Violated: What Next? A Discussion of Remedies, 20 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 597 (2010);
Larry Ribstein, The Market for Conservation Law 5-6 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law, Law &
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States subject to conservation easements exploded from very little in 1980
to over 5 million acres by 2003."108 Since then, the number of acres subject to easements has continued to expand dramatically, spurred in part
by federal and state tax incentives. 10 9 Although there are various types of
conservation easements, among the most common is a restriction that
prohibits commercial development and new subdivisions, but allows existing agricultural and residential uses. 110
However, the use of tax deductions, intended to encourage developers and land trusts to increase the number of conservation easements, has
proven controversial. Specifically, some developers have received substantial tax deductions for agreeing not to build on certain parcels of land,
including the fairways, bunkers, and putting greens of a golf course."' 1
Such developers were able to obtain tax deductions for agreeing not to
impose the social costs associated with development, even for lands they
had no intention of developing and would have conserved in the absence
of a payment.' 12 These tax deductions illustrate that individuals and firms
may undertake strategic spillovers not only to extract payments from
other private parties but also to obtain subsidies and other payments
from the government.
A similar phenomenon also has been occurring in densely-populated
cities and towns as well as in national forests and parks. Many cities and
towns are hoping to expand the amount of land devoted to open
Econ. Research Paper No. LE10-009, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 09-25,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1609793 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
108. Merrill & Smith, supra note 90, at 1038-39.
109. See Smith, supra note 107, at 598 (noting number of acres land trusts had
preserved more than doubled between 2000 and 2005 and "increased dramatically
between 2006 and 2010, during which time a special tax incentive was in place" (footnote
omitted)); see also Ribstein, supra note 107, at 8 (noting "easements and easement statutes
spread across the states following the 1976 federal income tax exemption" and citing
"experimental evidence indicating that tax incentives influence the demand for
easements").
110. Merrill & Smith, supra note 90, at 1039.
111. See, e.g., Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Developers Find Payoff in
Preservation, Wash. Post, Dec. 21, 2003, at Al. According to the article:
Pennsylvania developer Kenneth C. Hellings says he restricted building on
"unusable" portions of his new subdivision and took "a shocker" of a tax
deduction.... Using guidance from a local land trust, Hellings's lawyers wrote an
easement covering a dozen islands of protected land, one as small as six-tenths of
an acre. Then they placed a second easement directly on 220 acres of the golf
course, including the fairways, bunkers and putting greens. The easements were
accepted by the Brandywine Conservancy, a well-established Pennsylvania land
trust.
Id.; see also Jessica Owley, Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of
Perpetual Conservation Easements, 30 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 121, 161 n.168 (2011)
("Opportunistic acquisition dominated the beginning of most land trusts ....").
112. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 107, at 8 (asserting "the public benefit of the easements
encouraged by the tax break may be disconnected from the public cost").
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space.' 1 3 To this end, municipal governments are seeking to purchase
undeveloped parcels of land or the development rights to such parcels. 114 However, realizing the municipality's interest in acquiring additional open space, landowners may act opportunistically. Specifically,
even if a landowner had no intention of building on a particular parcel,
the landowner may announce construction plans or commence construction to secure an elevated price, thereby making it much more costly for
115
the municipality that is seeking to preserve the land as open space.
Similarly, as the Wall Street Journal has documented, a real-estate broker
named Thomas Chapman "has made a controversial career trading scattered parcels of private land that sit inside national forests and national
parks."116 Mr. Chapman's strategy is simple: "[H]e talks up plans to develop the parcels," including the possibility of bulldozing the land,
"[e]nvironmentalists sound the alarm," and "often, the government or
conservationists come with money or a land swap to buy him out, saving
the cherished parcel from development-and making Mr. Chapman
17
money." 1
B. Environmental Law
The typical concern with pollution in environmental law, as noted
above, is that the owners of factories and other facilities whose byprod113. See Robert H. Levin, When Forever Proves Fleeting: The Condemnation and
Conversion of Conservation Land, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 592, 617 (2001) (claiming there are
"hundreds of examples of states and communities accepting higher taxes to preserve fastdisappearing open space"); A. Dan Tarlock, How California Local Governments Became
Both Water Suppliers and Planners, 4 Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. 7, 18 (2010) ("As new
suburbs [in California] expanded into farming areas near older urban areas, concern
about the loss of 'open space' emerged as a 'hot' local and regional political issue.");
Derald J. Hay, Comment, When Sealing the Leaks of Habitat Conservation Banking,
Multiple Gaskets Are Needed: The Case for Bog Turtle in Pennsylvania, 14 Penn St. Envtl.
L. Rev. 299, 325 n.161 (2006) ("Twenty municipalities in Chester County, Pennsylvania
have increased taxes to purchase and preserve areas of open space to prevent subdivision
and development.").
114. See Amanda Siek, Comment, Smart Cities: A Detailed Look at Land Use
Planning Techniques that Are Aimed at Promoting Both Energy and Environmental
Conservation, 7 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook J. 45, 62 (2002) (discussing acquisition of
development rights as "land use technique in which state or local authorities purchase a
conservation easement on farmland or undeveloped open space").
115. See id. at 62 n.99 (noting "one drawback could be the expense required to
employ a purchasing of development rights program" (citation omitted)). At the same
time, local governments often have an incentive to act quickly to prevent an owner from
completing construction. See Michael C. Spata, A Practical Approach to the Deductibility
of a Charitable Contribution for a Qualified Conservation Easement, 22 Real Est. LJ. 132,
132-33 (1993) (describing "tendency for local government agencies to augment their
inventory of open space areas by changing land use and development regulations before
the developer can complete actual construction of the physical structures that were
approved previously by that same local government agency").
116. Stephanie Simon, 'The Buzzard of Backcountry' Strikes It Rich in National
Parks, Wall. St. J., Oct. 2, 2010, at Al.
117. Id.
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ucts may damage the air, water, natural resources, or climate may not
have an incentive to internalize the harm their activities are imposing on
others. 118 But pollution may arise for another reason as well. Writing in
the wake of Coase, a handful of economists observed that, theoretically,
certain firms might have an incentive to become "pollution entrepreneurs" who could profit by emitting excessive pollution to extract payments from those bearing the social costs.' 19
Historically, one of the primary reasons firms did not engage in this
type of opportunism is likely to be, as EJ. Mishan suggests, transaction
costs. 120 It typically would have been too costly for a firm to collect payments from each individual who is bearing the external costs of its pollution.1 2 1 Even if a firm's pollution were concentrated in a particular region, the costs of negotiating with each affected party might quickly have
surpassed the gains the firm might expect to obtain. The individuals affected by the pollution also might have an incentive not to make pay122
ments and "free ride" off of their neighbors.
But the problem of "pollution entrepreneurs," once only a theoretical possibility, is now a reality, especially in markets for greenhouse gases.
These markets emerged as a result of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Under the CDM, companies in Annex
I countries, including most European nations, are permitted to pay chemical plants in developing nations such as China to stop emitting green23
house gases, including trifluoromethane, also known as HFC-23.1
118. See supra Part I.A.
119. Shoup, supra note 7, at 310-11; see also Mishan, Postwar, supra note 7, at 24
(discussing possibility of "unnecessary pollution in order to extract greater tribute from the
public"); Rothenberg, supra note 7, at 115 (hypothesizing that "negative externalities" may

"lead to bribes by victims to desist").
120. See Mishan, Postwar, supra note 7, at 24 (suggesting that transaction costs
impede firms from producing unnecessary pollution to extract payments).
121. See id. at 22 ("[S]uch costs . . .increase with the dispersion of the [affected]
group, and increase with the numbers involved, probably at an exponential rate."); cf.
Kaplow & Shavell, Property Rules, supra note 30, at 749 ("Bargaining appears to have
relatively little importance in the context of industrial pollution because, as is often stated,
victims of pollution are unlikely to bargain with those responsible for it.").
122. On free riders, which here are actually beneficial in deterring opportunism, see
generally Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for

Collective Action 6 (1990) ("Whenever one person cannot be excluded from the benefits
that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort, but to
free-ride on the efforts of others."); Russell Hardin, The Free Rider Problem, in Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2008/entries/free-rider/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
phenomenon of free riding).
123. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations on Climate Change, art. 12, Dec. 11,
1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 (defining CDM); McGivern, supra note 17, at 26-27 (explaining
operation of CDM). HFC-23 is a byproduct of manufacturing HCFC-22, a common
refrigerant used in heat pump and air conditioning systems. For more on HCFCs and their
planned phase-out under the Montreal Protocol, see What You Should Know About
Refrigerants When Purchasing or Repairing a Residential A/C System or Heat Pump,
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Scientists estimate that, because of its potential to contribute to
global warming, HFC-23 is approximately 11,700 times worse for the environment than carbon dioxide.' 24 Thus, under the CDM, eliminating one
ton of HFC-23 earns a plant 11,700 tons of carbon offset credits, also
known as "Certified Emission Reductions" (CERs). 125 To avoid emitting
HFC-23 into the atmosphere, Chinese industrial plants are capable of incinerating the gas. In early 2008, carbon credits were trading at around
$25 per ton, so incinerating one ton of HFC-23 created a benefit of almost $300,000 (i.e., 11,700 x $25), even though the cost of doing so was
1 26
only $5,000 per ton.

As a result, speculation arose that certain "Chinese companies have
built chemical plants mainly to cash in on carbon credits." 127 In late 2006,
the New York Times reported that a United Nations study had found that
the profits from destroying HFC-23 were "enormous" and that "industrial
nations could pay $800 million a year to buy credits, even though the cost
of building and operating incinerators will be only $31 million a year. 1 28
Several academics, including Michael Wara and David Victor, also highlighted the problem. 129 Ultimately, in response to mounting pressure
from several nongovernmental organizations, 130 the United Nations
halted the issuance of CERs for five Chinese plants suspected of engaging
in excessive production to generate additional HFC-23. 13 1 And, recently,
several members of the CDM Executive Board recommended "that the
procedure of issuing U.N. carbon credits to industrial gas projects which
32
destroy [HFC-23] should be revised."'
Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/ozone/title6/phaseout/22phaseout.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated Aug. 19, 2010).
124. Stoft, supra note 20, at 212.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Keith Bradsher, Outsize Profits, and Questions, in Effort to Cut Warming Gases,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2006, at Al.
129. Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon
Offsets 1l (Stanford Univ., Program on Energy & Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74,
2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74-final-final.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting "CDM Executive Board implemented a number of
restrictions that limited, but failed to eliminate, the perverse incentive" resulting from
HFC-23 capture being more valuable than refrigerant gas production).
130. See, e.g., Press Release, CDM Watch, UN Delays Action on Carbon Market
Scandal (July 30, 2010), http://www.cdm-watch.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
2010/07/Press-ReleaseCDM-Panel-Calls-for-Investigation-over-Carbon-Market-Scandal.pdf
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("A coalition of environmental NGOs warned today
that the UN CDM Executive Board is avoiding immediate and necessary action to address
scandalous gaming of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism because of
conflicts of interest in the Board.").
131. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
132. Nina Chestney, UN Panel Backs Revision to Issuing of HFC-23 Offsets, Reuters
(Nov. 24, 2010, 9:58 PM), http://af.reuters.com/article/energy0ilNews/idAFLDE6AN20
420101124 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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Operators of industrial gas plants in China are not alone. Steven
Stoft documents how operators of a coal-fired power plant in South
Africa engaged in a similar scheme. 133 These operators "said they would
keep using dirty coal unless they got carbon credits to buy some natural
gas instead. ' 134 But they had "signed a gas contract before the CER policy
went into effect. That is, they had already planned to cut their carbon
dioxide emissions. They were simply hoping to defraud the United
135
Stoft points out that firms may take such actions even if
Nations ....
they do not intend to act strategically: "Whoever takes most advantage of
[CERs] makes the most profit and can sell their product for less and undercut their competition. Businessmen fear their competitor will employ
such a strategy, and so, in self-defense, they feel they must employ it
136
themselves."
The difficulty with regulating HFC-23 production in China and coal
production in South Africa is in distinguishing between those actions that
represent actual reductions of greenhouse gases that would not have
been undertaken but for the carbon credits and those actions that represent apparent reductions in greenhouse gases that would have been
undertaken even in the absence of carbon credits. This problem suggests
the need, as many environmental law scholars now recognize, for defining and implementing a "principle of additionality."1 3 7 A principle of additionality would provide a mechanism for distinguishing between
projects that would not occur in the absence of the subsidy (i.e., that are
"additional"), and thus that the government may have an interest in subsidizing, and projects that would occur in the absence of the subsidy (i.e.,
that are not "additional"), and thus that the government probably has no
1 38
interest in subsidizing.
133. Stoft, supra note 20, at 211.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 212.
137. See Carol M. Rose, Big Roads, Big Rights: Varieties of Public Infrastructure and
Their Impact on Environmental Resources, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 409, 438 (2008) (describing
"Kyoto insistence that forestry and other so-called clean development credits meet the
criterion of 'additionality'-that they be some measure in addition to what was going to
happen anyway"); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address
Climate Change, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 293, 323 (2008) (noting that "because of concerns
about additionality and related perverse incentives, the role of project-based offsets should
be defined carefully").
138. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's
Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 Ind. L.J. 21, 57 n.208
(2008) ("Because many energy efficiency projects are economically attractive on their own,
they have difficulty satisfying this [additionality] criterion."); cf. Tom Baker & Peter
Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the Health-Insurance Pool
with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 Wis. L. Rev. 79, 102
n.78 ("To the extent that one uses subsidies to alter behavior, any money directed towards
those already engaged in the desired behavior is a waste. In tax policy, the problem of
subsidizing pre-existing conduct while trying to create incentives for new behavior is
known as 'buying the base.'").
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To be sure, instead of subsidizing reductions, the government could
impose a corrective tax so each firm would be forced to internalize the
harm it is generating.1 39 The corrective tax approach, which this Article
discusses below,140 recognizes that, by engaging in an activity that involves
pollution, a firm is imposing harm on others and attempts to force the
firm to internalize this harm. However, as commentators have noted, a
corrective tax of a significant magnitude may not be a feasible option for
forcing firms to internalize their externalities."4 Given these constraints,
governments may continue to rely on subsidies to encourage reductions,
an approach that increases the likelihood that modern-day "pollution entrepreneurs" will engage in this type of opportunism. 14 2
C. Intellectual Property Law
This type of opportunistic behavior is also common in the world of
intellectual property. Cases involving "cybersquatters," which initially
arose under trademark and unfair competition law, are an example. 43 A
"cybersquatter" is an individual who "knowingly reserves with a registrar a
139. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes
to Quantity Regulation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 2 (2002) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell,
Corrective Taxes] (arguing "traditional notion of the superiority of corrective taxes should
continue to be a benchmark for economists' thinking about the control of externalities").
140. See infra Part IV.A.4 (examining corrective taxes, as well as liability rules, as
solution for strategic spillovers).
141. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Foreword, The Search for Regulatory
Alternatives, 15 Stan. Envtl. LJ., at viii, xix (1996) (noting that, while direct incentives such
as taxes may be "more dynamic than marketable permit systems," they are "politically less
feasible"); cf. JR. DeShazo &Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The
Case of Climate Change, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1499, 1544-45 (2007) (arguing "stronger
industry consensus [will] emerge in favor of cap-and-trade").
142. Obviously, externalities can include visual pollution (e.g., aesthetic blight) or
audio pollution (e.g., loud noises) as well as air and water pollution. And, the same type of
opportunistic behavior is possible. For example, in analyzing eminent domain, Lee Fennell
discusses the "particularly troubling" situation in which owners of blighted property might
share in an assembly's surplus. Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004
Mich. St. L. Rev. 957, 985. Fennell notes that "[t]he incentives for extortionate behavior
are clear enough if people are allowed to create bad situations and then glean some of the
surplus associated with relieving the negative condition." Id. She compares such situations
to a claim that "someone who is making hideous music on the sidewalk has a right to some
of the surplus associated with stopping the racket." Id. (citing Randy Cohen, The Ethicist:
Pay for No Play?, N.Y. Times Mag., Nov. 28, 2004, at 66); see also Fennell, Adjusting
Alienability, supra note 38, at 1453-54 (discussing "resident [who] plays her trombone very
poorly" and observing "it is almost impossible to distinguish musicians in the early stages of
their training from opportunists hoping to extract payments from their annoyed
neighbors").
143. See H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting
Rights and Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y 301, 311 (2005) ("The first
attempts to dislodge cybersquatters utilized traditional trademark and related actions:
direct trademark infringement and unfair competition, dilution, and secondary liability
(contributory infringement and vicarious liability)." (citingJennifer Golinveaux, What's in
a Domain Name? Is "Cybersquatting" Trademark Dilution?, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 641, 654-55
(1999))).
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domain name consisting of the mark or name of a company for the purpose of relinquishing the right to that domain name back to the legitimate owner for a price." 144 For example, in Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen,
plaintiff Intermatic, a company that had been manufacturing and distributing a variety of electrical and electronic products since 1941, brought
suit under federal and state trademark and unfair competition laws
against defendant Dennis Toeppen.1 45 Toeppen operated an internet
service provider and registered approximately 240 domain names including "deltaairlines.com," "crateandbarrel.com," "ramadainn.com," "g eatamerica.com," and "ussteel.com," as well as "intermatic.com," the subject
of the litigation. 146 But for the possibility of extracting a payment for resale or licensing, it is unlikely that Toeppen would have expended the
time and effort necessary to register "intermatic.com" and hundreds of
other domain names. 147 The court ultimately enjoined Toeppen from us14 s
ing the "intermatic.com" domain name.
Congress eventually attempted to address the issue more systematically in the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 149
Under ACPA, "a person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark" if that person "(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark"
and "(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name" that is "identical or
confusingly similar to that mark .

. . ."150

However, considerable contro-

versy remains over how to distinguish a legitimate owner of a domain
name, who may harm other businesses as an incidental byproduct of such
151
ownership, and a cybersquatter who is engaging in a strategic spillover.
The distinction turns, as the Act indicates, on the concept of "bad faith,"
but, in many circumstances, bad faith may be difficult to define as well as
15 2
to detect.
144. 4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 25:77 (4th ed. 2008).
145. 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1229 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
146. Id. at 1229-30.
147. See id. at 1230 ("One of Toeppen's business objectives is to profit by the resale
or licensing of these domain names, presumably to the entities who conduct business
under these names."); id. at 1233 ("At no time did Toeppen use intermatic.com in
connection with the sale of any available goods or services. At no time has Toeppen
advertised the intermatic.com domain name in association with any goods or services.").
148. Id. at 1241.
149. Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3002(a), 113 Stat. 1501, 1501A-545 (1999) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006)).
150. Id.
151. Cf. Orion Armon, Note, Is This as Good as It Gets? An Appraisal of ICANN's
Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) Three Years After
Implementation, 22 Rev. Litig. 99, 110 (2003) (pointing out that "fundamental
disagreements regarding which types of domain name registration practices are acceptable
and which are not remain largely unresolved").
152. See Natalia Ramirez, Note, Will the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
Create More Problems than It Solves?, 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 395, 396 (2002) (arguing
ACPA, by relying on "traditional trademark infringement and dilution principles to
determine whether a person has infringed or diluted the mark in bad faith[,] .. . merely
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Strategic spillovers are also prevalent in patent law. For example, a
"patent troll" may rely on an erroneously issued patent to extract a payment or licensing fee from a company that has independently discovered
the same invention. As Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley point out, "a
large and growing number of 'patent trolls' today play this exact strategy,
using patents on obvious inventions quite literally to tax legitimate business activity."' 153 By acquiring patents they do not intend to use, patent
trolls may purposely harm legitimate businesses attempting to license
multiple patents for a new product. 154 The difficulty, once again, is how
is
to determine whether a patent holder that is not practicing a patent 155
sitting on the sidelines for a legitimate reason or an opportunistic one.
Like patent trolls, patent thickets involve situations in which a party
may impose harm purposely to extract a payment or gain a competitive
advantage. A patent thicket is "an overlapping set of patent rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses
from multiple patentees. 1 5 6 Patentees sometimes use their patent rights
and intellectual property portfolios strategically,1 57 and, if a party seeking
to develop a life-saving drug or other product is required to assemble
licenses from several parties, a patentee may "hold up" a project opporcodifies existing cybersquatting case law, which scarcely addresses the difficult issue created
when both parties have a valid claim to the same domain name"); cf. Armon, supra note
151, at 110 (noting disagreements persist "partly because a key element in a cybersquatting
claim-bad faith-is notoriously difficult to define and prove"). For more on this
controversy, see Mairead Moore, Cybersquatting: Prevention Better than Cure?, 17 Int'l
J.L. & Info. Tech. 220, 220, 228 (2009) (examining "legal mechanisms that have been
employed to deal with cybersquatting" and arguing prevention at registration stage will be
necessary to curb such activity).
153. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of
Validity, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 45, 48 (2007).
154. For more on patent trolls, see generally John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent
Trolls" and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2114 (2007) (arguing against
categorical denial of injunctive relief to noncompeting patent holders); Gerard N.
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1809, 1811 (2007) (comparing "patent trolls" with nineteenth century
agricultural "patent sharks" to derive lessons about particularly vulnerable patents and
potential remedies); J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna & Olivia E. Marbutt, Strategies
for Combating Patent Trolls, 17J. Intell. Prop. L. 367, 368 (2010) (focusing on adjusting
risks and costs of patent litigation against trolls).
155. Cf. Greg Halsey, Comment, There Is a Pink Elephant at Our Patent Negotiation,
and His Name Is Declaratory Judgment, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 247, 275 (2009) ("In
declaratory judgment cases, the only way courts can distinguish between aggressive patent
trolls and quiescent patent holders is through the application of prudential
considerations.").
156. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in 1 Innovation Policy and the Economy 119, 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh
Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001).
157. See generally Daniel R. Rubinfeld & Robert Maness, The Strategic Use of
Patents: Implications for Antitrust, in Antitrust, Patents and Copyright: EU and US
Perspectives 85, 86 (Francois Leveque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005) (discussing strategic
uses of IP portfolios to compete with rivals).
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tunistically.' 58 The patentee may do so to extract license payments from
competitors, to deter potential competitors from entering a market, or to
obstruct competitors from innovating.15 9 And patent thickets are a perennial concern, from the sewing machine 1 60 to nanotechnology,16 1 al62
though scholars disagree on the scope of the problem.
Finally, although prior use of the term "strategic spillovers" is relatively rare, the literature on knowledge spillovers in patent law is one of
the few areas in which scholars have utilized this phrase.163 The structure
of strategic knowledge spillovers is similar to the general structure of strategic spillovers discussed above. 164 However, strategic knowledge spillovers entail an additional twist because, paradoxically, a party that strategically discloses information is able to help itself and (ultimately) may
hurt its rival by freely providing the rival with valuable information:
[T] he fact that patent applications are evaluated in light of the
prior art gives firms a strategic incentive to create prior art. A
firm can publish a journal article or engage in a public demonstration and in that way affect both a rival's ability to patent a
related invention and the rival's incentive to do so. Perhaps surprisingly, this can make the disclosing firm better off even
158. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698 (1998) (discussing
anticommons in patent); see also Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621, 623-24 (1998)
(discussing anticommons in general).
159. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1251, 1300 n.175 (2004) (describing James Bessen's view that most patenting is
"'strategic patenting'-that is, patents that are taken out.., to create a 'patent thicket' by
which the holder.., can extract license payments from potential competitors, deter entry
from potential competitors, or hold up innovation by potential competitors").
160. See generally Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 165, 168 (2011) ("[T]he
explicit identification of the Sewing Machine War as a patent thicket . . . will be of
significant interest to patent and property scholars today.").
161. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 601, 630 (2005)
(discussing how law might "ameliorate the risk of a nanotechnology patent thicket" by
changing "rules that encourage opportunistic holdup").
162. Compare Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership
Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives 6 (2008) ("Research scientists have
whispered to me about other potential cures blocked by a multiplicity of patent owners.
These missing drugs are a silent tragedy. Millions have suffered and will continue to suffer
or die from diseases that could have been treated or prevented ....
), with Richard A.
Epstein, Heller's Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too
Much Private Property, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 51, 74-82 (2011) (discussing patent thickets and
taking more skeptical view of extent to which patents cause gridlock).
163. See, e.g., Giovanni De Fraja, Strategic Spillovers in Patent Races, 11 Int'l J. of
Indus. Org. 139 (1993); see also Dietmar Harhoff, Strategic Spillovers and Incentives for
Research and Development, 42 Mgmt. Sci. 907, 907 (1996) (developing "model in which a
monopolist supplier can contribute to downstream product improvements by creating
knowledge spillovers which downstream firms use as a substitute for their own R&D
efforts").
164. See supra Part I.
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though, by revealing information, the firm is likely helping its
rival and, worse, 5 narrowing or even fully preempting the very
16
patent it seeks.
As with strategic spillovers more generally, the possibility of strategic
knowledge spillovers may result in "private negotiations" with the strategic party "agreeing not to disclose and in exchange receiving from the
166
ultimate patentee some form of favorable licensing agreement."
D. Corporate Law
Parties also engage in activities that are similar to the strategic spillovers
described above in several situations in corporate law including hostile
takeovers, shareholder initiatives, and cumulative voting.
For example, a party may threaten to engage in a hostile takeover for
purposes of "greenmailing" a company's managers. 1 67 In Heckmann v.
Ahmanson, a California appellate court explained how "[a] greenmailer
creates the threat of a corporate takeover by purchasing a significant
amount of the company's stock [and] then sells the shares back to the
company at a premium when its executives, in fear of their jobs, agree to
buy him out."168 Greenmail is usually thought to be problematic if it is
initiated solely to extract a payment.1 69 However, certain forms of "greenmail" may be socially desirable. Stephen Bainbridge, citing prior work by
Jonathan Macey and Fred McChesney, notes that "greenmail actually may
be beneficial in that it may allow the board to seek higher bids or to
enhance value (above the greenmail bidder's price) by making changes
in management or strategy." 1 70 As a result, "a greenmailer may be a catalyst for change from within or for a bidding war and may therefore deserve to make a profit."' 71 The difficulty, once again, is determining
whether a party threatening a hostile takeover is acting out of self-interest
in a manner that may be socially desirable or is undertaking a socially
wasteful action to extract a payment.
165. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker & Kate Kraus, Strategic Disclosure in the Patent
System, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 2175, 2175-76 (2000).
166. Id. at 2176.
167. See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tactics: A
Comment on Two Models, 96 Yale L.J. 295, 311 (1986) ("A targeted share repurchase, or
greenmail, is the buyback of the shares owned by a particular shareholder of the target
who has made, or threatened, a takeover bid.").
168. 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180 n.1 (Ct. App. 1985).
169. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 167, at 311 (noting "standard account of
greenmail . . . argues that greenmail serves management entrenchment objectives only;
that is, that management, which has mismanaged target assets, pays greenmail in order to
perpetuate its ability to exploit the target").
170. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 Del.J. Corp. L. 769, 792 n.98 (2006) (citingJonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A
Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L.J. 13, 15-16 (1985); Fred S.
McChesney, Transaction Costs and Corporate Greenmail: Theory, Empirics and a Mickey
Mouse Case Study, 14 Managerial & Decision Econ. 131, 133-34 (1993)).
171. Id.
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Similarly, corporate shareholders may use shareholder initiatives for
benevolent or malevolent purposes. On one hand, Lucian Bebchuk is optimistic about the role of shareholders and "presents the case for giving
shareholders the power not only to elect and replace directors, but also to
initiate and adopt rules-of-the-game decisions to amend the corporate
charter or to reincorporate in another jurisdiction." 172 On the other
hand, shareholders also may utilize the initiative process to extract payments in exchange for not imposing harm on the corporation or its managers. As Jeffrey Gordon emphasizes, shareholder initiatives create "an
opportunity for shareholders to pursue private wealth maximization
through bargaining with managers." 173 Gordon explains:
Shareholders can threaten to make a shareholder initiative that
has some probability of success, or having made the initiative,
can suggest a willingness to withdraw it, and thereby induce
managers with valuable agency benefits to use the firm's resources to buy them out at a premium over market or make
174
other transfers.
This type of shareholder initiative, Gordon concludes, "may make it possi75
ble to extract greenmail-like payments from the firm."'
There is also a debate among corporate scholars about the ways in
which parties might use (or abuse) cumulative voting in corporate governance.' 76 One of the concerns about cumulative voting is that "a minority stockholder might use board access and the threat of disruption to
hold up the corporation for greenmail." 77 Indeed, as Jeffrey Gordon admits, courts historically "did not police such potential uses of cumulative
voting. ' 178 However, Gordon claims that commentators should take a
"new look" at the benefits of cumulative voting. 179 He argues that "activist
institutions" are likely "to use power added by cumulative voting to pursue strategies that will increase share values, producing gains that are
common to all shareholders, rather than to extract private gains, such as
greenmail." 8 0° Of course, it may be difficult to know in advance whether
172. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 833, 837 (2005).
173. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 347, 381 (1991).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Cumulative voting is "a vehicle for proportional board representation of
significant shareholder minorities" and was a "common feature in corporate governance
until the managerialist assaults of the 1950s." Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational
Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124, 127 (1994); see also
id. at 127 n.8 (explaining mechanics of cumulative voting in corporate law).
177. Id. at 167.
178. Id. at 167 n.139 (citing Chi. Macaroni Mfg. v. Boggiano, 67 N.E. 17 (Ill. 1903);
Tomlin v. Farmers & Merchs. Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (1893)).
179. Id. at 124.
180. Id. at 128; see also Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model
of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1947 (1996) (arguing cumulative voting
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these institutions will use cumulative voting to act in a self-interested way
that also increases value for other shareholders or to act opportunistically
to extract private benefits for themselves.
E. Legislation and Regulation
Strategic spillovers also arise in the legislative or regulatory process.
Legislators or regulators have the ability to impose costs on several types
of parties, including (1) a party that benefits from a cartel or existing
regulation (by threatening to deregulate), (2) a party that benefits from
the absence of regulation (by threatening to regulate), or (3) a party that
is seeking regulatory approval (by threatening to withhold approval or by
allowing objectors to delay the process). The ability to impose these costs
provides a chance for opportunistic legislators or regulators, as well as
others who may be capable of influencing the substance or timing of legislation or regulation, to extract payments in exchange for not imposing
such harm.
In the legislative process, Fred McChesney has observed that "payments to politicians often are made, not for particular political favors, but
to avoid particular political disfavor, that is, as part of a system of political
extortion, or 'rent extraction." 1 81 According to McChesney, politicians
may threaten to enact legislation for which they would not have voted in
order to extract campaign contributions or other benefits from a particular constituency that the new law might burden. 18 2 Similarly, but more
"provides access to company information," "makes it more likely that a minority of
directors is truly independent of management," and "reinforces the principle that
directors owe their loyalty to shareholders, not to the company's officers").
181. Fred S. McChesney, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and
Political Extortion 2 (1997) [hereinafter McChesney, Money for Nothing]. McChesney
provides an example:
The political strategy of cost forbearance can assume several forms. Perhaps most
obvious is the threat to deregulate an industry previously cartelized. Expected
political rents created by earlier regulation are quickly capitalized into firm share
prices. If politicians later breach their contract and vote unexpectedly to
deregulate, shareholders suffer a wealth loss. Rather than suffer the costs of
deregulation, shareholders will pay politicians a sum, up to the amount of wealth
loss threatened, to have them refrain from deregulating. And in fact one
routinely observes payments to politicians to protect previously enacted cartel
measures. Dairy interests pay handsomely for continuation of congressional milkprice supports; physician and dentist political action committees (PACs)
contribute large sums for continuation of self-regulation.
Id. at 23 (citing Larry J. Sabato, PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action
Committees 133-37 (1984)).
182. See id. at 45-68 (examining different forms of payment from private groups to
politicians and describing how politicians extract rents by threats); see also Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16
J. Legal Stud. 101, 117 (1987) ("Status as a legislator confers a property right not only to
create political rents but also to impose costs that would destroy private rents.").
McChesney points out that the "extraction option is not mere blackboard economics" and
that "politicians practice rent extraction routinely." McChesney, Money for Nothing, supra
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recently, Guy Halfteck has suggested that "the legislative process is frequently used solely to exert threats of impending legislation rather than
to enact a legislative measure."18 3 Like McChesney, Halfteck argues that
legislators sometimes undertake these types of legislative threats to obtain
campaign contributions and extract other types of political rents.1 8 4 This
type of "political extortion" has real effects on firms and market participants.18 5 And, as Halfteck documents, it appears that "[t]he prevalence
of legislative threats incorporates all areas of activity, ranging from cybersecurity and e-piracy to digital obscenity and air pollution; from executive
compensation and money laundering to obesity and illegal
186
substances."
In the regulatory process, parties also may challenge various types of
regulatory approvals. Some parties do so not because they have an interest in preventing the grant of a license to a party, but to extract a payment from the party in exchange for ceasing their opposition. For example, one observer of the communications industry notes: "Frequently,
challenges to license renewals are mounted by persons who have no interest in broadcasting. The purpose of mounting a challenge is to obtain a
1 87
payoff from the licensee in exchange for dropping the challenge.
Likewise, two decades ago, one commentator noted that, under the
Community Reinvestment Act,' 88 any individual could "submit to regulatory authorities objections to bank mergers, acquisitions, and branch

note 181, at 29. He notes that "'[m] ilker bills' is one term used by politicians to describe
legislative proposals intended only to 'milk' private producers for payments not to pass the
rent-extracting legislation." Id. He also quotes an earlier paper by William Stubblebine in
which Stubblebine vividly describes the practice of "milker bills" in the California State
Legislature. Id. at 29-30; see also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40
Stan. L. Rev. 577, 591 (1988) [hereinafter Rose, Crystals and Mud] (discussing how
"interest groups will bid for whatever 'asset' is the object of the decision-maker's
discretionary choice").
183. Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 629, 647 (2008); see also id. at
664 ("In view of their prevalence, it stands to reason that legislators benefit from exerting
threats and, furthermore, that these benefits exceed the costs undertaken by doing so.").
184. See id. at 664 n.145 ("Paying rents essentially compensates the legislator for not
exercising his power to charge individuals and firms for the right to keep capital they have
amassed and wealth they have produced. Rents take many forms, including campaign
contributions, speaking honoraria, and in-kind benefits." (citation omitted)).
185. See R. Beck, C. Hoskins & J.M. Connolly, Rent Extraction Through Political
Extortion: An Empirical Examination, 21 J. Legal Stud. 217, 223 (1992) (demonstrating
Canadian firms suffered negative stock returns following announcement of potential
adverse government action).
186. Halfteck, supra note 183, at 647.
187. Donald L. Bell, Unbundling: An Alternative to the Current System of Cable
Television Franchising, 21 Cumb. L. Rev. 43, 70 n.127 (1990).
188. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2006).
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openings or closings."1 89 The commentator claimed that, because "objections result in administrative proceedings which, in turn, entail substantial costs and delay, financial institutions induce community activists to
withdraw their objections by paying bribes in the form of low-cost loans
and mortgages, donations for housing projects, and contributions to
community groups." 190 Obviously, in the wake of the mortgage crisis, this
claim is significant, albeit extremely controversial.1 9 1 And, although it is
difficult to know the motivation of any individual or organization that
launched (or threatened to launch) an objection, Business Week reported
'pledged' more than $5
at the time that "[b]etween 1986 and 1988, banks
' 19 2
billion in response to activists' complaints."
F. Litigation and Settlement
Strategic spillovers also arise during the litigation process itself. For
example, a plaintiff may file a negative expected value suit for its nuisance value. 193 Lucian Bebchuk explains that in many cases "the potential
plaintiff recognizes that the expected value to him of going to trial is
negative. This might be the case either because the chances of winning a
trial are small (the suit is 'frivolous') or because the expected judgment is
189. Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 Tul. L.
Rev. 339, 389 (1990).
190. Id. at 389-90.
191. Compare David G. Tarr, The Political, Regulatory, and Market Failures that
Caused the US Financial Crisis 10 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5324,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1322297 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ("The real problem is that once bank regulators initiated
changes in enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act to require banks to lower
underwriting standards, they could hardly oppose similar loans to better qualified
borrowers. Then the relaxed standards spread to the wider mortgage market ...."),and
Stan Liebowitz, The Real Scandal: How Feds Invited the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. Post (Feb. 5,
2008, 2:39 Am), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/item-)jlO8v
Dbysbe6LWDxcq03Jjsessionid=C10C51D2E92830A5E4DB16A20D368628 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (opining that "it was the regulators who relaxed [underwriting]
standards-at the behest of community groups and 'progressive' political forces"), with
Adam J. Levitin & Susan Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 Geo. L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 40), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1669401 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Claims about
the CRA's role in the bubble have been thoroughly considered elsewhere and largely
debunked ...."),and Raymond H. Brescia, Part of the Disease or Part of the Cure: The
Financial Crisis and the Community Reinvestment Act, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 617, 619 (2009)
(contending that "instead of causing the subprime mortgage crisis, the CRA simply failed
to prevent the crisis").
192. Greve, supra note 189, at 390 n.206 (citing Catherine Yang, The 'Blackmail'
Making Banks Better Neighbors, Bus. Wk., Aug. 15, 1988, at 101).
193. See D. Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their
Nuisance Value, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 3, 3 (1985) (defining nuisance suit as "suit in which
the plaintiff is able to obtain a positive settlement from the defendant even though the
defendant knows the plaintiffs case is sufficiently weak that he would be unwilling or
unlikely actually to pursue his case to trial").
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small relative to the expected litigation costs."1 9 4 Yet, as Bebchuck explains, "the negative expected value of litigation might not deter the
plaintiff from suing: the plaintiff might sue-hoping to extract a settlement offer from the defendant, and planning to drop the case if such an
195
offer is not received."
The primary legal mechanism in the federal courts for deterring frivolous suits and other actions brought for their "nuisance value" is Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 19 6 For this reason, one commentator has drawn an analogy between Rule 11 and the spite fence statutes
discussed above: 197 "What does [Rule 11] have in common with rules of
nuisance-abatement that apply to spite fences? The rule is designed to
deter vexatious and frivolous legal actions ... that are brought for purposes other than to obtain the relief sought in the pleading, motion, or
other demand for relief." 19 8 Of course, as commentators have noted,
Rule 11 is underinclusive in deterring negative expected value suits, at
least in part because of the difficulty of distinguishing colorable claims
from suits brought for their nuisance value. 1 99
Negative expected value suits are common in state and probate
courts as well as federal courts. For example, in the field of trusts and
estates, disinherited children and others who are dissatisfied with their
share of an estate may launch will contests. Contestants may initiate litigation because they realize that, by increasing costs through delays, negative
publicity, and litigation expenses, they may be able to extract a settlement

194. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 437, 437 (1988).
195. Id. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs) are another type of
opportunistic litigation because "while SLAPP suits 'masquerade as ordinary lawsuits'"
SLAPPs "are generally meritless suits brought by large private interests to deter common
citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so."
Wilcox v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Ct. App. 1994). In an attempt to deter
such suits, a majority of states have enacted anti-SLAPP statutes. See Carson Hilary Barylak,
Note, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP Protection, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 845, 847 (2010)
("[T]wenty-seven states and one territory have passed anti-SLAPP statutes.").
196. Rule 11 permits a federal court to sanction any attorney, law firm, or party for
violating a provision that requires "an attorney or unrepresented party [to] certif[y] that to
the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances" that a pleading, written motion, or other paper "is
not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay,
or needlessly increase the cost of litigation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
197. See supra Part II.A.3.
198. Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 Pac. L.J. 37, 66
(1995).
199. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand
Side Perspective, 49 Md. L. Rev. 869, 908 (1990) (noting "Rule 11 standards will be
intentionally underinclusive").
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from the estate. 20 0 Consequently, as John Langbein notes, "the odor of
20 1
the strike suit hangs heavily over this field.
Strategic spillovers are present not only in litigation but also in the
settlement process itself. For example, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) (5), any class member may object to the proposed settlement
of a class action. 20 2 In many cases, however, "professional objectors" file
objections to receive monetary payments in exchange for withdrawing
their objections. 203 In analyzing this possibility of "objector blackmail,"
Brian Fitzpatrick explains that, even if a federal district court approves a
class action settlement, class members who filed objections with the district court can appeal the court's approval. 20 4 An appeal not only delays
the resolution of the settlement, but "it also delays the point at which
class counsel can receive their fee awards, which are contingent upon the
settlement." 20 5 Eager to obtain these fee awards, class counsel "are willing
to pay objectors out of their own pockets to drop the appeals." 20 6 Consequently, as Fitzpatrick describes, class members may file "wholly frivolous
objections and appeals for no other reason than to induce these side payments from class counsel. 20 7
200. John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 Mich. L. Rev.
63, 66 (1978) (stating most litigation over testator's capacity "is directed towards provoking
pretrial settlements, typically for a fraction of what the contestants would be entitled to
receive if they were to defeat the will"); see also Edmond Nathaniel Cahn, Undue
Influence and Captation: A Comparative Study, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 507, 518 (1934) ("The delays
in probate occasioned by groundless contests often result in depreciation, waste or
complete disappearance of valuable assets of the estate. Contestants have nothing to losethe 'nuisance value' of delay and the abhorrence of respectable persons for publicity may
result in a settlement.").
201. Langbein, supra note 200, at 66; see also Jesse Dukeminier, Robert H. Sitkoff &
James Lindgren, Wills, Trusts, and Estates 198-99, 203-07, 519-21 (8th ed. 2009)
(discussing defensive measures, including "no-contest clauses," that testators and their
attorneys use to avoid will contests and incentives for settlements with disinherited
children).
202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5).
203. See generally 4 Alba Conte & Herbert B. Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions
§ 11.55, at 168-69 (4th ed. 2002) (noting that "objecting has become big business" but that
courts must carefully review objectors as some objections are "'obviously "canned"
objections filed by professional objectors who seek out class actions to simply extract a fee
by lodging generic, unhelpful protests'" (quoting Shaw v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91
F. Supp. 2d 942, 973 (E.D. Tex. 2000))); Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors:
Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. Chi. Legal F. 403, 429
("Commentators have characterized the fees paid to class action objecting attorneys as 'an
extortion game' and have described the objector's tactics as identifying a class action
settlement, arguing against it, and 'go[ing] away' in exchange for 'some payment of
attorneys' fees.'").
204. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 1623,
1624 (2009).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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The concern about objector blackmail in class action settlements has
a structure similar to the problem of strategic spillovers. Certain class
members may not have any incentive to object to a settlement. However,
knowing they can impose costs on class counsel, in the form of a delay in
receiving their fee awards, these class members may object opportunisti20 8
cally to extract a payment in exchange for ceasing their objections.
Of course, various types of activities that also might be characterized
as strategic spillovers arise in many other areas of the law as well. 20 9 The
examples of strategic spillovers discussed above are thus not intended to
be a comprehensive list but merely illustrations of a problem that appears
in different forms throughout the law.
III. THE HARm

OF STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS

Before examining a number of potential solutions for mitigating the
harm from strategic spillovers, it is necessary to identify the underlying
problem more precisely. In a 1975 article in the American Economic Review,
208. See Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in
Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1377, 1401 n.45 (2000) (noting
that "non-class counsel [who] file or threaten objections to the class settlement for the
purpose of forcing a side-settlement with class counsel" may be engaging in the socially
detrimental practice of "extracting nuisance-value settlements"); William B. Rubenstein,
The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1435,
1459 (2006) (concluding "track record of professional objectors to date ...has been less
than stellar" and "[t]his part of the profession has arguably attracted lawyers more
interested in coercing a fee than in correcting a wrong").
209. Competition law is another area that seems worthy of exploration. Several early
property law cases, which involve situations similar to the strategic spillovers discussed
above, raise fundamental issues regarding what distinguishes "fair" versus "unfair"
competition and under what circumstances a party may be liable for harming a competitor.
See, e.g., Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (Minn. 1909) ("[W]hen a man starts an
opposition place of business . . .for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of
business ... he is guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort."); Keeble v. Hickeringill,
(1707) 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B.) 1128; 11 East 574 (holding plaintiff has cause of action
against defendant who had fired gun near plaintiff's duck decoy to deprive plaintiff of
profit by frightening away wildfowl, even though defendant may not have been liable if he
had lured wildfowl into his own decoy, because "where a violent or malicious act is done to

a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood[,] there an action lies in all
cases[,] [blut if a man doth him damage by using the same employment .... no action
would lie"). Similarly vexing issues concerning the line between fair and unfair
competition arise today in a number of contexts including intentional or tortious
inference with business relationships or contractual relations, see Harvey S. Perlman,
Interference with Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and
Contract Doctrine, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 61, 61 (1982) (discussing fact that "courts impose
liability under the rubric of the interference tort in a variety of contexts, but they have
failed to develop common or consistent doctrines"), and intellectual property, see, for
example, Monsanto Canada, Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 904 (Can.) (holding
farmer infringed chemical company's patent even though he had never purchased or
deliberately planted genetically modified seeds), as well as antitrust law, see Steven C.
Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 267, 267 (1983)
(discussing how "firm can induce its rivals to exit the industry by raising their costs").
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economists George Daly and J. Fred Giertz discussed the connection between externalities and extortion.2 10 Daly and Giertz argued that, in addition to the obvious distributive effects, using externalities to engage in
"extortion" is socially undesirable because bargaining to resolve such ex211
ternalities entails transaction costs.
However, the misallocation of resources that can occur as a result of
strategic spillovers is not merely, or even primarily, a matter of needless
transaction costs. Strategic spillovers create three additional problems,
each of which is potentially more significant than the costs of bargaining.
First, strategic parties may engage in socially wasteful actions to establish
the credibility of threats to engage in strategic spillovers. Second, strategic parties may undertake socially wasteful actions because, in certain situations, it is infeasible for such parties to bargain with potential victims ex
ante. Third, potential victims, realizing that strategic parties may engage
or threaten to engage in such externality-generating activities, may undertake various types of socially wasteful precautions. After briefly discussing transaction costs, this section analyzes each of these problems in turn.
A. Transaction Costs Incurred While Bargaining
Strategic spillovers have a distributive effect to the extent that an opportunistic party is able to extract a payment from potential victims. For
example, by threatening to construct a livery stable, a strategic landowner
may be able to extract a significant payment from his neighbors.2 1 2 By
continuing to emit excess pollution, an opportunistic firm may be able to
obtain a substantial subsidy from the government.2 1 3 Or, by threatening
to deregulate a regulated industry, a legislator may be able to acquire
additional campaign contributions from industry members. 2 14 As Daly
and Giertz noted, using externalities to extract payments from others can
"result in profound changes in the distribution of income."2 15
Yet Daly and Giertz point out that using externalities to extract payments may have an allocative (or welfare) effect, as well as a distributive
effect.2 1 6 The reason for this welfare effect, they assert, is that, in bargaining to resolve such externalities, parties incur transaction costs. 217 For
example, if a strategic landowner and the landowner's neighbors bargain
over a payment to ensure the landowner will not build a livery stable, the
210. Daly & Giertz, Externalities, supra note 7.
211. Id. at 1001.
212. See supra Part II.A.1.
213. See supra Part I1.B.
214. See supra Part ILE.
215. Daly & Giertz, Externalities, supra note 7, at 1001.
216. Id. at 999 ("While extortion redistributes wealth and is sometimes condemned
on the basis of equity, there also seem to be important allocative reasons for its disfavor as
well ..

").

217. Id. at 999-1000 (describing how allocative reasons for disfavoring extortion
through externalities "relate to the costliness of the bargaining process").
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2 18
costs of bargaining are social costs incurred for no productive purpose.
Similarly, if an opportunistic firm lobbies for a carbon subsidy and the
government grants the subsidy, the costs of lobbying for and administering the subsidy are costs incurred for no productive purpose. Likewise, if
a legislator collects campaign contributions to ensure a bill will be defeated, even though the legislator would have voted against the bill anyway, the costs of soliciting and making the contributions are costs incurred for no productive purpose. Thus, according to the conventional
wisdom, allowing parties to extract payments by engaging in extortion
through externalities may have not only a distributive effect (because of
payments from potential victims to strategic parties) but also a welfare
effect (because of the transaction costs that accompany bargaining for
219
such payments).

B. Investments to Establish the Credibility of Threats
The conclusion that transaction costs are the primary problem with
parties attempting to extract payments using externalities is premised on
a simplifying (yet, ultimately, unwarranted) assumption. The assumption
is that threatening to engage in an activity that entails a negative externality is equivalent to engaging, or preparing to engage, in the activity itself.
Ronald Coase, for example, remarks: "Of course, it would not be necessary actually to plant the crops or increase the herd before agreeing not
to do so. All that need be done would be to threaten to take such ac-220 Likewise, Stewart Sterk notes that it may be unnecessary for
tions .
a landowner to construct a spite fence because the "mere threat of building the fence is likely to induce his neighbor to pay money to be free of
the fence, at least so long as the neighbor knows that no legal (or equitable) remedy is available."2 2 1
However, if a strategic party is merely issuing a threat that the party
intends to undertake an externality-generating activity, potential victims
may be unwilling to pay the strategic party to refrain from engaging in
the activity. For example, it is unlikely that a Chicago resident would have
transferred money to a stranger who, after announcing plans to operate a
218. See id. at 1000 ("With any positive level of bargaining costs, extortion will clearly
lead to a reduction of social welfare since scarce resources are utilized in the process of
negotiation while failing to improve the allocation of resources."); see also Fennell,
Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1424 ("Scholars analyzing phenomena like
blackmail and cybersquatting have correctly homed in on the worthlessness of the
underlying acquisition activity.").
219. See George Daly &J. Fred Giertz, Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency: Reply,
68 Am. Econ. Rev. 736, 736 (1978) ("In a world of zero transactions cost, extortion would
merely redistribute resources; in a world of costly transactions it would result in resources
being used in the bargaining process with no resulting allocative gains . . ").
220. Coase, Blackmail, supra note 66, at 657; see also supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text (highlighting Coase's discussion of strategic farmer and cattle-raiser).
221. Sterk, supra note 95, at 84; see also supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text
(discussing use of "spite fences" to extract payment).
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livery stable in the neighborhood, demanded a payment in exchange for
agreeing not to operate the stable. In the absence of some credible evidence that the stranger intended to operate the stable, the landowner
222
might have dismissed the threat as "cheap talk."
Social costs begin to arise because a strategic party might attempt to
make his or her threat credible by incurring some costs. Incurring costs
provides an informational signal to potential victims because it allows
threateners to distinguish themselves from other parties for whom it
would not be worthwhile to carry out the threat. For example, in commenting on Coase's ranchers, Harold Demsetz points out that "[t]he acquisition of a larger sum by the owner of ranchland generally will require
him to incur some cost to make his threat credible, perhaps by actually
beginning to increase herd size beyond normal levels." 22 3 Similarly, to
convince neighboring landowners that the threat to open a livery stable
was credible, a strategic party might have had to incur some costs such as
ordering equipment for operating the stable or beginning to construct
the stable itself. At the very least, neighboring landowners might want to
know whether the party had purchased the land for the livery stable.
These steps antecedent to engaging in an activity-purchasing land, ordering equipment, and beginning construction-entail investments that,
in the absence of the externality, the strategic party would not have in22 4
curred and that, therefore, are socially wasteful.
Moreover, a strategic party may have to begin undertaking the activity to demonstrate to potential victims that they would in fact suffer harm
or to show the extent to which they would suffer harm. An individual
engaging in the livery stable scam in Chicago may have had to begin operating the stable before neighbors realized the extent of the harm.
(Hearing about the possibility of horse manure has a potentially different
effect than having to smell the manure itself.) Furthermore, in some circumstances, the strategic party may prefer to wait until the activity is in
222. A cheap-talk threat is a threat that is costless to make and, as a result, is often
considered to be not credible. For a relatively accessible introduction to cheap-talk games,
see Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 210-18 (1992). On the concept
of "cheap talk" in economics, see generally Vijay Krishna &John Morgan, Cheap Talk, in 1
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, supra note 24, at 751. A number of articles
suggest that cheap talk can affect bargaining under certain conditions. See generally
Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, 10J. Econ. Persp. 103 (1996);Joseph Farrell
& Robert Gibbons, Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining, 48J. Econ. Theory 221 (1989);
Steven Matthews & Andrew Postlewaite, Pre-Play Communication in Two-Person SealedBid Auctions, 48J. Econ. Theory 245 (1989).
223. Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud. 13,
23-24 (1972) [hereinafter Demsetz, Rule of Liability].
224. A party's incurring such costs for the purpose of increasing the credibility of a
threat to engage in the externality-generating activity is a social loss because otherwise the
party could have put these resources to a productive use. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text; see also Shoup, supra note 7, at 310-11 (noting "a pollution
entrepreneur might actually have to invest resources, and he might have to pollute, solely
to make his threats credible, a clear social loss").
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progress before attempting to extract a payment. Attempting to bargain
with victims after the externality is already occurring might arouse less
suspicion that the spillover is strategic than demanding payments from
225
potential victims before the fact.
Social costs also may arise if a strategic party is concerned about the
credibility of future threats. Suppose a strategic party threatens to engage
in an externality-generating activity, but the party is unsuccessful in extracting a payment because bargaining fails. In this circumstance, the
party normally would have an incentive not to engage in the activity as
the private costs of doing so exceed the private benefits. However, if the
party is concerned about the credibility of future threats, the party may
still undertake, rather than just threaten to undertake, the activity,
2 26
thereby imposing social costs.
Thus, even if contracting between strategic parties and potential victims is possible ex ante, strategic parties may make investments and expend resources to establish the credibility of their threats. Yet these investments and resources are costly. And costly expenditures that are
incurred to game the system are socially wasteful because parties would
not have incurred such costs in the absence of the possibility of extracting
a payment.
C. Decisions Made if Ex Ante BargainingIs Infeasible
Strategic spillovers are also problematic because, even if bargaining
were costless and all threats were credible, 227 it is sometimes infeasible for
parties that are planning to engage in externality-generating activities to
bargain with potential victims of their activities before the fact. In certain
circumstances involving opportunistic behavior, the primary concern is
the possibility that ex post opportunism will cause parties to incur additional costs ex ante. In the contractual holdup literature, for example,
the concern is that parties may attempt to renegotiate a contract as a
result of a change in circumstances. 22 8 Because contracting parties anticipate the possibility of renegotiation, they may initially invest effort to
225. Cf. Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1454 (suggesting "we might
view an interest in selling the entitlement as evidentiary on the question of intent" (citing
Berman, supra note 98)).
226. Cf. Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 96, at 1876 (positing that blackmailer
may intentionally exploit information "in order either to get immediate payment or, failing
that, to invest in credibility for the next time").
227. But cf. supra Part III.A (discussing transaction costs); Part III.B (discussing
credibility of threats).
228. On the problem of contractual holdup and renegotiation of contracts, see
generally Aaron S. Edlin & Benjamin E. Hermalin, Contract Renegotiation and Options in
Agency Problems, 16J.L. Econ. & Org. 395 (2000); Oliver Hart &John Moore, Incomplete
Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 Econometrica 755 (1988); Steven Shavell, Contractual
Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J. Legal Stud. 325 (2007).
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structure their contracts to minimize the likelihood of holdup, or they
229
may forgo the contractual relationship altogether.
But, for certain strategic spillovers, this possibility of negotiating ex
ante is infeasible. As noted above, a firm planning to construct a new
factory, quarry, or other facility that entails harmful spillovers may have
an incentive to build its facility in a suboptimal location that is more likely
to conflict with future development. 23 0 The firm anticipates that, if a conflict does arise, it may be able to bargain with the future developer or
2 31
homeowners and extract a payment, e.g., a higher sales price.
However, the firm that is deciding where to locate its facility may be
unable to bargain with the future developer or homeowners that will incur the harm. 232 At the time of the firm's decision, neither the developer
nor the homeowners are known. These parties may not decide whether to
settle near the facility until years after the firm has chosen a site. Thus,
the firm may build a facility in a socially undesirable location even
though, if ex ante bargaining were feasible, it might have negotiated an
agreement with potential victims. 23 3 A social loss occurs because, even if
bargaining is possible ex post, the firm already has chosen a suboptimal
location for its facility. Thus, strategic spillovers also can result in a misallocation of resources in situations in which there is no opportunity for
bargaining to occur before a party must decide whether (or where) to
undertake an externality-generating activity.
D. Precautions to Avoid Harmful Effects
Strategic spillovers are problematic not only because opportunistic
parties may undertake socially wasteful actions, either to establish the
234
credibility of their threats or because ex ante bargaining is infeasible,
but also because potential victims may undertake socially wasteful precautions. Knowing parties may engage in strategic spillovers, potential victims
may attempt to lower their vulnerability to externality-generating
activities.
In the general context of extortion or blackmail, Steven Shavell describes how "potential victims of threats will want to reduce their vulnerability to threateners" and can do so by "diminish[ing] the scale of the
activities that expose them to risk" or "tak[ing] precautions to lower the
229. See Abraham L. Wickelgren, The Limitations of Buyer-Option Contracts in
Solving the Holdup Problem, 23J.L. Econ. & Org. 127, 127 (2007) ("Several articles have
established conditions under which renegotiation will undermine the ability of any
contract to create efficient incentives for ex ante investment .....
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
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See
See
See
See
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supra
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Part
Part
Part
Part
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likelihood of threats given the scale of [an] activity." 23 5 The precautions
taken by these victims are the same types of precautions that potential
victims may undertake to avoid the effects of strategic spillovers. But the
precautions to avoid strategic spillovers, like the precautions to avoid ex236
tortion and blackmail in general, reduce social welfare.
For example, in anticipating the livery stable scam, a potential purchaser of real estate in Chicago may have decided not to buy a lot adjacent to an empty parcel of land. The purchaser might have feared that a
strategic party could later buy the empty parcel and threaten to operate a
livery stable there. The decision to forgo purchasing a particular parcel
for this reason is socially undesirable. Because of the possibility of strategic behavior, the buyer may have purchased a different parcel that was
less desirable or not purchased a parcel at all. Alternatively, existing owners, such as the affluent residents in San Francisco, might decide to buy a
vacant parcel preemptively to avoid the risk that a strategic party will
purchase the parcel and then threaten to engage in a nuisance-like activity like operating a brewery or bordello. The decision to buy the vacant
parcel is also socially undesirable. The buyer is only choosing to purchase
235. Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmail,
Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1877, 1879-80 (1993) [hereinafter Shavell,
Blackmail]. For other economically oriented analyses of extortion and blackmail in the
legal literature, see Berman, supra note 98, at 797-810 (using economic analysis to support
"evidentiary theory" that blackmail is used primarily to reveal bad actor's motives); Coase,
Blackmail, supra note 66, at 658 (evaluating widespread disapproval of blackmail even
though economically "there are no losers in an exchange"); Richard A. Epstein, Blackmail,
Inc., 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 553, 554-55 (1983) (developing theory supporting criminalization
of blackmail based on "interplay between normative and practical considerations");
Ginsburg & Shechtman, supra note 96, at 1850 (defending current state of blackmail law as
consistent with economic rationality"); Lindgren, supra note 48, at 672 (arguing "key to
the wrongfulness of the blackmail transaction" is implicit involvement of third party);
Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Contract, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1817,
1818 (1993) (asserting "blackmail is, and should be, forbidden because, although
ostensibly a voluntary transaction between consenting adults, it is likely to be, on average,
wealth-reducing rather than wealth-maximizing"); Henry E. Smith, The Harm in
Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 861, 863 (1998) (arguing "the criminalization of blackmail is
aimed at preventing .. .harms stemming from victim self-help").
236. See Shavell, Blackmail, supra note 235, at 1894 (noting "precautions taken by
potential victims avoiding threats reduce social welfare"). The costs of such precautions
can be significant. As Nicole Garnett points out in the context of private investments to
prevent crime:
Americans spend more on these private precautions-estimates range from $160
billion to $300 billion-than on the total U.S. law-enforcement budget. In other
words, private individuals spend more to avoid being victimized than U.S.
governments at all levels (federal, state, and local) spend on police, prosecutors,
judges, and prisons. And these figures do not reflect the total cost of crime
avoidance, such as the opportunity costs of remaining inside behind locked doors
to avoid victimization.
Nicole Stelle Garnett, Ordering the City: Land Use, Policing, and the Restoration of Urban
America 133 (2010) (citing Robert A. Mikos, "Eggshell" Victims, Private Precautions, and
the Societal Benefits of Shifting Crime, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 307, 307 (2006)). To date, there
are no estimates of the costs of precautions to avoid strategic spillovers.
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the extra parcel as a precaution against the possibility of strategic
behavior.
Strategic spillovers also reduce social welfare because individuals are
often risk averse. Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld point out that
"[i]ndividuals would presumably be willing to pay something to insure
against the prospect of a factory moving nearby and imposing substantial
externalities." 23 7 But parties may be willing to insure against the possibility of an externality regardless of whether the harm arises unintentionally
as the incidental byproduct of a conventional externality or purposely as
the result of a strategic spillover. Thus, if potential victims are risk-averse
and if they had some way to insure against the possibility of strategic spillovers, they presumably would avail themselves of the opportunity.
Overall, the precautions undertaken by potential victims, like the investments undertaken by opportunistic parties, are socially undesirable.
Potential victims would not have undertaken these precautions, and opportunistic parties would not have undertaken such investments, but for
the possibility that the opportunistic parties might attempt to extract payments by means of strategic spillovers. 238 As one commentator explains,
"[t]he wealth transfer [from victim to opportunist] is significant not because of its mere existence, but because the transferring act itself does
not produce a beneficial product nor promote the productive goal of the
contract; yet both perpetrating and protecting against such a transfer are
costly."

239

IV.

SOLUTIONS FOR STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS

Given the ubiquity of strategic spillovers, 240 and the social harm that
such spillovers may create, 24 1 here is the challenge: How, if at all, can the
legal system attempt to differentiate conventional externalities and strategic spillovers and thus eliminate, or at least mitigate, the harm arising
from the opportunistic use of externalities? To begin to address this question, this section examines (A) a number of the traditional mechanisms
for resolving externalities; (B) several innovative approaches for targeting
opportunism; and (C) a few of the nonlegal limitations that minimize
strategic spillovers.

237. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 569, 592 (1984).
238. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (discussing why strategic spillovers
are socially undesirable, regardless of whether opportunistic party engages in externalitygenerating activity or merely threatens to do so).
239. TimothyJ. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L.
Rev. 521, 526 (1981).
240. See supra Part II.
241. See supra Part III.
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A. TraditionalMechanisms for Resolving Externalities
This section begins to explore potential strategies for mitigating the
harm of strategic spillovers by first analyzing four of the traditional mechanisms for resolving conventional externalities: (1) Coasean bargaining;
(2) public subsidies; (3) regulatory prohibitions; and (4) liability rules or
corrective taxes.
1. Coasean Bargaining.- Bargaining can be an effective way to resolve externalities, at least if transaction costs are relatively low. 242 Coase
emphasizes "the possibility that externality problems would be cured by
bargaining, and the consequent irrelevance of the law to substantive outcomes, when parties can bargain with little cost. '2 43 However, bargaining
is relatively ineffective for controlling strategic spillovers. 24 4 Relying on
bargaining is problematic, regardless of the magnitude of negotiating
costs (at least in the absence of perfect information), 2 45 because it allows
a strategic party to engage in the very activity, namely, bargaining, that is
246
necessary to extract payments from potential victims.
To see why bargaining is suboptimal, consider again the livery stable
scam. Suppose Owner Z is an opportunistic individual in Chicago who is
considering whether to operate a livery stable to extract payments from
the owners of neighboring parcels. If Z decides to operate a stable, he
would obtain a private benefit of 8 at a private cost of 10. In addition,
operating a livery stable involves an external cost of 5 on the neighbors.
Thus, by operating a livery stable, Z creates a social loss of 7 (i.e., -2 - 5).
It is better, therefore, for Z not to operate a livery stable.
Under the conventional wisdom regarding externalities, Z would not
have an incentive to operate a stable because Z's private benefit, 8, is less
than his private cost, 10.247 The problem is that, when the possibility of
opportunistic behavior is considered, Z may have an incentive to operate
a stable. Although Z's private cost, 10, outweighs his private benefit, 8, Z
may engage in the activity to impose harm, 5, on his neighbors. By doing
so, Z is then able to bargain for a payment-suppose the neighbors agree
to pay 4 to Z-in exchange for Z agreeing to cease his activity. Assuming
bargaining costs are 0, Z may decide to operate the stable-the socially
undesirable outcome-because his private benefit of 12 (i.e., 8 + 4) outweighs his private cost of 10.
242. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1 (emphasizing role of transaction
costs as barrier to efficient allocation of resources).
243. Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 109 (citing Coase, Social Cost, supra note
1).
244. See supra Part I.C.
245. See supra note 56 (discussing debate among economists on necessity of perfect
information for Coase Theorem).
246. See Daly & Giertz, Externalities, supra note 7, at 997 ("Critics have noted that the
reliance on private bargaining to control the creation of externally harmful activities may
well have the adverse effect of encouraging the very phenomena it seeks to control.").
247. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Instead of operating a livery stable, Z could just threaten to do so.
However, without incurring any costs to make the threat credible, such a
threat is merely cheap talk.24 8 The neighbors might not pay unless Z incurred some cost to make his threat credible. Suppose, for example, that
Z could purchase the equipment necessary to make his threat credible at
a cost of 1. Under these circumstances, Z might incur this cost as the
benefit of extracting a payment through a credible threat, 4, is greater
than the cost of making the threat credible, 1. However, the result is,
once again, socially undesirable because Z's investment in this equipment, -1, is a social loss. The social loss occurs because of the misallocation of resources: Z would not have purchased the equipment but for the
possibility of extracting a payment. 249 Thus, relying on bargaining to resolve strategic spillovers may result in an undesirable outcome, regardless
of whether the strategic party engages in the activity or merely threatens
250
to do SO.
Moreover, the fact that a party may seek to bargain with others, either before or after undertaking an externality-generating activity, does
not necessarily mean the party is acting opportunistically. As noted above,
some commentators have suggested that an attempt to negotiate might
itself provide evidence of a strategic or bad faith motivation. 25 1 However,
it may be optimal for parties to engage in bargaining, including bargaining ex ante, to resolve conventional externalities. 252 Thus, bargaining
usually cannot distinguish self-interest from opportunism.
Finally, it is worth noting that, even if a strategic party and potential
victims are capable of resolving a strategic spillover through bargaining, it
may not be feasible to prevent subsequent strategic spillovers. Clifford
Holderness describes how bargaining is "futile" if there is an "open class"
25 3
Simibecause assignment of liability will encourage entry into the class.
larly, with strategic spillovers, a different strategic party may attempt to

248. On cheap talk, see supra note 222 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part III.B.
250. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. Bargaining to prevent the
strategic imposition of harm may be possible in certain circumstances if potential victims
can create a mechanism to distinguish self-interested from opportunistic behavior. For
example, to circumvent strategic holdouts in the context of assembling multiple parcels of
land, a party may utilize "secret buying agents" and assemble the land without disclosing
the identity of the assembler or the nature of the assembly. See generally Daniel B. Kelly,
The "Public Use" Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret
Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Kelly, Public
Use]. In this way, buying agents can provide "an effective mechanism for distinguishing
between those owners who are refusing to sell for opportunistic reasons and those owners
who are refusing to sell because the price is too low." Id. at 24.
251. See supra note 225.
252. See supra Part I.C (illustrating ability of parties to resolve conventional
externalities through bargaining).
253. Holderness, supra note 49, at 185-88.
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extract payments from the same victims or the same strategic party may
2 54
attempt to extract payments from different victims.
2. Public Subsidies. - Public subsidies, which are often invoked as25a5
solution for encouraging activities that involve positive externalities,
are also a tool for discouraging activities that entail negative externalities. 25 6 Specifically, the government may choose to pay a party that is
causing a negative externality an amount "equal to the reduction in ex25 7
pected harm from some benchmark level that the party accomplishes."
However, like bargaining, this type of subsidy is relatively ineffective for
resolving strategic spillovers. Indeed, like bargaining, a subsidy may create a perverse incentive for an opportunistic party to engage in an activity
the party otherwise would not have undertaken.
To see why a subsidy is ineffective, return to the numerical example
involving the livery stable scam described above. 25 8 Suppose the government decided to pay livery stable owners for a reduction in expected
harm. In this case, the government might pay 5 to Owner Z, if Z reduces
the harm on neighbors to 0 from the baseline of 5, either by modifying its
activity to limit the harm or by refraining from the activity itself. Anticipating that the government will subsidize this reduction, Z, who ordinarily would not have an incentive to operate a livery stable (because Z's
private benefit, 8, is less than his private cost, 10), might open a livery
stable and then close the livery stable in exchange for receiving a subsidy
of 5. Here, because the benefit of obtaining the subsidy, 5, exceeds the
cost of creating and eliminating the social harm, -2, Z has the same incentive as the "pollution entrepreneurs" in China who are engaging in excess
254. For an example of a case illustrating this potential for subsequent strategic
spillovers, see Lewis v. Gollner, 14 N.Y.S. 362, 363 (City Ct.), rev'd, 29 N.E. 81 (N.Y. 1891),
in which a property owner "threatened to erect flats" and extracted a payment from
neighbors "who thought their homes would be injured" and then, having "closed his
bargain," purchased a plot on the opposite side of the street, initiated construction of flats,
and "negotiate[d] with the immediate neighbors of the new purchase, asking a large
advance on his purchase price." Id.; cf. Scott Altman, A Patchwork Theory of Blackmail,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1639, 1648 (1993) ("Market-price-only blackmail is hard to detect
because there cannot be any guarantee that a first payment will not be followed by more
demands."); Paul H. Robinson, Michael T. Cahill & Daniel M. Bartels, Competing Theories
of Blackmail: An Empirical Research Critique of Criminal Law Theory, 89 Tex. L. Rev. 291,
299 (2010) (noting blackmail "may involve not just one demand of money for silence but
repeated demands because the blackmailer ... can continue to extract money or other
value from the threatened party").
255. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency
and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 44 (2006)
("Pigouvian subsidies correct for positive externalities by subsidizing the desired behavior
so that the market price reflects the social value of the good, which is defined as its private
value to consumers plus the value of the positive externalities it generates.").
256. See, e.g., Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 94 (discussing use of subsidies to
address harmful externalities).
257. Id.
258. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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production to generate additional HFC-23 in order to cash in on carbon
2 59
credits.
3. Regulatory Prohibitions. - Another potential solution is directly
prohibiting certain activities through regulation. Under regulation, the
government attempts to "constrain[ ] the set of acts that would otherwise
be permissible to commit given one's property rights, so as to optimally
resolve an external effect." 260 Although it is one of the "preeminent
tools" that society uses for controlling conventional externalities, 26 1 regulation might be ineffective for resolving strategic spillovers because it may
be overinclusive.
Suppose that, in addition to Owner Z, there are three other individuals in Chicago, Owners A, B, and C, each of whom is considering establishing a livery stable. Unlike Owner Z, Owners A, B, and C have served as
apprentices at other livery stables and are true equine experts. If A, B,
and C each decide to operate a stable, each owner would obtain a private
benefit of 17 at a private cost of 10, for a profit of 7. Once again, if Z
decided to operate a stable, he would obtain a private benefit of 8 and
have a private cost of 10. In addition, operating a livery stable involves an
external cost of 5 on the stable's neighbors. Thus, by operating a livery
stable, A, B, and C each create a social benefit of 2 (i.e., 7 - 5), and Z
creates a social loss of 7 (i.e., -2 - 5). As Table 2 illustrates, the socially
desirable outcome is for A, B, and C to operate a livery stable and for Z
not to operate a livery stable.

259. See supra Part II.B. Similarly, Howard Chang has argued that, "[u]nder
conditions of asymmetric information, countries may seek to convince others that they
bear large costs from pollution abatement by engaging in a great deal of pollution, so that
other countries will offer larger 'carrots' to induce abatement." Howard F. Chang, Carrots,
Sticks, and International Externalities, 17 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 309, 310 (1997). Chang
concludes that "'carrots' encourage greater environmental harm pending a multilateral
agreement" and that, therefore, "a regime that is less hostile to 'sticks' may be more
efficient in dealing with international externalities." Id.; see also Howard F. Chang, An
Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 83 Geo. L].
2131, 2154-59 (1995) (discussing how subsidies and other carrots may create perverse
incentives for countries to pollute); cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Allocation and Uncertainty:
Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, 36 Ecology L.Q. 809, 846 (2009)
(noting that "program that distributes permits to individual societal actors based on
current activities creates an incentive for those actors to increase their activities in
anticipation of the regulation-and thus to worsen global climate change-in order to
obtain more permits").
260. Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 93.
261. Id. at 101.
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TABLE 2:
THE "LIVERY STABLE SCAM"

Private

External

Social
Welfare

Owner

Benefit

Private Cost

Cost

A

17

10

5

2

B

17

10

5

2

C

17

10

5

2

Z

8

10

5

-7

Under the conventional wisdom, only A, B, and C would choose to
operate a stable because only these three owners obtain a private benefit,
17, that exceeds their private cost, 10. Z would not have an incentive to
operate a stable because Z's private benefit, 8, is less than his private cost,
10. If A, B, and C operate livery stables, social welfare is 6 (i.e., 2 + 2 + 2),
the socially desirable outcome. However, the conventional wisdom ignores the fact that Z may have an incentive to operate or threaten to
operate a stable in order to extract a payment. As discussed above, relying
on bargaining or subsidies to resolve this type of strategic spillover leads
to an undesirable outcome because parties like Z hope to bargain with
potential victims or to obtain a subsidy in exchange for reducing or elimi262
nating the social harm of their activities.
But what if the city enacted a regulation prohibiting livery stables in
all residential areas? Enacting this regulation would result in a higher
level of social welfare than relying exclusively on bargaining or subsidies.
If A, B, C, and Z were each prohibited from operating a livery stable, then
social welfare would be 0 because, with no livery stable operations, there
would not be any costs or any benefits. Here, a prohibition is better than
permitting the activity and then allowing bargaining or providing subsidies to resolve harmful effects because 0, the outcome if livery stables are
prohibited, is greater than -1, the outcome if all four owners operate stables. However, a prohibition is worse than the socially desirable outcome
because 0 is less than 6. The prohibition on livery stables in residential
areas prevents the opportunistic party, Z, from engaging in a strategic
spillover. But the prohibition also prevents the nonopportunistic parties,
A, B, and C, from engaging in activities that, although having harmful
effects, are socially desirable because the social benefits exceed the social
costS.

263

262. See supra Part LV.A.1-2.
263. From the present perspective, not having any livery stables in residential areas
seems like the optimal outcome. However, in the context of this example, the socially
desirable outcome is for A, B, and C (but not Z) to operate livery stables in the residential
neighborhood. The premise of the example is that there is a net social benefit if certain
livery owners operate their stables in a residential area-perhaps because of quick access
for residents to their horses-rather than forcing every livery owner to locate to a
nonresidential area.
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Thus, if policymakers are unable to identify opportunistic behavior,
then regulatory prohibitions may be suboptimal. Unless there is a way to
distinguish strategic spillovers from other externality-generating activities,
such prohibitions might deter socially desirable, as well as socially undesirable, activities. Harold Demsetz, in discussing Coase's example of a
rancher who might purchase additional cattle or a farmer who may cultivate additional land, reaches a similar conclusion: "Because it is difficult
to sort desirable from undesirable increases in herd or crop size, there is
crop size by
a real danger of penalizing desirable increases in herd or
264
mistake if such wealth transfers are treated as extortion."
4. Liability Rules or Corrective Taxes. - Liability rules or corrective
taxes seem to offer a promising solution for addressing strategic spillovers. Ideally, either liability rules or corrective taxes would force each
party that is engaging in an externality-generating activity to internalize
the external costs of its activities. 26 5 If opportunistic parties were forced
to internalize the costs of their externalities, these parties would have no
incentive to engage in strategic spillovers. Rather than being able to extract payments from potential victims, such parties would have to compensate victims (under liability rules) or pay the government (under corrective taxes) for the harm they are imposing or expect to impose.
Moreover, unlike regulatory prohibitions, liability rules or corrective
taxes would not eliminate the externality-generating activities that are socially desirable. On one hand, if an activity's private benefits still exceed
its private costs (including liability costs or tax payments), a nonopportunistic party would continue to engage in the activity. On the other
hand, if the activity's private benefits did not exceed its private costs (including liability costs or tax payments), the nonopportunistic party would
cease the activity. Thus, if forced to internalize their external costs, all
parties, both opportunistic parties and nonopportunistic ones, would
have a private incentive that converges with the socially desirable
outcome.
To see why an approach based on liability rules or corrective taxes
might lead to the optimal result, consider once again the livery stable
264. Demsetz, Rule of Liability, supra note 223, at 25; see also Mohring & Boyd, supra
note 79, at 349 (discussing how "under the bribery approach [for resolving congestion
externalities], it could prove troublesome to separate genuine potential drivers from those
who pretend to be such merely to obtain bribes").
265. On the internalization of externalities, see supra note 47. Of course, liability
rules come in two major forms: strict liability and negligence. See Shavell, Foundations,
supra note 6, at 93-94 (distinguishing strict liability and negligence). For the sake of
simplicity, this Article only discusses a liability rule based on strict liability, in which a party
imposing harm on another is liable for the harm regardless of the party's level of care. It is
worth noting, however, that a rule based on negligence can result in an additional type of
strategic spillover. Specifically, under a negligence rule, an opportunistic party that is
using a reasonable level of care may increase (or threaten to increase) its activity level to
impose additional harm on others in order to extract a payment even though the party
otherwise might not have undertaken the higher activity level.
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example. With liability rules, Owners A, B, C, and Z would each be required to compensate their neighbors for the external harm, 5, if they
operated a livery stable. Under these conditions, A, B, and C would continue to operate their stables, even after being forced to internalize the
external harm, because their private benefits, 17, is greater than their
private costs including liability, 15 (i.e., 10 + 5). Z, instead of being able to
extract a payment of 4 from his neighbors, would be required to pay 5 to
his neighbors to compensate them for the harm. If Z is unable to extract
payments by imposing external harm, Z's private benefit, 8, would be less
than either his private cost, 10, or his private cost including liability, 15
(i.e., 10 + 5). As a result, Z would not have any incentive to operate the
stable. Thus, under the liability rule approach, social welfare is 6, the socially desirable outcome, because A, B, and C would each operate a stable
and Z would not operate a stable. The same result occurs if the owners
are required to pay a corrective tax in the amount equal to expected
harm.

266

The existence of strategic spillovers seems to suggest that, all other
things being equal, society should rely on liability rules or corrective taxes
somewhat more frequently than would be the case if individuals and firms
acted to further their self-interest or maximize their profits but did not
act opportunistically.2 67 However, liability rules or corrective taxes are not
a panacea for solving strategic spillovers, as the example above seems to
suggest, for two major reasons. First, liability rules and corrective taxes
may involve high litigation or administrative costs. 268 Second, liability
rules and corrective taxes also create informational problems for courts
and regulators. 269 Indeed, the reason that society does not rely on liability
or taxes for resolving many types of harm (e.g., congestion externalities
266. With a corrective tax, A, B, C, and Z would each be required to pay the
government for the expected harm to neighbors, 5, if they operated a livery stable. A, B,
and C would continue to operate their stables, even after being forced to internalize these
external costs, because their private benefit, 17, would be greater than their private cost
including the corrective tax, 15 (i.e., 10 + 5). Z, instead of being able to extract a payment
of 4 from his neighbors, would be required to pay 5 to the government. If Z is unable to
extract payments by imposing external costs, Z's private benefit, 8, would be less than
either his private cost, 10, or his private cost including the corrective tax, 15 (i.e., 10 + 5).
As a result, Z would not have any incentive to operate the stable. Thus, as in the case of
liability rules, under a corrective tax, social welfare is 6, the socially desirable outcome,
because A, B, and C would each operate a stable and Z would not operate a stable.
267. It is unclear whether this theoretical conclusion suggests the need for an
increased reliance on liability rules or corrective taxes in practice as there is little empirical
evidence regarding whether or not such mechanisms are currently over- or under-utilized.
See Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 101, 109 (stating that regulation and liability
rules are the "preeminent tools that society employs to control externalities" and that
corrective taxes are "used rarely" but noting that "the comparative analysis of the various
means of controlling externalities is relatively underdeveloped").
268. See id. at 98 ("Administrative costs are the costs borne by the state and the
parties in connection with the use of a legal rule . . ").
269. See id. at 95 ("If the state does not have complete information ....
it cannot
determine with certainty whether or not an action such as polluting should take place.").
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on most roads or certain types of external harm between neighbors) is
the existence of litigation and administrative costs as well as informational problems.
Theoretically, liability rules might entail an "administrative cost advantage" over other mechanisms for resolving externalities because "the
legal system becomes involved only if harm is done." 270 Similarly, corrective taxes might offer an administrative cost advantage because the government might apply such taxes at the time an individual or firm
purchases a product. 27 1 But the nonuse of liability or taxes to combat
conventional externalities in many situations suggests that litigation or
administrative costs are sometimes prohibitively high. Furthermore, in order to separate strategic spillovers from other externalities, the legal system would have to impose liability equal to damages or levy a tax equal to
expected harm on each party engaging in an externality-generating activity, regardless of whether or not the spillover was strategic. Thus, liability
rules or a corrective tax would entail litigation or administrative costs for
imposing liability not only on parties engaging in strategic spillovers, but
also on parties engaging in nonopportunistic externalities.
A second potential disadvantage with relying on liability rules or corrective taxes to deter strategic spillovers involves informational problems.
If a court or regulator lacks perfect information, liability may not equal
damages or a tax may not equal expected harm. As a result, liability or
taxes may result in overdeterrence of conventional externalities associated with socially desirable activities or underdeterrence of either conventional externalities or strategic spillovers. Moreover, as Mitch Polinsky has
pointed out, if liability exceeds damages (or if a tax exceeds expected harm),
parties planning to undertake externality-generating activities that are socially desirable, as well as parties attempting to engage in strategic spillovers, may threaten not to engage in the activity to extract a payment
from those who would be overcompensated. 272 Conversely, if liability is
less than actual damages (or a corrective tax is less than expected harm),
nonopportunistic parties may not bargain strategically, but opportunistic
parties would still have an incentive to engage in strategic spillovers.
Finally, it is worth noting that, although functionally similar in many
respects, liability rules and corrective taxes do entail important differences. In a pair of recent articles, Steven Shavell discusses several of the
key differences between liability and taxation for the optimal resolution
270. Id.
271. See id. ("[A]pplying corrective taxes can be inexpensive if, for instance, it is
done at the time of the purchase of a product (a firm could be made to pay the tax when it
buys fuel that generates pollution).").
272. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 22
(3d. ed. 2003) (discussing this type of strategic behavior in nuisance law example); see also
Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance, supra note 84, at 1093-94 (noting "if liability ever exceeds
actual damages, the parties have an incentive to bargain over (at least some of) the gains
from trade and therefore may engage in strategic behavior").
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of harmful externalities. 2 73 While there has been relatively little analysis
of liability versus taxation, 274 Shavell compares the relative merits of these
tools by examining a number of factors including administrative costs,
litigation costs, and informational problems. 275 A systematic application
of these factors to the various types of strategic spillovers discussed above
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it is important to recognize that
the differences between liability rules and corrective taxes are relevant
not only for the optimal resolution of conventional externalities but also
276
for any future analyses of strategic spillovers.
B. Alternative Approaches for Targeting Opportunism
Because each of the traditional ways of resolving conventional externalities is imperfect for addressing strategic spillovers, this section considers four alternative approaches: (1) financial disclosures; (2) inalienability; (3) equity; and (4) abuse of right.
273. See Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 273,
273 (2011) [hereinafter Shavell, Corrective Taxation] (comparing "corrective taxation to
liability in two versions of a model, with a view toward shedding light on the difference in
their application); Steven Shavell, Corrective Taxation Versus Liability as Solutions to the
Problem of Harmful Externalities, 55J.L. & Econ. (forthcoming Nov. 2011) (manuscript at
3) [hereinafter Shavell, Harmful Externalities], available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w16235 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (attempting "to achieve an understanding
of the relative merits of liability and of taxation").
274. See Shavell, Corrective Taxation, supra note 273, at 273 n.1 (pointing out that
"[a]lmost no attention has been paid to liability as an alternative to corrective taxation").
For two notable exceptions, see A. Mitchell Polinsky, Controlling Externalities and
Protecting Entitlements: Property Right, Liability Rule, and Tax-Subsidy Approaches, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 1, 2 (1979) (comparing property rules, liability rules, and corrective taxes "in a
two-party externality problem in which the parties are able to bargain"); Michelle J. White
& Donald Wittman, A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and Liability Rules Under
Imperfect Information, 12J. Legal Stud. 413, 413 (1983) (presenting "general framework
for analyzing the costs of operating different types of pollution control programs under
the assumption of imperfect information").
275. Specifically, in many circumstances, liability may be superior to taxation because
employing taxes that properly reflect the usually numerous variables that significantly
affect expected harm" may be an "impracticality," the government "need only measure the
harm under strict liability to create desirable incentives," the imposition of liability through
a negligence rule, unlike a reliance on taxes, "generates desirable incentives to control
dimensions of care," and liability may entail "administrative cost advantages ... deriving
from its being applied only when harm occurs." Shavell, Harmful Externalities, supra note
273, at 26. However, in other circumstances, including pollution controls, taxation may be
superior to liability as the "incentives under liability would be significantly diluted by the
inability of victims to attribute harm to injurers and to related problems in bringing suit."
Id. at 27.
276. As discussed above, "property rules" are also not an adequate solution for
deterring strategic spillovers. See supra notes 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing
how a party may use an injunction, or the threat of an injunction, to extract payment and
describing how this type of opportunistic behavior is possible regardless of whether
plaintiff or defendant has the entitlement).
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1. FinancialDisclosures.- As noted above, the difficulty with strategic
spillovers frequently involves a problem of asymmetric information. 27 7 An
opportunistic party knows the private benefits and costs of its own activities, but the potential victims usually do not have access to this information.278 Many of the traditional mechanisms for resolving externalities
rely on forcing a party to internalize the external effects of its activities. 2 79
However, this internalization of externalities might be unnecessary for
deterring strategic spillovers if potential victims had some way of knowing
that, in the absence of the externality, the opportunistic party would have
280
no incentive to engage in the activity.
Therefore, one possibility for addressing strategic spillovers is to require greater disclosure of financial information from parties that are engaging in externality-generating activities. 281 Such disclosure might be
made before the fact to a regulatory agency or other administrative body
as a prerequisite of engaging in an activity. Alternatively, disclosure might
be made after the fact to a court or arbitrator during a litigation or arbitration. Moreover, disclosure might be mandatory (e.g., government audits or motions to compel) or discretionary (e.g., private audits or voluntary compliance).282 Whatever the institutional mechanism, to the extent
the opportunistic party disclosed truthful and accurate information about
the private benefits and costs of an activity, the opportunistic party would
presumably be unable to make a credible threat to extract a payment.
Potential victims, as well as public officials, would most likely be unwilling
to pay if an opportunistic party's private costs exceeded its private
benefits.
Increasing financial disclosures may be one aspect of the solution,
but auditing is unlikely to be a panacea. First, auditing, either ex ante by
277. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (discussing asymmetric information
and opportunistic behavior).
278. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing underlying problem of
asymmetric information and how opportunist might exploit informational advantage).
279. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing internalization of
externalities); see also supra Part IV.A.4 (discussing internalization through liability rules
or corrective taxes).
280. See supra notes 56 and 58 and accompanying text (discussing how perfect
information might thwart strategic spillovers).

281. In general, debates about disclosure are ubiquitous because "[flederal securities
law imposes extensive mandatory disclosure obligations on public corporations .... "
William T. Allen, Reinier Kraakman & Guhan Subramanian, Commentaries and Cases on
the Law of Business Organization 132 (2d ed. 2007); see also Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory
Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047, 1048 (1995)
(contending "principal purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address certain agency
problems").
282. For an examination of mandatory versus discretionary disclosure in the securities
context, see Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The
Significance of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory
Securities Disclosure, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 223, 292 ("Mandatory disclosure
requirements, like antifraud provisions, discourage opportunistic forms of quality
disclosure and thereby increase the average disclosure quality of issuers generally.").
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regulators or ex post through the courts, is time consuming and expensive. 283 Although strategic spillovers could be detected if auditing were
costless and error-free, 28 4 auditing is costly and subject to human limitations. 285 Second, in response to a request for information, a party being
audited or a firm performing the audit may act opportunistically. 28 6 For
2 7
example, the party might strategically disclose too much information,
or an auditor might perform a low-quality review due to the low
probability that the auditor's opportunism will ever be detected.2 8 8 Third,
the right not to disclose the private benefits and costs of an activity is
sometimes socially beneficial. Specifically, individuals and firms are often
unwilling to disclose various types of proprietary information, especially
relating to their business plans, litigation strategies, or trade secrets, and
requiring disclosure of such information may reduce their incentives to
compete or innovate. 289 Fourth, although disclosure may be beneficial if
a firm is subject to securities laws or a litigant is required to provide information during discovery, disclosure may be less practicable in other contexts. For example, in attempting to deter legislative threats, it would be

283. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-Opting the Tax Bar
into Dissuading Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 Va. Tax Rev. 43, 64-65 (2001) ("[C]onducting
audits is expensive and time consuming."); Lisa J. Hamm Winnenauer, To Tell or Not to
Tell: Latent Environmental Effects and the Doctrine of Caveat Emptor in Real Property
Sales, 1 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 83, 86 n.73 (1993) ("[E] nvironmental audits are typically
both time consuming and expensive.").
284. Cf. Mehmet Bac & Parimal Kanti Bag, Graduated Penalty Scheme, 29 Int'l Rev.
L. & Econ. 281, 282 n.5 (2009) ("If auditing were costless and perfect, opportunistic
defaults could be eliminated.").
285. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities
Regulation, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 333, 352 (2006) ("Auditors are humans and subject to the
same cognitive shortcoming, even irrationalities, that affect all humans."); A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Optimal Fines and Auditing when Wealth Is Costly to Observe, 26 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 323, 324 (2006) (explicitly incorporating "cost of an audit" into enforcement
authority's ability to acquire private information).
286. See Cross & Prentice, supra note 285, at 351 ("Outside auditors have shown
themselves to be every bit as opportunistic as other informational intermediaries.").
287. See Joshua D. Blank, Overcoming Overdisclosure: Toward Tax Shelter
Detection, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1629, 1632 (2009) (arguing mandatory disclosure can result in
opportunistic "overdisclos [ure] in an attempt to avoid detection of abusive tax planning").
288. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight
into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 133, 217 (2000) (noting "it is possible
for an audit firm to engage in opportunistic behavior by performing a low-quality audit
that is never discovered" and, "[i]f an audit failure is discovered, financial statement users
will not know whether the audit firm's failure was due to opportunistic behavior, human
frailty, a rogue employee, or bad luck").
289. See, e.g., Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 6, at 609 ("Mandatory disclosure
can also undermine the use of secrecy as a legitimate device for appropriating the benefits
of being the first company to make a valuable discovery or to obtain commercially valuable
information.").
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difficult to compel a legislator to reveal her internal motivation for decid290
ing to propose a new piece of legislation.
Nonetheless, regulators have attempted to require disclosures or engage in auditing to deter certain types of strategic spillovers. For example,
because of the concern regarding opportunism in the market for carbon
offset credits, 29 1 "some carbon sequestration accounting standards require that an economic analysis be performed to determine if an economically rational owner of the project area would have undertaken the
project without the project generating any carbon offsets credits." 292 If
the owner would have undertaken the project even in the absence of the
offset credits, the project does not satisfy the additionality requirement,
and no subsidy is awarded. 293 However, to date, there is no consensus on
the appropriate definition of additionality or how to implement addition29 4
ality in practice.
2. Inalienability.- In a recent article, Lee Fennell proposes inalienability as another mechanism for discouraging certain types of strategic
behavior. 2 95 Fennell explores inalienability not in the usual context of
whether human organs or legal rights should be transferable but instead
290. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 Yale LJ. 1205, 1279 (1970) ("The difficulty of determining motivation must never
be entirely discounted.").
291. See supra Part II.B (discussing Chinese chemical plants' alleged manipulation of
certified emissions reductions).
292. Peter L. Gray & Geraldine E. Edens, Carbon Accounting: A Practical Guide for
Lawyers, Nat. Resources & Env't, Winter 2008, at 41, 44, 49; see also James L. Olmsted, The
Global Warming Crisis: An Analytical Framework to Regional Responses, 23 J. Envtl. L. &
Litig. 125, 163 (2008) ("One way to prevent the expenditure of carbon offset funding for
pre-existing or already funded projects is to require that any carbon offsets demonstrate
'additionality' . . . mean[ing] that any anti-global warming program for which funding
from offsets [is] used would not have taken place but for the offsets program.").
293. See Gray & Edens, supra note 292, at 49 (stating "project does not satisfy the
additionality requirement" if owner would have undertaken it in the absence of carbon
offset credits). On the principle of additionality, see supra notes 137-138 and
accompanying text.
294. See John Copeland Nagle, Discounting China's CDM Dams, 7 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l
L. Rev. 9, 14 (2009) ("The 'additionality requirement' has been the target of particular
skepticism . . . [and] there remains a substantial uncertainty surrounding the true
emissions savings resulting from foreign investment in projects in the developing world.");
Mark C. Trexler, Laura H. Kosloff & Carol Hu., Developing Project-Level Emissions
Reductions at the State Level, 14 Widener LJ. 269, 272 (2004) ("The lack of a concrete
definition of additionality has allowed for development of widely divergent interpretations
of how additionality should be applied." (footnote omitted)); Michael Wara, Measuring
the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1759,
1799 (2008) (discussing problems with existing criteria for additionality and
recommending reforms to existing CDM structure but noting such reforms "do not resolve
the issue of how to separate additional from nonadditional projects in regulated and stateowned industries like the Chinese energy sector").
295. Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38. As noted above, Calabresi and
Melamed discussed inalienability, as well as property and liability rules, in their classic
article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral.Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 85, at 1111-15.
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to analyze the potential of inalienability rules "as tools for achieving efficiency (or other ends) when applied to resources that society generally
296
views as appropriate objects of market transactions."
A number of the examples discussed above are situations that
Fennell explicitly addresses. 297 For example, Fennell mentions the
problems created by cybersquatters, patent trolls, and certain land-use en-

titlements (including variations on the strategic spillovers in nuisance,
coming to the nuisance, and spite fences).298 She also points out, citing
an earlier version of this Article, that "[m]any similar problems of the
'pay me not to' or 'pay me to stop' variety can be readily imagined. '299
Fennell contends that the legal system might be able to address the opportunism present in such situations through the use of inalienability
rules.3 00 She focuses on "inalienability's capacity to alter upstream decisions by would-be resellers about whether to acquire an entitlement in
the first place." 3° 1 For example, if cybersquatters or patent trolls are unable to extract a payment ex post, these parties will not have an incentive
30 2
to acquire a domain name or patent for opportunistic reasons ex ante.
Adjusting alienability is a potentially useful tool for deterring certain
types of strategic spillovers. However, as Fennell acknowledges, inalienability rules have their own limitations.3 0 3 Most importantly, by prohibiting
transfers in which one party may have acted strategically, inalienability
not only blocks strategic spillovers but it also may deter socially desirable
activities because "any restriction on alienability carries the potential to
inefficiently block the flow of goods to higher-valuing users. ' 30 4 Fennell
attempts to mitigate this problem by advocating an increased reliance on
put options and transfer protocols such as Vickrey auctions.3 0 5 A related
296. Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1406.
297. See supra Parts II.A, II.C (discussing strategic spillovers arising in contexts of
property and intellectual property law).
298. Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1413-17, 1454-55.
299. Id. at 1417 (citing Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers (Dec. 13, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
300. See id. at 1405 ("Concern about such strategic acquisition for resale surfaces in a
variety of contexts, from blackmail to cybersquatting to ticket scalping to water speculation.
Yet the connections between these concerns and alienability as an attribute of property
remain largely unexplored.").
301. Id. at 1406.
302. See id. at 1420 ("Foreseeing the inability to sell, those motivated solely by resale
opportunities would simply select out of the market.").
303. See id. at 1451 ("We have good reason to be suspicious of inalienability: it can
lock entitlements into inefficient uses. We should not be surprised, then, to see that the
law usually targets other attributes of property when strategic dilemmas loom.").
304. Id. at 1408; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 204, at 1662 ("Inalienability rules
typically come with one very big downside: unless they can somehow be restricted only to
strategic acquirers, they will prohibit utility-enhancing transactions as well as utilitydiminishing ones.").
305. See Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1457-63 (arguing put
options and transfer protocols such as Vickrey auctions can reduce inefficiencies associated
with inalienability rules).
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limitation of inalienability rules is that it is "very difficult" to tell "one's
reason for wishing to engage" in a given action, 30 6 and an interest in selling an entitlement is not necessarily relevant or dispositive for determining a party's motivation. 30 7 Overall, as Fennell concludes, "[w] hether inalienability rules offer the best chance for increasing surplus or achieving
other goals in a given context is a comparative inquiry that turns on the
feasibility, efficacy, and normative desirability of other courses of action,
30 8
including doing nothing."
Nevertheless, inalienability may prove useful in addressing at least
one type of strategic spillover: objector blackmail.3 0 9 Brian Fitzpatrick,
citing Fennell, notes that "inalienability rules separate those persons who
wish to acquire an entitlement for strategic reasons from those sellers
who genuinely value the entitlement."3 10 Applying inalienability rules to
objector blackmail, Fitzpatrick argues: "If objectors were prohibited from
selling their right to appeal to class counsel, then objectors who wished to
appeal solely to extract rents from class counsel eager to avoid delay, risk,
and litigation costs would not bother filing appeals at all." 31 1 He notes,
"At the same time, no legitimate objector would be discouraged from having their appeals heard in the face of an inalienability rule."3 12 Because
"an inalienability rule can thwart blackmail-minded objectors at the same
time it leaves access to appellate review open for sincere objectors," 3 13
inalienability disentangles opportunism from self-interest and, as
Fitzpatrick concludes, "may be the optimal solution to the problem of
3 14
objector blackmail."
Closely related to inalienability rules is another potential solution
based on the nonenforcement of contracts. By refusing to enforce a contract between a strategic party and potential victims, the court might eliminate the incentive for a party to impose externalities opportunistically.
Knowing a contract is unenforceable, potential victims may not be willing
to pay a strategic party. And, the strategic party, realizing potential victims
may be unwilling to pay, may not attempt to extract a payment. But the
problem, once again, is the difficulty of distinguishing between contracts
306. Id. at 1454.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 251-252.
308. Fennel, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1463.
309. On objector blackmail, see supra notes 203-208 and accompanying text.
310. Fitzpatrick, supra note 204, at 1661 (citing Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra
note 38, at 1424).
311. Id. at 1662.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1664. Fitzpatrick points out that inalienability rules also might be relevant
for deterring negative expected value suits. See id. at 1661 (characterizing proposal
"calling for a prohibition on the ability to settle litigation before summary judgment" in
Randy Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance Value Settlement Problem:
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 Va. L. Rev. 1849 (2004), as "example of an
inalienability rule").
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for resolving conventional externalities and contracts involving strategic
315
spillovers.
3. Equity. - Another approach, relying on equity, is perhaps the oldest of the aforementioned mechanisms for addressing strategic behavior.
In a recent paper, Henry Smith sheds new light on the function of equity
by suggesting that "equity in private law . . . is a coherent package of
features motivated largely by one overriding goal: preventing
opportunism."

316

Smith cites some historical evidence that judges and commentators
viewed equity as a mechanism for addressing opportunism. 3 17 But Smith's
primary objective is to analyze the functional basis for equity and equitable maxims. 31 8 As noted above, Smith defines opportunism as "behavior
that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively captured-defined,
detected, and deterred-by explicit ex ante rulemaking." 31 9 Based on
this definition, courts of equity were necessary, in Smith's view, to supplement common law courts because common law courts could not adequately consider the many circumstances in which a strategic motivation
may have played a role in the actions of a plaintiff or defendant. 320 Equity, including the maxims of equity, provided a "private law solution to
3 21

opportunism."

315. See Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, supra note 38, at 1454-55 (discussing how
inalienability rules could "screen out those building [a spite fence] for strategic reasons"
but noting that "by blocking potential bargains, such rules risk leaving in place inefficiently
ugly but earnestly constructed fences"). Nonenforcement is a standard solution in the
context of blackmail, see, for example, Joseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1905, 1925-32 (1993) (arguing that refusing to enforce certain blackmail
contracts is superior to criminalizing blackmail), but nonenforcement is sometimes
ineffective as a blackmailer often can demand a cash transfer "up front" or, even if there is
an agreement, courts may have difficulty identifying blackmail, see Shavell, Blackmail,
supra note 235, at 1890 (explaining that "it is frequently difficult to obtain evidence that a
blackmailer made a threat").
316. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 3.
317. Id. at 5 ("Justice Story recognized that it is foundational that equity must be
open-textured in light of the ability of parties to opportunistically evade their obligations,
or as he put it, '[f]raud is infinite' given the 'fertility of man's invention."' (quoting 1
Joseph Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, as Administered in England and
America 184 n.1 (9th ed. 1866) (alteration in Smith))).
318. Id. at 4 ("This paper offers a functional rather than a historical account of
equity.").
319. Id. at 9.
320. See id. at 10, 38 (describing opportunism as major problem because of common
law's reliance on modular structures for governing behavior of most people in most cases
and arguing that "decision making that is a hybrid between law and equity is likely to be
superior to law or equity alone"); cf. Rose, Crystals and Mud, supra note 182, at 604 n.139
(noting "post-hoc mud rules" might be more efficient "where the costs of getting
information in advance are high, or where one party effectively blocks information to
another").
321. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 17.
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For example, Smith highlights the maxim that "[e]quity will not allow a wrongdoer to profit from his own wrong." 3 2 2 He describes this
maxim as "almost a statement of the anti-opportunism principle. '32 3 Likewise, Smith points out that equity "uses disproportionate hardship as one
of its main proxies for opportunism. '' 3 2 4 He also notes that, because injunctions can themselves facilitate opportunism, a possibility explored
above in the context of a strategic coming to the nuisance and patent
3 26
trolls, 325 injunctions are a discretionary remedy.
However, relying on equity to address strategic spillovers has certain
limitations. First, despite the possibility that equity courts may have enjoyed a comparative advantage over common law courts in detecting opportunism, it is still difficult for equity courts (then) or any court (now)
to distinguish between conventional externalities and strategic spillovers. 32 7 Second, as Edwards v. Allouez illustrates, 328 and as Smith acknowledges, 3 29 a party may use the threat of injunctive relief itself in attempting to extract a payment.33 0 Third, while equity may perform a
significant function detecting opportunism in disputes involving a small
number of participants in a relatively circumscribed area, it is less clear
whether equity is capable of providing a comprehensive solution for complex global issues like the opportunistic use of carbon offsets and the
principle of additionality in international environmental law. Still,
Smith's exploration of equity suggests that the legal system's struggle with
the appropriate way to prevent opportunism is a perennial problem.
4. Abuse of Right. - Unlike the United States, many civil law countries attempt to address explicitly the type of opportunism inherent in
strategic spillovers. 331 To do so, these countries employ a legal doctrine
322. Id. at 28.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 33; see also id. (noting that "a (perhaps somewhat broader) notion of
disproportionate hardship lies at the heart of the civil law doctrine of abuse of right, which
despite the lack of equity courts in such systems, resembles my reconstruction of equity as
an anti-opportunism device"). On "abuse of right," see infra Part IV.B.4 (describing abuse
of right, a doctrine frequently utilized in civil law, but not common law, countries, as a
potential deterrent to strategic spillovers).
325. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (discussing strategic coming to
the nuisance); supra notes 153-155 (discussing patent trolls).
326. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 36-37 (discussing eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), and problem of patent trolls).
327. See id. at 29 ("Notice that the standard for the maxim to apply to avoid the
straightforward application of the [law] is absurdity or (manifest) unreasonableness.
Equity is not supposed to be used for borderline policy calls . . ").
328. 38 Mich. 46 (1878); see also supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing case).
329. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
330. See Yorio, supra note 81, at 85 (noting "peculiar facts of Edwards dramatize how
equitable remedies may be used to extort overcompensatory settlements").
331. I thank Holger Spamann for bringing this point to my attention.
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known as "abuse of right. '332 Under the abuse of right doctrine, a court
may prohibit an individual from engaging in what would otherwise be a
valid exercise of a legal right if the person is exercising the right for an
illegitimate reason. For example, the German Civil Code states: "The exercise of a right which can only have the purpose of causing injury to
another is unlawful." 333 The concept exists in many civil lawjurisdictions,
including France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Quebec, Spain,
33 4
and Switzerland.
As noted above, Henry Smith observed that equity serves an antiopportunism function in deterring "behavior that is undesirable but that
'335
cannot be cost-effectively captured ...by explicit ex ante rulemaking.
The idea of abuse of right remains "an enduring element of the civil
law" 336 at least in part for the same reason: "While the rules [the legislator] promulgates are becoming increasingly precise and detailed, he cannot foresee every eventuality." 337 As a result, "the proscription of abuse of
rights makes it possible to establish the connection between the justice
338
ostensibly guaranteed by positive law and genuine justice."
While prevalent in the civil law tradition, the "principle of abuse of
rights is not so readily apparent in common law systems." 3 39 However,
Joseph Perillo has argued "such a doctrine exists in American law and is
employed under such labels as nuisance, duress, good faith, economic
waste, public policy, misuse of copyright and patent rights, lack of business purpose in tax law, extortion, and others."3 40 But Perillo contends
332. See generally Michael Byers, Abuse of Rights: An Old Principle, a New Age, 47
McGill L.J. 389 (2002) (examining doctrine's origin and explaining its significance in
various international issues including transboundary pollution); John H. Crabb, The
French Concept of Abuse of Rights, 6 Inter-Am. L. Rev. 1 (1964) (discussing doctrine's
civil law roots and contemporary use in France); Antonio Gambaro, Abuse of Rights in
Civil Law Tradition, in Aequitas and Equity: Equity in Civil Law and Mixed Jurisdictions
632 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 1997).
333. Bfrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code], Aug. 18, 1896, The German Civil
Code: Translated and Annotated 59, § 226.
334. See Byers, supra note 332, at 392-95 (discussing civil law systems). For an
analytical investigation into the meaning of "abuse of rights," see Frederick Schauer, Can
Rights Be Abused?, 31 Phil. Q. 225 (1981).
335. Smith, Law Versus Equity, supra note 38, at 9.
336. Byers, supra note 332, at 395.
337. J. Voyame, B. Cottier & B. Rocha, Abuse of Rights in Comparative Law, in Abuse
of Rights and Equivalent Concepts: The Principle and Its Present Day Application 23, 48
(Council of Eur. 1990) 1989.
338. Id.
339. Byers, supra note 332, at 395.
340. Perillo, supra note 198, at 40; see also Anna di Robilant, Abuse of Rights: The
Continental Drug and the Common Law, 61 Hastings L.J. 687, 695 (2010) (suggesting that
"in vast and highly transversal areas of the law, such as water law, nuisance, tortious
interference with contractual relations or economic expectancies, and labor law,
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American courts weighed defendants' motives and
conduct through malice tests and reasonable user rules that closely parallel abuse of
rights").
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that "the lack of an overt recognition of a doctrine of 'abuse of rights'
' 41
creates injustices in cases not falling within one of these doctrines.
More recently, Larissa Katz also has explored the idea of "abuse of right"
in the common law tradition. 342 Based on her findings, Katz claims that
there is a principle analogous to "abuse of right" in the common law and
that this principle prohibits owners from using property in ways "that
even they do not deem to be valuable (but merely deem to be useful as
ways to harm another or to gain leverage for some further negotiation). '' 343 Katz cites the cases involving "spite fences" as one example
among many in which a property owner may "attempt to use the privileges and rights of owner as a pretext, where the real purpose is to cause
harm. 3 44
One substantial problem with utilizing the "abuse of right" doctrine
to deter strategic spillovers in any legal system, including common law
systems like the U.S., is the difficulty of applying the concept in concrete
cases. Although abuse of right may provide courts with a legal justification for examining a party's motivation, the doctrine, by itself, does not
provide a functional test for distinguishing self-interested from opportunistic behavior. 345 Nonetheless, this comparative perspective suggests the
feasibility, and perhaps desirability, of beginning to address strategic spil3 46
lovers more systematically.
341. Perillo, supra note 198, at 40; cf. di Robilant, supra note 340, at 710-11
(discussing why "'malice' and 'reasonableness' rules never congealed into a unitary
category of 'abuse of rights'").
342. Larissa Katz, A Jurisdictional Principle of Abuse of Right (Feb. 8, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
343. Id. at 1-2.
344. Id. at 22 & n.41.
345. Cf. William W. Park, Fiscal Jurisdiction and Accrual Basis Taxation: Lifting the
Corporate Veil to Tax Foreign Company Profits, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 1609, 1656-57 (1978)
(noting that, because of "subjectivity involved" in determining abuse of rights, "doctrine
would be difficult to apply to extraterritorial fiscal jurisdiction"); see also Irina Petrova,
Note, "Stepping on the Shoulders of a Drowning Man" The Doctrine of Abuse of Right as a
Tool for Reducing Damages for Lost Profits: Troubling Lessons from the Patuha and
Himpurna Arbitrations, 35 Geo. J. Int'l L. 455, 463 (2004) ("Although there is a lot of
commentary dealing with the abuse of right doctrine, precisely what acts constitute an
abuse of right has proven very difficult to define.").
346. Because opportunism is difficult to detect, alternative approaches like disclosure,
inalienability, equity, and abuse of right, as well as traditional mechanisms like liability
rules or corrective taxes, may be insufficient for deterring strategic spillovers. If the
probability of detecting strategic spillovers is relatively small, supracompensatory remedies
such as punitive damages or criminal sanctions may be necessary. See Walter Kamiat,
Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible Failures
of Individual Contracting, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1953, 1970 n.27 (1996) ("[H]ard-to-detect
opportunism must be subject to quite severe sanctions if it is to be effectively deterred."
(citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability of Norms and the
Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1913, 1924-25 (1996))); A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 887-96
(1998) (arguing where injurers can sometimes escape liability, damages should be
increased on those found liable to achieve optimal deterrence); Shavell, Foundations,
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C. Nonlegal Limitationsfor Minimizing Strategic Spillovers
There are several reasons why, irrespective of the applicable legal
rule or even in the absence of any legal rule, an individual or firm may
decide not to engage in a strategic spillover. As an initial matter, engaging
in a strategic spillover involves opportunity costs, i.e., the foregone benefits of not engaging in other activities. The potential benefits of pursuing
other activities are often sufficiently high to dissuade a party from engaging in, or even contemplating, a strategic spillover.3 4 7 Other nonlegal limitations include transaction costs, reputation effects, and social norms.
First, transaction costs might deter parties from attempting to profit
from activities they otherwise would not have undertaken. As noted
above, the concern about "pollution entrepreneurs" was, until recently,
primarily a matter of theoretical interest.348 The transaction costs of collecting payments from a large number of victims, some of whom may
have been unaware of the harm being imposed, was most likely
prohibitive.
Second, parties may refrain from strategic spillovers if they are concerned that engaging in such actions could be detrimental to their reputations. 349 For example, a landowner may decide not to attempt to extract
payments by building a spite structure if she knows she is in a repeat
350
game with her neighbor.
supra note 6, at 540-47 (discussing why criminal law may be necessary to deter acts in
which "individual intends to do significant harm" or "actor has attempted to conceal...
responsibility").
347. Opportunity costs also help to explain why, in a particular industry, the
competitors of an opportunistic party may decide not to adopt a similar strategy of
engaging in a strategic spillover.
348. See supra notes 120-121 and accompanying text (suggesting transaction costs
historically have prevented firms from purposely producing unnecessary pollution to
extract payments).
349. See Muris, supra note 239, at 527 ("[Ihf good reputation has importance to the
potential opportunist, the risk of a bad reputation may deter some acts of opportunism.");
cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 Harv.
L. Rev. 1437, 1478 (2010) (questioning "Justice Traynor's view that firms employ their
reputations opportunistically to sell risky products"); David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart,
Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 242, 250
(2007) (noting "potential long-term reputation cost of opportunistic behavior in
transactions with centrally positioned clients").
350. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The
Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1659
(1996) ("The problem of opportunistic behavior is solvable in many repeated games when
players commit to an enduring relationship-provided that they can observe each others'
moves and they do not discount the future too heavily."); see also Pedro Dal B6 &
Guillaume R. Fr~chette, The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games:
Experimental Evidence, 101 Am. Econ. Rev. 411, 411 (2011) (presenting "experimental
evidence on the evolution of cooperation in infinitely repeated games"). For the seminal
analysis of repeat play in resolving strategic games, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of
Cooperation (1984).
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Third, basic social norms of reciprocity and decency often discourage this type of opportunistic behavior. 35 1 Social norms are relatively effective at preventing opportunism among family, friends, and neighbors.3 52 However, the effectiveness of social norms is less clear with
regard to strangers, parties in arms-length transactions, and participants
353
in a large and diffuse marketplace.
Unfortunately, as one can infer from the various strategic spillovers
discussed above, 35 4 these nonlegal limitations are sometimes insufficient
to deter opportunistic behavior.3 55 It is also possible that, with the arrival
of technological advances such as the Internet, these nonlegal limitations
35 6
may be weakening, at least to a degree.
Take the bizarre case of Toby the Bunny, in which an individual,
whose alias was 'James McEahly," attempted to extort money on the
Internet by threatening to kill Toby unless payments were made to his
bank account. 357 Essentially, McEahly was attempting to extract payments
by imposing harm on others who might suffer mental anguish and emotional distress from seeing his bunny killed.3 5 8 Presumably, in the absence of such payments, McEahly would not have had any reason to tar351. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 74 (2000) (discussing "additional
nonlegal sanctions ... that help deter opportunistic behavior"); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 973 (2001) (discussing how social
norms "curb opportunistic behavior in everyday life"); see also Fennell, Adjusting
Alienability, supra note 38, at 1454 n.231 (observing that "[s]ocial norms, rather than legal
prohibitions" may deter bargaining between neighbors because "offering cash to one's
neighbor to stop [engaging in certain activities] couples a direct insult with the
interjection of money into a setting where it is likely to seem inappropriate").
352. See Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights
Around the Hearth, 116 Yale L.J. 226, 250 (2006) ("[I]n most societies ambient social
norms support loyalty to kin. An opportunistic act at the expense of kinfolk thus is
particularly likely to provoke neighbors to inflict diffuse third-party sanctions, such as
negative gossip.").
353. But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Social Norms from Close-Knit Groups to LooseKnit Groups, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 359, 361-65 (2003) (noting "cooperation-promoting
norms" can exist even in "non-close-knit settings").
354. See supra Part II (exploring examples of strategic spillovers in property,
environmental law, intellectual property, corporate law, legislation and regulation, and
litigation and settlement).
355. See Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment:
The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England,
in Empirical Studies in Institutional Change 134, 136-39 (Lee J. Alston, Thrainn
Eggertsson & Douglas C. North eds., 1996) (discussing "insufficiency of repeat play and
reputation to prevent reneging").
356. See April Mara Major, Norm Origin and Development in Cyberspace: Models of
Cybernorm Evolution, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 105 n.187 (2000) (explaining that "the
Internet is not a close knit society, but instead a digital society as heterogeneous as society
itself").
357. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Comment, Saving Toby: Extortion, Blackmail,
and the Right to Destroy, 24 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 251 (2006) (detailing Toby the Bunny
case).

358. See id. at 252 ("McEahly has committed to killing Toby only because he hopes
that someone else will pay him not to.").
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get the hapless bunny. The strategic spillover was likely possible only
because the Internet had lowered transaction costs-the costs of transmitting the threat, finding an audience willing to pay, and collecting payments. Moreover, by allowing such threats to be made anonymously, the
Internet may have diminished the effectiveness of reputation costs and
3 59
social norms in deterring this type of strategic spillover.
The Internet also may enable strategic parties to extract payments
from businesses and others with an interest in maintaining their reputations. For example, in Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, Monex filed a complaint against three defendants for publishing MonexFraud.com, a website "rife with defamatory statements" that the defendants allegedly had
posted "to extort money from Monex." 360 Monex claimed the defendants
had threatened that "they would continue to libel Monex on their website, would share information with government regulators, and would interfere with Monex's relationships with investors and banks" unless
Monex agreed to pay $20 million. 361 Similarly, a veterinarian recently
filed a class action against Yelp, a website that millions of people use each
month for reviews of local businesses. 36 2 The veterinarian became suspicious of Yelp when his practice received two negative reviews that were
identical (except for the sender's name) and, between the first and second review, Yelp allegedly offered to give the veterinarian more control
over his site if he paid $300 per month.3 63 The veterinarian is alleging
that Yelp "extorts business owners by promising to hide or bury negative
reviews if they agree to purchase a monthly advertising subscription from
364
the company.'
To be sure, Toby, Monex, and Yelp are just three examples of the
types of strategic spillovers that are increasingly possible due to the
Internet. However, to the extent transaction costs are decreasing, reputation is less important, and social norms are losing their efficacy, it is possible we may observe an even higher number of strategic spillovers in the
future. Correspondingly, the costs of ignoring such spillovers will likely
increase.
359. SeeJulie Seaman, Hate Speech and Identity Politics: A Situationalist Proposal, 36
Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 113 (2008) ("Countless laboratory and field studies . . . have
demonstrated that a feeling of anonymity can often increase-even cause-aggressive,
disturbing, and antisocial behavior, including speech.").
360. First Amended Complaint for Defamation, Civil Extortion, Cyberpiracy, Unfair
Competition, Racketeering, Interference with Contract, Trade Libel, Interference with
Prospective Economic Advantage, and Trade Secret Misappropriation at 2, Monex Deposit
Co. v. Gilliam, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (Case No. SACV 09-287JVS (RNBx)).
361. Id.; see also Monex Deposit Co. v. Gilliam, Case No. SACV 09-287 JVS (RNBx),
2010 WL 2349095, at "1-'9 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2010) (summarizing ultimate findings of fact
and conclusions of law).
362. See Ki Mae Heussner, Yelp Faces Extortion Claim, Class Action Suit, ABC News
(Feb. 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/TheLaw/yelp-faces-extortion-claimclass-action-suit/story?id=9944826 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
363. Id.
364. Id.

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1716
V.

[Vol. 111:1641

VARIATIONS OF STRATEGIC SPILLOVERS

A. Positive Versus Negative Externalities
Strategic spillovers may arise in situations involving positive, as well as
negative, externalities. 365 In fact, opportunistically withholding external
benefits may be just as prevalent as, and perhaps more prevalent than,
opportunistically imposing external costs.
The classic problem with positive externalities, like the classic problem with negative externalities, is well known: Parties sometimes generate
benefits as an unintended byproduct of their use of property.3 66 However, if
they are unable to internalize these benefits, parties may forgo certain
activities that are socially desirable. For example, the owner of a business
may not have a financial incentive to install benches on the sidewalk in
front of her shop because a portion of the benefits are enjoyed by other
business owners. The primary reason these benefits, so-called "positive
externalities," can be socially problematic is straightforward: A party may
not have an incentive to engage in an activity because the activity's private
costs exceed its private benefits even though, as a result of the externality,
367
the activity is desirable as its social benefits exceed its social costs.
Yet activities that entail positive externalities can be problematic for
another reason as well: Namely, individuals and firms may purposely seek
to withhold benefits that would be generated in their use of property in
order to extract payments from potential beneficiaries who would benefit
from their undertaking an activity. In certain situations, a party may refrain from or discontinue a socially desirable externality-generating activity (or threaten to do so) even though the activity's private benefits exceed its private costs. That is, even though, in the absence of the
externality, the party would have a sufficient incentive to engage in the
activity, the party may not do so. By refraining from or discontinuing the
activity (or threatening to do so), the party anticipates the possibility of
obtaining a payment, either from the government in the form of a subsidy or from other private parties in the form of a side payment, in exchange for commencing or continuing the activity.
There are many examples in which it is difficult to determine
whether a party attempting to obtain a subsidy has a sufficient incentive
to engage in the activity. Economic historians, for example, have long
disagreed about whether federal loans and land grants to railroad companies were necessary to enable the construction of railroads to the Pacific
Ocean. 368 Historian Heywood Fleisig concludes that "subsidies to the
365. On positive and negative externalities, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing nature of externalities).
367. See, e.g., Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 80 (noting, in discussing optimal
resolution of external effects, "it will be socially desirable for individuals . . . to engage
more often in acts that engender beneficial external benefits than is in their self-interest").
368. Compare Robert W. Fogel, The Union Pacific Railroad (1969) (arguing grants
were necessary), and Lloyd J. Mercer, Rates of Return for Land-Grant Railroads: The
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Central Pacific were 'excessive' at the margin, where 'excessive' describes
subsidization that influenced neither the decision to invest in the railroad
nor the speed of its construction." 369 He asserts that "the rate of return
excluding land grants was sufficient to have induced construction at a
maximum rate of speed, implying that the entire land grant was an excessive subsidy-what a reasonable man might reasonably term a 'giveaway.' "370 If subsidies to the Central Pacific were in fact unnecessary,
then the costs of lobbying for such subsidies, as well as the administrative
costs of providing such subsidies, were a social waste.
Likewise, certain situations in which a developer, corporation, or
other private party attempts to assemble multiple parcels of land may involve positive externalities.3 7 1 To facilitate such assemblies, the government may need to provide a subsidy to the assembler or attempt to assemble the land using eminent domain.3 7 2 However, it is often less expensive
for an assembler to convince a local government to exercise eminent domain on its behalf than to purchase the parcels in the real estate market. 373 Thus, an assembler might claim the private benefit is insufficient
to induce assembly, even though the assembler does have a sufficient incentive to purchase the parcels. Indeed, as I have pointed out elsewhere,
"if a party's private incentive would already be substantial enough (i.e., if
the private value of assembly is greater than the value to existing owners),
then the use of eminent domain would be unnecessary even if a signifi374
cant externality exists."
Moreover, even in nonassembly situations, businesses and other
property owners whose activities arguably entail positive externalities for
the community may threaten to relocate if local officials are not forthcoming with substantial subsidies. Such threats to relocate are often credible, at least for " [c] ompanies that provide towns or cities with substantial
Central Pacific System, 30J. Econ. Hist. 602, 626 (1970) (contending grants were rational),
with Heywood Fleisig, The Central Pacific Railroad and the Railroad Land Grant
Controversy, 35 J. Econ. Hist. 552, 553 (1975) (arguing grants were excessive).
369. Fleisig, supra note 368, at 552-53.
370. Id. at 553.
371. See Kelly, Public Use, supra note 250, at 42 (discussing situations in which
.private benefit may not be large enough to induce a private party to assemble property
even though a positive externality makes the project socially desirable").
372. See id. at 42-45 (discussing positive spillovers associated with land assembly and
noting that, if such spillovers are substantial, "government could provide a public subsidy
to supplement the private incentive to assemble the property" or invoke eminent domain).
373. See Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justifications,
Limitations, and Alternatives, in Research Handbook on the Economics of Property Law
344, 355 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) (explaining "private parties often
will have an incentive to capture the eminent domain process for their own advantage");
cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 61, 88 n.91 (1986)
(noting "[c]ondemnation followed by retransfer is especially likely to engender rent
seeking if . . . the price charged by the government on retransfer is less than the
compensation awarded under the opportunity cost formula").
374. Kelly, Public Use, supra note 250, at 43.
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tax revenue and that are capable of moving to other locations." 375 For
example, JPMorgan Chase hoped to move from midtown to downtown
Manhattan in order to build a new office building on the site of the
World Trade Center. 376 Unsatisfied with a benefits package from the city
involving "a combination of tax breaks, cash payments and subsidized
electricity benefits worth more than $100 million," the company
threatened "to move thousands of employees from Midtown to Stamford,
Conn., if New York officials [did] not give it a larger subsidy package to
build a 50-story skyscraper near ground zero. '37 7 As the New York Times
reported:
Officials view the bank's threat to relocate outside Manhattan as
the latest move in what has become a routine game of corporate
poker in which companies try to extract special benefits. But
Chase has gotten in touch with at least one large property owner
in downtown Stamford, although it remains unclear whether the
378
bank is serious or bluffing.
379
Eventually, JPMorgan Chase and city officials did reach an agreement,
but Chase subsequently "abandoned its plan to build a new headquarters
380
for its investment banking division near ground zero."
Notably, threatening to relocate to extract a payment is an idea that
is not entirely unfamiliar to law professors and other academics. Academics may accept a "visit" at another law school or university to obtain a
competing offer and then negotiate for a higher salary at their home
38 1
institution.
375. Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local Governments,
and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173, 180 (2009).
376. See Charles V. Bagli, Chase Says It Will Move to Stamford if City Balks, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 25, 2007, at B2 (describing "tentative deal with the Port Authority in late
March to pay about $300 million for the development rights at the site of the soon-to-bedemolished Deutsche Bank building").

377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Charles V. Bagli, Chase Bank Set to Build Tower by Ground Zero: Officials
Describe Deal with Large Incentives, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2007, at B1 ("After months of
sharp bargaining and threats to relocate, JPMorgan Chase is expected to announce today
that it has struck a deal to build a skyscraper near ground zero and move its investment
banking headquarters from Midtown . . ").
380. Charles V. Bagli, As Finance Offices Empty, Developers Rethink Ground Zero,
N.Y. Times, April 15, 2009, at A19.
381. See, e.g., Rick Bales, Comment to Merit Pay and Performance, MoneyLaw: The
Art of Winning an Unfair Academic Game (June 27, 2007, 2:36 PM), http://money-law.
blogspot.com/2007/06/merit-pay-and-performance.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) ("While annual merit increases may be small, my sense is that most deans have the
capacity to match lateral offers from elsewhere. This, unfortunately, forces productive
faculty to shop themselves on the market if they want a significant raise .... "); cf. Clayton
P. Gillette, Law School Faculty as Free Agents, 17J. Contemp. Legal Issues 213, 219 (2008)
(noting "free agency should increase income even for those [law professors] who do not
move" because "deans have incentives to anticipate and attempt to foreclose financially
motivated moves by offering market rate salaries to mobile professors").
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Many of the strategic spillovers discussed above could be characterized as either strategically imposing a harm or strategically withholding a
benefit. For example, a developer might threaten to engage in an activity,
e.g., building on certain parcels of land, with negative externalities, to
extract a payment from a municipality that is interested in preserving
open space. 38 2 Alternatively, the developer might refrain from an activity,
e.g., not building on certain parcels of land, with positive externalities to
extract a payment or subsidy.38 3 If "harm-imposing" and "benefit-withholding" actions are indistinguishable, strategic negative spillovers-opportunistically imposing harms on others-and strategic positive spillovers-opportunistically withholding benefits from others-may be
3 84
functionally equivalent.
B. Relevant Versus Irrelevant Externalities
Strategic spillovers also suggest that certain seemingly "irrelevant externalities" may be relevant. In IrrelevantExternality Angst, David Haddock
points out that previous work among economists, including James
Buchanan and William Stubblebine, has examined how external effects
can be irrelevant to efficient resource allocation. 38 5 Haddock agrees that
"[e]xternalities, positive and negative, are everywhere but are usually economically meaningless" and that, "[t]hough chronic, such externalities ...need no regulation.138 6 Indeed, the literature on property rights
and the internalization of externalities "distinguishes between those 'relevant' externalities that ought to be taken into account in policy analysis
38 7
and 'irrelevant' externalities that ought to be discounted.
The existence of strategic spillovers does not necessarily undercut
the thesis of Buchanan and Stubblebine and of Haddock that certain externalities are irrelevant. However, it does suggest that, even if a party
does not have a sufficient incentive to undertake an activity that entails
harmful effects, the effects of such an activity are not necessarily irrelevant. The party can threaten to impose such harm on others unless a
382. See supra Part II.A.4 (describing strategy by which developers threaten to build
to impose costs on municipalities).
383. See supra Part II.A.4 (discussing strategy by which developers received tax
subsidies for conservation easements).
384. Cf. Shavell, Foundations, supra note 6, at 79 ("Whether we tend to call an
externality harmful or beneficial depends on what we are likely to assume.., about the
standard of reference."). Another variation worth considering is a hybrid case in which a
strategic party purposely engages in an activity that imposes external harm on another
party to extract a payment from that party but the activity also generates external benefits
for other parties.
385. See generally David D. Haddock, Irrelevant Externality Angst, 19 J. Interdisc.
Econ. 3, 4-5 (2007) (discussing "neglected idea of Buchanan and Stubblebine" that
certain "external impacts on large populations are irrelevant impacts" (citing Buchanan &
Stubblebine, supra note 29, at 371-72)).
386. David D. Haddock, When Are Environmental Amenities Policy-Relevant?, 44 Nat.
Resources J. 383, 387 (2004).
387. David W. Barnes, Trademark Externalities, 10 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1, 19 (2007).
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payment is made. 3 88 Thus, a negative externality may have a positive

value, rather than being of zero value, to the party generating the externality. Conversely, even if a party does have a sufficient incentive to undertake an activity that entails beneficial effects, the effects of such an
activity are not necessarily irrelevant. The party can threaten to withhold
such benefits unless a payment is made. 389 Thus, a positive externality
also may have a positive value, rather than being of zero value, to the
party generating the externality. In short, although it is important to recognize that certain conventional externalities may be irrelevant, it is also
important to recognize that certain spillovers are strategic and that these
externalities may in fact be relevant.
CONCLUSION

The problem of strategic spillovers involves situations in which parties purposely seek to generate harm in their use of property to extract
payments from victims in exchange for desisting. As discussed above, this
problem is more pervasive than is ordinarily thought. From historical
events like the "livery stable scam" in Chicago to contemporary controversies involving "pollution entrepreneurs" in China, parties may engage or
threaten to engage in activities that impose harm on others in order to
profit through subsequent bargaining. The Article has highlighted a
number of situations in which strategic spillovers arise in property law,
environmental law, intellectual property law, corporate law, legislation
and regulation, and litigation and settlement, although this list is by no
means exhaustive.
In certain circumstances, strategic parties may threaten to engage in
externality-generating activities and then bargain with potential victims
ex ante. In other situations, bargaining ex ante is infeasible and parties
undertake such activities because they know there is some potential for
bargaining ex post. In either case, strategic parties may have an incentive
to undertake socially wasteful activities, and, anticipating such activities,
potential victims may engage in wasteful precautions. In addition, parties
may engage in strategic positive spillovers-opportunistically withholding
social benefits-as well as strategic negative spillovers-opportunistically
imposing social costs.
The legal system can possibly reduce, but almost certainly cannot
eliminate, this type of opportunistic behavior. Transaction costs, reputation effects, and social norms may decrease the likelihood of strategic
spillovers, even in the absence of any legal intervention. When strategic
spillovers do occur, however, the legal system usually fails to address
them. Moreover, given certain technological changes (like the Internet)
and institutional developments (like the Clean Development
388. See supra Part I.A.
389. See supra Part V.A.
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Mechanism) that reduce the transaction costs of extracting payments,
strategic spillovers may pose an even greater problem going forward.
Attempting to address strategic spillovers through the traditional
mechanisms for resolving externalities can result in suboptimal outcomes. Bargaining and subsidies encourage the very activities-negotiating for payments and lobbying for subsidies-that opportunistic parties
hope to undertake. Regulation may prevent certain strategic spillovers
but it also might eliminate externality-generating activities that are socially desirable. In certain situations, liability rules or corrective taxes may
be able to deter strategic spillovers while still permitting socially desirable
activities, at least if litigation or administrative costs are relatively low and
courts and agencies can overcome informational problems to set liability
equal to damages or a tax equal to expected harm. In other situations,
alternative approaches such as disclosure, inalienability, equity, and abuse
of right may be useful to avoid both insufficiently deterring strategic behavior and excessively deterring nonopportunistic behavior.
Overall, this Article suggests policymakers, courts, and academics
should be more cognizant of strategic spillovers and, when feasible, begin
to address this type of opportunism through externalities. In any event,
future analyses of social costs should not assume that the harm arising as
a byproduct of an activity is necessarily unintended.

